Three Lessons the United Kingdom Can Teach the United States About Domestic Counterterrorism

Steve Hewitt
I. INTRODUCTION

The appointment of Quintan Wiktorowicz, formerly an academic at Rhodes College, as senior director for global engagement at the National Security Council offers the perfect opportunity to open a piece designed to reflect on what lessons the United Kingdom might be able to offer the United States when it comes to counterterrorism. The reason is simple: Professor Wiktorowicz conducted considerable fieldwork in the United Kingdom where he interviewed hundreds of Islamists. The conclusions he drew based on this research and his experience in the United Kingdom will apparently be put into practice in his new job in Washington, D.C.¹

The appeal of the United Kingdom to those seeking lessons about counterterrorism seems obvious. In addition to dealing with al Qaeda-inspired and organized terrorism, including the 7 July 2005 attacks that left fifty-two people dead across the London transportation network, since the nineteenth century the United Kingdom has experienced terrorism related to Ireland, first over
independence for Ireland and then, once that was achieved, because of continuing British control of Northern Ireland. The relevance of Ireland-related terrorism to the issues of today, however, only goes so far as Peter Clarke, a former top UK counterterrorism police officer noted in a 2007 speech:

Colleagues from around the world often say to me that the long experience that we have in the United Kingdom of combating a terrorist threat must have stood us in good stead; that the experience gained during some 30 years of an Irish terrorist campaign would have equipped us for the new challenges presented by Al-Qaeda and its associated groups. To an extent that is true—but only to an extent. The fact is that the Irish campaign actually operated within a set of parameters that helped shaped our response to it.

It was essentially a domestic campaign using conventional weaponry, carried out by terrorists in tightly-knit networks who were desperate to avoid capture and certainly had no wish to die. The use of warnings restricted the scale of the carnage, dreadful though it was. The warnings were cynical and often misleading, but by restricting casualties, were a factor in enabling the political process to move forward, however haltingly.

I believe that if you take the reverse of many of these characteristics, you are not far away from describing the threat we face today.  

There is certainly some validity to Clarke’s contention, although the purpose of this piece is not to get into a comparison of old versus new terrorism. The point to be remembered is that while the terrorism threats differ, the counterterrorism methods to be employed in response do not deviate as widely.

Even more significant to examining the lessons from the United Kingdom is the nature of the threats since the attacks of 11 September 2001. The fear at the time was that this was to be one of a series of high profile spectaculars. Thus, 9/11 became the initial model for the future of post-9/11 terrorism. However, in many


3. For more on the alleged differences, see Peter R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism (2009).
respects, 9/11 was a unique, never-to-be-repeated occurrence. The element of surprise has been lost. The vulnerability of American airline security and the U.S. immigration system to terrorists, while not completely removed, has been greatly reduced. And greater resources have flowed into counterterrorism, rendering the possibility of a 9/11-style attack far less likely because such an enterprise needs coordination and involvement of a substantial number of individuals, many from abroad. That means the spectacular is far less likely than the small-scale, homegrown terrorist atrocity of the type that occurred in London in July 2005. This is low-intensity doable terrorism requiring only a small number of persons, or even a single individual, making such undertakings difficult to detect and prevent. Equally, however, the loss of life, while horrible, is on a scale far below 9/11.

In such a terrorism climate, responding to small-scale, homegrown plots takes on greater significance, hence the relevance of the UK example to U.S. counterterrorism. The parallel threats are already evident. The example of Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, mirrors the June 2007 failed attacks in London, when a similar car bomb to that of Shahzad’s did not detonate outside of a London nightclub. The 7/7 attacks also have their parallel in the plot under the leadership of Najibullah Zazi, an Afghani-American citizen, to carry out coordinated suicide bomb attacks on the New York City subway. There is not just anecdotal evidence of a growing threat in the United States from homegrown, al Qaeda-inspired, supported, and, organized attacks involving individuals, small groups, or cells—there is quantifiable evidence as well. Arrests in twenty-two separate al Qaeda-inspired homegrown plots were made in the United States between May 2009 and November 2010. This compares to arrests in twenty-one separate Islamist-inspired homegrown plots between 11 September 2001 and May 2009.


6. JEROME P. BJELLOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT Summary (2010),
With this background in mind, the following are three general lessons to be learned from the post-9/11 counterterrorism experience in the United Kingdom.

II. LESSON ONE: ADDITIONAL LAWS CAN BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

A traditional response to serious acts of terrorism in the United Kingdom, both before and after 9/11, has been to enact new laws. In some cases, the laws were designed to address perceived gaps available to be exploited by terrorists. For instance, after 9/11, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government passed legislation, as did other countries, to target the financing of terrorism. Similarly, after the 7/7 suicide bombings, the Blair government made it a criminal offence to attend terrorism-training camps. But the Blair government also repeatedly overstepped the legal and law enforcement bounds. A number of laws were passed, including one criminalizing the glorification of terrorism and another making the possession of terrorism materials illegal. Both potentially infringed on free-speech rights and, in one case, a graduate student was arrested and held for six days before being released without charge after he downloaded an al Qaeda training manual off of the U.S. State Department’s website.


