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Stories of Civil Rights Progress and the Persistence of Inequality and Unequal Opportunity 1970-2010

Michael A. Wolff

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Justice Michael A. Wolff†

I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 858
II. THE “WAR ON POVERTY” ........................................................ 859
III. LITIGATE, LEGISLATE, OR BOTH? .......................................... 861
IV. LIMITS OF “LAW REFORM” ...................................................... 862
V. THE DISCOVERY OF STATE COURTS ....................................... 864
VI. INTENTIONAL INEQUALITY? ................................................... 866
VII. DUE PROCESS AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ............................. 867
VIII. MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIME ................................................. 869
IX. OVERRIDING ECONOMIC TRENDS ........................................ 872
X. CIVIC CULTURE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY ............. 878
XI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 880

† Justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri; distinguished visiting professor at Saint Louis University School of Law; A.B., Dartmouth College; J.D., University of Minnesota. This lecture was the keynote address for a conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the legal aid programs in St. Paul for low-income persons. The conference, SMRLS (Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services) Racial Justice, Legal Aid Staff, & Alumnae/i Roles and Opportunities—Then and Now, was held in June 2010 at William Mitchell College of Law. Justice Wolff was a staff attorney at the predecessor to SMRLS—Legal Assistance of Ramsey County (LARC)—from 1971 to 1972. The author dedicates the lecture to the memory of Dolores “Dee” Orey, a wonderful colleague and mentor with whom he shared an office at LARC, and Alberta “Bert” Dowling, office manager/secretary at LARC, whose constant admonition to “stand up straight” has stayed with him since. Dee later served as a District Judge in Hennepin County and Bert went on to serve many years as office manager of the clinical programs at William Mitchell. The author thanks law clerks Laura Keck, Rachel Shenker, and Susan Musser and 2L student Michele Parrish for their research and editorial assistance; Beth Riggert, communications counsel for the Supreme Court of Missouri, for editing assistance; with special thanks to Bruce Beneke, longtime SMRLS director and conference organizer, for his suggestions and encouragement.

857
I. INTRODUCTION

I open with a story from the heyday of the Fourteenth Amendment—the mid-1970s. The state of Minnesota had appealed a 1975 judgment ordering the state to upgrade conditions in a state-run institution for “mentally retarded” persons, including the installation of new carpeting. As a recovering legal services lawyer who had recently migrated to academia, I went to watch the oral arguments in St. Louis. The U.S. Court of Appeals panel included Judge J. Smith Henley, an Arkansas judge whose deep-woods accent is hard for us Yankees to imitate. The Minnesota assistant attorney general began by observing that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to require states to install carpeting. “Young man,” Judge Henley interrupted in a slow deep drawl, “I have been to y’all’s state capitol up there in St. Paul, Minnesota, and I have seen the paintin’ of the Minnesota regiment enterin’ the city of Little Rock. I just want to remind you, suh, that that Fourteenth Amendment was not our idea.”

The Fourteenth Amendment has been a remarkable source of law for the advancement of human rights. Regardless of whose idea the Fourteenth Amendment might have been, the State of Minnesota lost its argument over carpeting. I do not know whether the State is still required to keep the carpeting in repair, but it will be useful, I hope, to go back forty or fifty years and see where we have come from and where we are today.

The central question is the extent to which the legal victories for equality in our era—whether in the courts or the legislatures—survive or are overwhelmed by economic and political forces.

My starting point in this inquiry is a remarkable speech in 1965, several months following the passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. The speaker said:

1. Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
2. Id. The case was about a lot more than carpeting—such as conditions of confinement, staffing, and the right to decent treatment. Id. at 1126. Judge Henley wrote the opinion upholding the district court decision of Judge Earl R. Larson. Id. at 1124. Luther Granquist of the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis represented the plaintiffs. Id. at 1123.
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: “Now you are free to go where you want, do as you desire, and choose the leaders you please.” You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “You are free to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been completely fair . . .

This is the next and more profound stage of the battle for civil rights. We seek not just freedom of opportunity—not just legal equity but human ability—not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as fact and as a result. 4

The speaker was President Lyndon B. Johnson delivering the commencement address at Howard University in 1965.5 The speech is a historical marker; it was probably the high point of the struggle for equity and equality in my lifetime. And, to a certain extent—especially in economics—you might say it has been mostly downhill from there.

II. The “War on Poverty”

The battle for economic justice, which President Johnson called the “War on Poverty,” founndered as he became obsessed with—and bogged down by—the Vietnam War. The moral denunciation of the war by Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders split President Johnson from the civil rights movement. 6 There were legislative victories, such as the Voting Rights Act of 19657 and the laws against housing discrimination and age discrimination in 1968. 8 But the fervor to change the economic conditions that produced poverty has had few lasting

5. JAMES T. PATTERSON, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND AMERICA’S STRUGGLE OVER BLACK FAMILY LIFE FROM LBJ TO OBAMA ix (2010).
remnants—the legal services program is one, of course. If there was a victory in Vietnam, it was the defeat of the “War on Poverty.”

When the “War on Poverty” was fully engaged, the courts were a hope for progress in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Following the landmark school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 and the political equality cases such as Reynolds v. Sims, which struck down malapportioned legislatures, there were those in the 1960s and 1970s who believed that courts were where the action was when it came to advancing social justice.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 reinvigorated legal services programs and brought them to a scale previously thought unimaginable. Legal Assistance of Ramsey County (LARC) received enormous increases in funding, staffing, and mission from its days as a bar association-funded program for the poor. In that same era, there came from these landmark court decisions a belief that courts should be a primary focus of what was called “law reform.”

On a more subtle and understandable level, judicial decisions were beginning to be understood better in their proper context, that is, as sparks to legislated changes. In a democracy, after all, the only way that change can endure is by coming through the legislative process. Well, “only” is perhaps a little too strong. As we have seen in recent years, there has been a serious limit to what courts in their confined adjudicative roles can or should do to advance causes that encompass a concept of “social justice.”

14. Id. at 12.
15. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 110–13 (1996) (stating that judicial intervention in education has not “resulted in meaningful reform” and noting that a majority of attorneys involved in desegregation litigation have “expressed general dissatisfaction with the results of [the] litigation”).
III. LITIGATE, LEGISLATE, OR BOTH?

The point was brought home to me rather forcefully, and personally, a couple of years after I left the LARC program in St. Paul, when I inherited a case at Black Hills Legal Services in Rapid City, South Dakota, where I was director for a few years in the early 1970s. The client was a girl who wanted to play Little League baseball, and her complaint was pending before the South Dakota Human Rights Commission. I was intrigued but not overwhelmed by the case, unsure as I was of its value in enhancing the economic interests of the poor. However, it was important to the client, so I pursued it and won before the Human Rights Commission. The Little League organization sought review in the circuit court, and I won again. Expecting to be marched to the Supreme Court of South Dakota, I waited. What I found, in short order, was that the South Dakota legislature amended the human rights statute to exclude voluntary youth athletic programs.16 I do not remember the client’s name; I think it was Megan—so call it Megan’s law, if you will.17 This, of course, was before anyone thought of naming a statute after a person.

The larger point is that cases inevitably have a political context. We ignore this at our peril. When I was in South Dakota, I did some successful lobbying on a mental health bill, a rape shield law, and a landlord-tenant bill.18 I had a pretty good year in 1974, before they figured out who I was and what I was up to. When I mentioned these efforts at meetings of legal services directors in the mid-1970s, the common reaction was: “What could you be thinking? How can you get your hands dirty in the political process?” Well, actually, a successful legislative effort goes a long