For a longer account of this history, see LAURA K. DONOHUE, COUNTER-TERRORIST LAW AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1922–2000 (2007).


was a required counterterrorism tool. This argument was undermined by the 2004 Madrid train bombings carried out in a country with identity cards and by the London bombings in which identity cards would not have made a difference. The counterterrorism justification for identity cards was eventually dropped and the whole exercise was scaled back before being cancelled by the coalition government that came to power in 2010. Similarly, after 7/7, the Blair government proposed extending the period that terrorism suspects could be held after arrest but before being charged with an offence from fourteen days to ninety days. The government’s argument that the complexity of international-terrorism cases meant more time was needed to collect evidence was not accepted by UK parliamentarians, who allowed only an increase to twenty-eight days. In 2008, the government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown raised the issue again with a proposal to increase the period of detention without charge to forty-two days. This proposal too was blocked with even a past director of Britain’s domestic intelligence agency, the Security Service (MI5), speaking out against it.

When it came to the exercise of state powers, the problem was the collective message that these measures sent to those most vulnerable. Statistically, citizens of ethnic and religious minority communities in the United Kingdom have been disproportionately targeted under terrorism stop-and-search measures. The repeated efforts to push for longer periods of detention before facing a charge similarly sent a negative message to these same communities, especially when fifty-five percent of all of those arrested under terrorism legislation between 9/11 and 31 March 2010 were released without charge. The UK government should
already have known the dangers in such an approach. Internment without trial was introduced in Northern Ireland in the 1970s with disastrous results from a counterterrorism perspective. It served as a recruiting tool for the Irish Republican Army. The dangers of an overreaction in the current climate are great, as terrorism expert Brian Jenkins notes: "[O]ne danger of this response is that revelations of abuse or of heavy-handed tactics could easily discredit intelligence operations, provoke public anger, and erode the most effective barrier of all to radicalization: the cooperation of the community."  

III. LESSON TWO: FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS

Another important message from the United Kingdom for the United States is that the terrorism problem is "glocal" in nature. In an interview with a senior counterterrorism officer in 2010, I referred to the 7 July 2005 terrorists as "homegrown." He immediately took issue with this label, arguing that it downplayed the interconnection between the foreign and domestic, and the means through modern technology that citizens of one country can live virtual lives in other countries. Thus, something occurring thousands of miles away and not directly connected to the local environment, such as in the case of the United Kingdom, India's occupation of Muslim Kashmir, can motivate terrorism.

The same point applies even more forcefully when what is occurring thousands of miles away is being carried out by your country. Long after the bombs exploded on 7 July 2005, the Blair
government, including the Prime Minister himself, publicly denied any linkage between UK foreign policy, specifically related to Muslim countries, and al Qaeda-inspired terrorism at home.\textsuperscript{19} Behind the scenes it was a different story. In 2004, two important UK government departments, the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, commissioned a joint report entitled, *Young Muslims and Extremism*.\textsuperscript{20} The report, which was leaked to the British media after the 7/7 attacks, left no doubt about the strong relationship between what the United Kingdom did abroad and discontent at home:

- It seems that a particularly strong cause of disillusionment amongst Muslims including young Muslims is a perceived “double standard” in the foreign policy of western governments (and often those of Muslim governments), in particular Britain and the US. This is particularly significant in terms of the concept of the “Ummah,” i.e. that Believers are one “nation.” This seems to have gained a significant prominence in how some Muslims view HMG’s policies towards Muslim countries.

- Perceived Western bias in Israel’s favour over the Israel/Palestinian conflict is a key long term grievance of the international Muslim community which probably influences British Muslims.

- This perception seems to have become more acute post 9/11. The perception is that passive “oppression,” as demonstrated in British foreign policy, eg non-action on Kashmir and Chechnya, has given way to “active oppression”—the war on terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan are all seen by a section of British Muslims as having been acts against Islam.

- This disillusionment may contribute to a sense of helplessness with regard to the situation of Muslims in the world, with a lack of any tangible “pressure valves,” in order to vent frustrations, anger or dissent.\textsuperscript{21}

The British government had already received a warning of the


\textsuperscript{21} Id.
Three Lessons

Linkage just prior to the invasion of Iraq. The Joint Intelligence Committee, which brings together the United Kingdom's three main intelligence agencies, warned the government that invading Iraq would increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the United Kingdom. \(^1\) Even senior UK politicians would later accept the connection between British foreign policy and domestic terrorism. \(^2\)