17. In a possibly related development, Governor Richard Kneip appointed me to the South Dakota Commission on the Status of Women in 1975. Officials of the Department of Social Services asked the governor to withdraw the appointment because I frequently had sued the state on behalf of legal services clients. The controversy became moot when I left the state a couple of months later to begin teaching in St. Louis. I assume the status of women in South Dakota has proceeded in my absence.
18. See, e.g., Michael A. Wolff, A Balancing Act: Strengthening South Dakota’s Landlord-Tenant Law, 22 S.D. L. REV. 15 (1977). The article includes my attempt to use informal legislative history, in a state that has no formal legislative history, to advance what I believed was a proper interpretation of the law. Id. at 16–19. It was a youthful indiscretion: today I believe such use of “legislative history” to be less than legitimate.
way to making the kind of permanent change on behalf of legal services clients that we and the clients think is desirable. In fact, such changes can be so effective that, for most of its existence, the Legal Services Corporation law has forbidden legal services lawyers from doing legislative advocacy. 19

IV. LIMITS OF “LAW REFORM”

Brown v. Board of Education and the ensuing fifty years of litigation and legislation teach us something about the limits of adjudicated law reform in a democratic society. Brown, of course, did spur major societal changes in an era in which the legislative branches of the federal and state governments were unable or unwilling to correct the apartheid in public education. 20 The Brown decision also illustrated the evolving role of courts in (1) correcting “wrong” decisions and (2) changing legal standards to suit changing needs—a role in line with the common law understanding that the law progresses as society’s views change. That role was quite evident, for example, in the recognition of the rights of gays to marry that was identified in court decisions in Massachusetts, 21 Iowa, 22 Connecticut, 23 and earlier in Vermont, 24 as well as legislative changes in the latter state. 25

The Brown decision produced in the South, particularly in border states such as Missouri, an extraordinary resistance to desegregation. Brown’s progeny got federal courts involved in the management of schools, specifically in the assignment of pupils, the busing of students, and the development of “magnet” schools

to affect racial desegregation. Judge Gerald Heaney of Duluth, who died recently, was probably better known in St. Louis than in St. Paul. He wrote twenty-seven opinions in St. Louis desegregation cases as a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals. Would this happen with today’s Eighth Circuit?

The political resistance to school desegregation decisions was sufficiently strong that, throughout the period of the 1970s and 1980s, there were serious proposals in Congress to change the jurisdictional statute for the federal courts to exclude school desegregation cases. Were it not for a few principled senators—some liberal, some conservative—that measure would have passed.

An equally large and looming problem in public education was the disparity of resources that was coming to the attention of the courts, both federal and state. The movement in the federal

26. See, e.g., Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1226–27 (1971) (discussing whether a given desegregation plan trespasses limits on school bus transportation and holding this issue cannot be determined from a recital of a one hour average travel time, but three hours would be offensive when school facilities are available at a lesser distance); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971) (stating that a student assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears to be neutral); Jenkins v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding a voluntary school desegregation plan in which all students participating in the plan would transfer to newly constructed magnet or collaborative schools as a single minority outpost in an overwhelmingly nonminority school district is constitutionally suspect on its face).


28. See generally Jeffrey Brandon Morris, Establishing Justice in Middle America: A History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 342 (2007) (noting the “more conservative course” of the Eighth Circuit in recent years).


31. See generally John E. Coons et al., Private Wealth and Public Education
courts was cut off quickly by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Court held that there was no fundamental right to education and
that the equal protection claims of the school children in San
Antonio would not be recognized, despite the great disparities in
spending between and among school districts in Texas.

Before _Rodriguez_, the LARC program had a go at economic
equality in federal court. The case, _Van Dusartz v. Hatfield_,
survived the state’s motion to dismiss with an opinion that
delineated some fine constitutional principles for the case if it were
to go forward. At that point, we LARC lawyers decided that we did
not have the money or the wits to litigate something that
complicated, and so declared victory after the legislature
significantly increased state funding for local school districts.

The strategy was modeled on the advice of the late Senator George
Aiken of Vermont, whose strategy for ending the endless war in
Vietnam in 1966 was simply to declare victory and go home.

Contemporary Justices in _Parents Involved_ reinterpreted _Brown_
to mean that the Constitution is entirely color-blind, and that all
racial classifications violate the Equal Protection Clause. These
recent decisions may tell us more about the current state of judicial
activism than they do about equal protection.

V. The Discovery of State Courts

The _Rodriguez_ decision pushed advocates into the state courts.
The move violated a principle I call Haydock’s Avowal. When I
practiced with Roger Haydock at LARC in 1971, he told me about
going to state court to keep utility customers’ power from being
shut off without due process and how the judge said: “That’s a big


35. _Id._

20, 1966, at 1.

39. _Id._ at 779; Joel K. Goldstein, _Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice

anticlassificationist view of _Brown_ as put forth by Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito in _Parents Involved_).
corporation, isn’t it? I can’t enjoin them.” At that point, Roger wrote a note to himself that said “I shall never go to state court again.” The opposite advice came some years later in a lecture by Justice William Brennan, who suggested that the Supreme Court of the United States was becoming a rather poor place for the adjudication of constitutional claims; the good Justice advised us all to go to state courts.\(^40\) And so, Haydock’s Avowal was overruled by Brennan’s Admonition.\(^41\)

The resulting move to state courts led to the discovery of state constitutions.\(^42\) In addition to state constitutional provisions about equal protection and equality, state constitutions also had requirements that the state provide a system of free public education for all children of a certain age. This became a fertile subject for litigation strategies, and there were, in fact, quite a few states in which state funding of public education was declared unconstitutional because of the gross disparities between “rich” districts and “poor” districts.\(^43\) It was in this 1970s and 1980s era that many states adopted “equalization” formulas for distributing state aid that were intended to—but did not—eliminate disparities between rich and poor school districts. These formulas were developed with some (but not much) regard for equal protection principles. More realistically, the legislative changes reflected political notions of fairness rather than a coherent legal doctrine of


\(^{41}\) Roger Haydock has had a highly successful career as a professor at William Mitchell College of Law and has written many books about how to practice law. Significant portions of Haydock’s writing can be useful for practitioners in state courts. See, e.g., Roger S. Haydock et al., Fundamentals of Pretrial Litigation (5th ed. 2001); Roger S. Haydock & John O. Sonsteng, Advocacy: Evidence, Objections, and Exhibits (1994).


\(^{43}\) See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (1983) (“For some [school] districts to supply the barest necessities and others to have programs generously endowed does not meet the requirements of the constitution.”); Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 101, 192 (1995) (explaining that in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989), reh’g denied, (Tex. 1989), found that “[c]hildren who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds,” so as not to violate Texas’s “efficient system” education clause).
equal protection of laws.\textsuperscript{44}

\section{VI. INTENTIONAL INEQUALITY?}

The school financing system that remains in most states is pretty awful from the standpoint of disparity. I have thought deeply about this subject; recently I was the sole dissenter in a case that upheld Missouri’s formula for distributing state aid to public education.\textsuperscript{45} Here is my deep thought: the persistence of inequality in funding among school districts is intentional and, to an extent, perhaps a matter of political necessity.\textsuperscript{46}

This is a stunningly depressing insight. But there is something we should realize: in the United States of America, local control is very important. Local control means not only control of curricular decisions, but also the support that is necessary from local sources to fund public schools. Public education in most states is highly dependent on local property tax revenue, which in turn is dependent on the willingness of local taxpayers to fund public education. It’s as simple as that.\textsuperscript{47} In the states that have done the most to equalize expenditures for public education, there have been some attempts at “Robin Hood” provisions—that is, requiring rich districts to contribute a certain amount of their largesse to a pool to be distributed to poor school districts that, regardless of how much tax effort they put forth at the local level, cannot raise the kind of property tax that a rich school district can.\textsuperscript{48} Robin Hood dies in the end.\textsuperscript{49} End of story.


\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 497.


\textsuperscript{48} Reynolds, supra note 47, at 1856 n.68.

\textsuperscript{49} JOSEPH RITSON, ROBIN HOOD: A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ANCIENT POEMS,
VII. DUE PROCESS AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

We should cover due process because, after all, this is what we legal services lawyers spent a good deal of our careers worrying about. In the area of public benefits, our cases were mostly about protecting the rights of individuals vis-a-vis government bureaucracy. The injection of due process principles into the provision of public benefits, or rather the protection against arbitrary denials of public benefits, was an important advance in terms of individual rights. It probably does little to level the economic playing field, which I will address toward the end of this piece.