In that sense, a self-delusion gripped the United States in the immediate aftermath of 7/7 as media coverage contrasted the situation of Muslim communities in the United Kingdom with those in the United States, with the latter being more middle class and being better integrated. \(^3\) However, as cases such as Shahzad and Zazi demonstrate, American exceptionalism provides no special immunity from global forces. People have multiple identities and loyalties (a factor again heightened by technology), greater economic integration through globalization, and mass immigration. One example of the impact of these forces is that since the end of the Cold War, a growing factor in cases of espionage against the United States has been individuals with dual citizenship. \(^4\) Having a strong national identity and an ideology built around notions of exceptionalism offers no special immunity to international currents. The involvement of Somali Americans in terrorism in Africa and allegedly in plots in the United States already demonstrates this. \(^5\) Nor is any of this unique to the present. In the 1930s, thousands of young men from across

---


Western nations, including from the United Kingdom and the United States, left their homes and their families and, against the wishes of their governments, travelled to a foreign country to take up arms and fight and, in some cases, die. The cause that motivated them was the Spanish Civil War and a belief in working-class solidarity with their Spanish brethren in the face of fascist aggression. And centuries earlier, of course, Crusaders from across Europe travelled to the Middle East to try to free Christian sites from Muslim occupation.

In a real sense then, none of this is new. Nor is it being suggested that foreign policies should necessarily be changed because of the interconnection of the foreign and the domestic. However, both the British and American governments have realized that greater consideration must be given to the impact of foreign policies, perceptions of foreign policies, and the selling of foreign policies to skeptical audiences, both at home and abroad.

IV. LESSON THREE: COOPERATION IS BETTER THAN CONDEMNATION

In the lead up to his replacing Tony Blair, Gordon Brown repeatedly emphasized in interviews the need to win hearts and minds as part of efforts against terrorism. His terminology when applied domestically was, however, problematic in two ways: it is a counter insurgency phrase and it assumes a lack of loyalty or even outright hostility on the part of communities within the United Kingdom. Such an approach runs the risk of creating a suspect community similar to the way that the Irish community was stigmatized during The Troubles.

Equally misguided is blaming terrorism on Islam, as the British example demonstrates. Considerable evidence exists, including in the work of Quintan Wiktorowicz, Marc Sageman, and in a detailed study by MI5, that strong Islamic beliefs can serve as a barrier to involvement in terrorism. In other words, terrorists may have a

28. See id.
skewed view of Islam or even no religious beliefs at all—not necessarily an orthodox faith. Equally problematic is associating terrorism with a lack of integration on the part of the same Islamic communities. A 2006 detailed study of the background of seventy-five Muslims charged in the United Kingdom with terrorism offences found that they were less likely to come from predominantly Muslim areas as opposed to more ethnically mixed areas. This certainly reflects the example of the 7/7 bombers who, by all accounts, were relatively well integrated. Indeed, one of the bombers, Jermaine Lindsay, was a convert to Islam as was Nicky Reilly, a failed bomber in Exeter in 2008.

This means any path to the future must be one of partnership between the police, intelligence agencies, and Muslim communities in which notions of the latter as suspect communities are dropped. At times, this may mean engaging with groups and individuals who hold beliefs outside of the mainstream, creating the risk of media and political controversy. It also means downplaying hard policing methods, such as the aggressive recruitment of informers, which have already damaged police-Muslim relations in both the United Kingdom and the United States. In turn, an embracing of a holistic approach to counterterrorism in which wider community issues, such as racism and hate crimes are addressed, will foster a sense of cooperation. Already, efforts are being made by police forces in the United Kingdom to work on partnerships. The London Metropolitan Police established a Muslim Contact Unit in 2002 in an attempt to reach out to traditionally marginalized

groups. Fostering such relationships can lead to greater efforts on the part of targeted communities themselves to supply information to the authorities but also to police themselves. However, such relationships remain fragile and controversial.

V. CONCLUSION

Having written about three important lessons for American counterterrorism from the UK experience, it is still not clear that these same lessons have been learned in the United Kingdom, at least on the part of politicians. In early February 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech at a security conference in which he suggested that UK terrorism had been caused by a lack of integration, which, in turn, had been fostered by multiculturalism. He also downplayed British foreign policy as a root cause of terrorism and said his government would no longer have any involvement with Islamic groups that it considers to be extremist, even if the extremism is nonviolent. A similar path is being embraced in other European countries, usually by parties on the right, and sometimes on the extreme right of the political spectrum. Congressman Peter King appears ready to claim the American franchise for this type of politics as he chaired, to the condemnation of many, hearings into the radicalization of American Muslims.

Such efforts, while undoubtedly appealing to many in the public and in the media and potentially even rewarding at the ballot box, are fundamentally counterproductive in terms of counterterrorism. They risk alienating Muslim citizens whose

assistance is needed to track terrorism recruitment in their communities. Even worse, such an approach, which in some places borders on demonization of Muslims and has fuelled Islamophobia, directly reinforces al Qaeda’s meta narrative in which Islam is under siege by the West and Muslims themselves have no place in Western countries. A politicized approach to counterterrorism, which flies in the face of the lessons learned since 9/11, ultimately serves no one except al Qaeda.

37. For more on Islamophobia, see Chris Allen, Islamophobia (2010).
38. See Dickey, supra note 35.