Employment discrimination cases have been a real source of vindication for individual rights. The case brought by LARC in the early 1970s alleging racial discrimination in hiring police officers had long-term effects. These effects are recounted in a profile of John Harrington, recently retired St. Paul Police Chief:

Harrington graduated from Dartmouth with a degree in East Asian studies and religion, and a minor in Chinese, and began looking for cop jobs in the big cities. No one was hiring . . . .

“New York went bankrupt,” Harrington recalls. “They laid off 2,000 cops in 1975 and 1976, and everywhere I applied my senior year was flooded with New York detectives. I’ve got this wonderful Ivy League degree and they’ve got 100 collars they made last year. Guess who got the job?”

Finally Harrington found a job in St. Paul, at least in part because a Minnesota judge had ordered the department to hire more black officers. There were just


51. The case, Norlander v. Schleck, is described in Romero & Beneke, supra note 9, at 14 n.43. Bruce Beneke, the co-author, led the efforts over many years to obtain the relief in Norlander and other employment and civil rights actions in St. Paul.
six black cops on the force at the time. 52

In recent years, the dominance of federal courts in civil rights litigation has ended as state courts have come to play an increasingly important role. This is a shift that seems counterintuitive to those who grew up thinking that courts whose judges are accountable through elections would be more reluctant to grant relief in civil rights cases than federal court judges who are appointed to serve for life. The state courts, at least in Missouri, recently have been much better places for such cases because, interestingly enough, state juries understand these cases. 53

A word about jury trials briefly: when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and so forth, the remedy was fashioned in such a way as to avoid having jury trials. 54 The problem as Congress correctly saw it was that juries in the South—where many of the problems were most plentiful—would not be amenable to blacks’ claims of racial discrimination. 55 When Congress subsequently provided a claim for age discrimination and housing discrimination, the remedies


54. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 12 (1963). The original version of the Civil Rights Act provided the following remedies: injunction, reinstatement, or hiring of employees, and interim earnings or amounts earnable. Id. Notably absent from this litany of options was a jury trial. See id.

55. Congress was undoubtedly aware of the racial tensions in the South. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1962, H.R. REP. NO. 87-1370 (1962). It can be inferred from this knowledge that racial tensions in the South were a factor in determining the appropriate remedies under this act. Scholars generally have accepted this proposition. See Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for Employers over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 91, 94 n.25 (2009) (citing M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and Summary Judgments, 8 S. Cal. L. Rev. & Women’s Stud. 311, 357 (1999) (“The legislative record for the 1964 Act reveals legislative unease with juries because they were perceived to be hostile or unfriendly to civil rights claimants. This was certainly the case with race discrimination, plainly the driving force behind the 1964 Act. . . . Federal judges would be more receptive to victims of racial discrimination . . . .”)).
included damages and were thus eligible for jury trials. Jurors, of course, understand age discrimination because a lot of jurors are pretty old or know someone who is. Today, race and gender rights are well established and can be vindicated in state court jury trials and, since 1991, in federal employment discrimination cases as well. That may be a sign of societal advancement. It is, at the very least, a vindication of efforts to ban discrimination against blacks and women serving on juries.

VIII. MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIME

In the 1970s, there was also a movement to give due process to persons committed to mental hospitals who were alleged to be mentally ill and in need of treatment. The due process movement was premised on the notion that, once patients were afforded due process rights and diverted from or released from mental institutions, they could be treated successfully and adequately in the community by the administration of the new psychotropic medicines that were doing so well at controlling psychoses of various kinds. Our belief was that the states would step up and fund community mental health centers because it was so much cheaper than maintaining mental hospitals.


60. See Chris Koyanagi & David L. Bazelon, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Learning From History: Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental Illness as Precursor to Long-Term Care Reform 4-9, 16 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7684.pdf (describing the history of deinstitutionalization and noting that many mental health policymakers...
Due process got a lot of mentally ill people out of hospitals. But the patients did not take their medications, wandered the streets, committed crimes, and ended up in prison.\textsuperscript{61} I can draw a line that shows the declining population of mental hospitals in this country in the 1970s and the early 1980s and then draw you another line that shows the increase in population in state and federal prisons. These two lines are not disconnected—as one goes down, the other goes up. It is not quite that simple, but it is close—if you don’t believe me, go to your local prison. Take your psychiatrist with you. He or she may estimate the number of doses of quality medications it might take to make it a happier place.

As to crime and punishment, the last forty years have seen an interesting swing in thinking about the proper use of “prisons” or “corrections.”

In the 1970s, as a result of some misguided academic studies, it became commonly believed that in the area of rehabilitation of criminals, “nothing works.” As a result, punishment in prison became more common and more commonly accepted for a greater range of crimes.\textsuperscript{62} Also in the same era, the superbly ineffectual and counterproductive war on drugs was launched.

As a result of these factors, as well as the criminalization of previously noncriminal conduct, we have been on a binge of incarceration that was aided and abetted by an explosion of prison building in the 1990s. The results are quite remarkable. Today, one in thirty-one persons are under correctional control,\textsuperscript{63} and as of 2008 one in one hundred are in prison or jail.\textsuperscript{64} “If you build it,
they will come” (to misquote a popular movie). 65

The effects on minority populations have been particularly dramatic. I ask any of you who recently have been to law school or college, to answer one question: Where are the black men? We have marginalized a lot of them by imposing felony sentences involving drugs, drug trafficking, and the kinds of things that many white people do without getting caught or getting a felony record. 66

The current decade has resulted in quite a few states rethinking their rush to incarceration. At the same time, by a series of decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States has made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—which I believe have been a source of a great deal of injustice in the criminal justice system—advisory rather than mandatory. 67

I should note, and not altogether as an aside, the difference in judicial attitudes from the time when the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became effective in 1987 and today. In 1987, judges in office were used to having full discretion in sentencing and were quite appalled by some of the cases in which they were required to send offenders to prison under the new guidelines. This resulted in more than a few federal judges declaring the guidelines to be unconstitutional—decisions that were overturned on appeal. 68

Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States said that the guidelines are only advisory; they cannot be mandatory. 69 The effect was not immediately recognized by the current generation of judges who were used to the guidelines and apparently did not know quite what to do without them. 70 That is a remarkable generational shift.

65. FIELD OF DREAMS (Gordon Company 1989).
69. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308.
70. Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 270 (2009) (noting that, even following Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines still received “considerable deference” as some judges “were simply no longer used to exercising discretion, and worse, they did not believe that they knew how”).
IX. OVERRIDING ECONOMIC TRENDS

The developments in the law relating to equality have been countermanded by economic trends, including federal taxation policies, which have seriously widened the gap between the richest and poorest in our society. It should hardly pass without notice that in the 1950s the United States was first or second in the world in health status and longevity of its citizens. Japan, on the other hand, recovering from World War II, was far down the list. Today, the income gap in the United States has broadened significantly. The effect of this has moved the United States down from first or second in longevity and health status to about thirtieth in the world.\footnote{Michael Marmot, The Status Syndrome: How Social Standing Affects Our Health and Longevity 61–81 (2005); see Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger 73–87 (2009).} As income inequality soars, so do death rates, various diseases, drug use, and obesity—you name it. Interesting research in the field of epidemiology demonstrates the effect that income inequality has on the society as a whole.\footnote{See Wilkinson & Pickett, supra note 71, at 73–87.}
Figure 1: Relationship Between Income Inequality and Life Expectancy

Figure 1 shows the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy. The United States, which has high income inequality, has one of the lowest life expectancies among developed countries. (The charts in Figures 1–4 are reproduced from Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger (2009), with permission of the authors.)
Figure 2: Relationship Between Income Inequality and Life expectancy

Health and Social Problems are Worse in More Unequal Countries


This trend towards inequality has been enhanced by the tax code of the United States. Since 1980, there has been a massive shift of wealth to the highest income families and away from the middle class. The era of tax cutting has relieved the highest brackets from their tax burden and shifted that burden disproportionately to the middle class. Alice Gresham Bullock, former dean of Howard University Law School, puts it well:

Since 1981, federal tax laws have supported and even encouraged the creation of the extreme income gap. After helping to create this gap, these tax laws subsidize the richest Americans, thereby exacerbating income inequality.

...
During the last three decades of the twentieth century, incomes rose for all demographic groups. Over time, however, the highest income households earned a much larger share of pre-tax income. In 1979, the bottom four quintiles (80% of taxpayers) earned 55% of pre-tax income and the top quintile earned 45%. In the late 1980s and the first half of 1990s, each group earned roughly one half of all income. By 1996, however, the top 20% moved out ahead, and the income disparity has skyrocketed ever since. The income gap that exists today is between the very richest Americans and everyone else.

There is no doubt the rich are getting richer. After adjusting for inflation, in 2002 the richest 13,400 households had more than $5 for every dollar they had in 1970. The remaining 99% of households had only eight cents more per dollar. . . . The top 1% saw the largest increase . . . .

While substantial gains were being made at the top, the bottom quintiles saw their pre-tax incomes decline by more than 27%.  

Figure 3: Income Inequality in the US by Presidential Administration

Trends in US income inequality 1975-2005

Figure 3 shows the growing income inequality between the rich and the poor by presidential administrations, beginning with President Ford in 1975. The disparity steadily increased and peaked in 1993. Although the disparity decreased after 1993, it again began increasing in 2000.

Coupled with the growing income and wealth inequality is the notion that government is bad or that government is inept. This is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from about 1980. There were two factors, I believe, that contributed to the revolt of the taxpaying masses in the last thirty years: (1) a reaction against “welfare” for the poor, a phenomenon that often times was driven by the perception of the race of the welfare recipients, and (2) welfare for the rich, that is, the enormous tax breaks and tax incentives that are given to corporations and wealthy citizens. In the latter category, most states have been on a drive to the bottom in terms of giving tax incentives to companies to build businesses in
the communities in their states. 74 This goes to absurd length, where a community will give tax-incremental financing or other tax incentives to a big-box retailer, such as Wal-Mart, to build a big store that employs lots of people, only to drive out of business the smaller, indigenous businesses in the community. The use of governmental power for corporate economic gain may be a significant impetus to the contemporary “property rights” movement.

The result of this era of government largesse is a distrust of government that is quite pervasive. In the 1980s, there was the idea that we should cut taxes because cutting taxes would produce more government revenue. How? The lower tax burden would spur innovation and investment, and the economy would grow bigger. 75 Closely akin, of course, was the idea that government was the problem and that taxes should be lowered to “starve the beast.” 76

The result of the anti-tax fervor, particularly in the middle class, is that there has been a massive disinvestment in human infrastructure, that is, education, public health, and cultural institutions that previously had been heavily dependent on public support to thrive.

There is no better illustration of this massive disinvestment than what has been happening with state-supported higher education. The state-supported law school education that I purchased in Minnesota for about $450 per year in 1967 to 1970 was an extraordinary bargain by today’s standards. Most of the law school’s budget came from the Minnesota legislature; today, I believe the University of Minnesota Law School gets less than 10 percent of its budget from the state. Here is what happened: when state budgets got tight, higher education was the easiest thing to cut. The cost of higher education can be passed on from taxpayers to the tuition payers. This is made easy by the federal government’s student loan programs, which banks administered. What a great business it was—the banks were getting about $60 billion a year for administering these loan programs—the banks

74. See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996) (arguing that state tax incentives can actually harm the state’s citizens and that such incentives should be restrained by the Commerce Clause).


bore no risk because the federal government insured and
guaranteed a return on the money. So the banks got $60 billion
for doing not much at all, a practice that ended recently under the
Obama administration. Perhaps that was an example of corporate
welfare.

The significance of this shift in funding from taxpayers to
tuition payers has made it difficult for families of modest means to
get a higher education for their children without the children
having to take on massive amounts of student loan debt. It is not
uncommon in the law school where I now teach for students to be
graduating with $150,000 to $200,000 in combined student loan
debt from their college and law school years. I became strikingly
aware of this a few years ago when a student who was a 3L in law
school told me she really wanted to be a public defender, a position
that had a starting salary of $32,000 per year. When she told me
that her student debt loan was $120,000, I really was taken aback,
but I said that I did not believe she could afford to be a public
defender. That’s just one small story about what this means and
what it is doing to us in terms of the opportunities that people may
have to serve in public service and other worthwhile but
nonlucrative endeavors.

X. **CIVIC CULTURE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY**

I end by saying there is a need for a strong civic culture whose
main characteristic is a common understanding that there are
certain things that we as a society need to buy collectively for a
large number of our citizens who purchase them individually—
education, for example. Put another way, we need a civic culture
that recognizes the need for long-term investments in human
infrastructure. I refer specifically to public schools at all levels,
including higher education, as well as roads, parks, and cultural
institutions (the latter can be funded both publicly and privately).
Public health, including clean water and sewage disposal, as well as
traditional public health measures, is another area in which we
must invest collectively. All of the tax incentives for businesses to
move someplace do not mean very much if there is not an

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77. See generally David M. Herszenhorn, *Plan to Change Student Lending Sets Up
/2009/04/13/us/politics/13student.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss
(describing the state of the student lending market in light of President Obama’s
plan to end the subsidized loan program).
educated and healthy work force and an infrastructure of strong institutions to support that population.

Human infrastructure probably matters most when it comes to economic development of a region. There is a remarkable contrast, for example, between Minneapolis-St. Paul, on the one hand, and the St. Louis metropolitan area where I have lived during the past thirty-five years, on the other hand. In 1970, the Minneapolis-St Paul metropolitan area was 1.8 million people. St. Louis was 2.3 million. Today, St. Louis has about 2.8 million in its metro area, which means that it has kept pace with the birth rate. Minneapolis-St. Paul, which has a long tradition of the civic culture I am talking about, has a population of 3.2 million in its metro area. I do not think people moved to the Twin Cities for the weather and I doubt that they moved for low taxes because Minnesota has one of the highest taxation rates in the country. Businesses flourish where human beings have the means to be their best. The Twin Cities area has a civic culture and traditions that have supported and solidified the gains in legal rights of the past forty years.

But this supportive environment seems fragile, and you can lose it. Perhaps you are losing it. In the past decade, both Minnesota and Missouri have experienced declines in average household income that exceed the decline in the United States as a whole. Minnesota’s economy seems to have been more resilient than Missouri’s. From 1999 to 2008, Minnesota’s average household income, adjusted for inflation, dropped 9.6%, while Missouri’s drop was 14.1%.

79. Id. at § 2, 27–43.
81. Id.
83. From 1999 to 2008, the median household income (adjusted for inflation) in the United States dropped from $52,587 to $50,303, a decline of 4.5%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY STATE (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/h08.xls. Minnesota’s average household income, which is well above the national average, declined 9.6%, from $60,782 to $54,925 in that period. Id. Missouri’s average household income, which was slightly above average at $53,475 in 1999, dropped
Figure 4: Effect of Income Inequality on Health and Social Problems in US States

Health and Social Problems are Worse in More Unequal US States


Figure 4 shows the effect of income inequality on the health and social problems of the fifty states. Minnesota has low income inequality in comparison with the majority of states, leading to fewer health and social problems.

XI. CONCLUSION

My lesson from the past forty years: the struggle for equality, for vindication of rights, is more than just a legal struggle. Political and economic forces can erase the gains and hold back the progress of the low-income clients for whom legal services and civil rights lawyers fight legal battles. The persistence of inequality affects the health and well-being of an entire society, not just the clients for whom legal services and civil rights lawyers toil. There is no doubt that legal services and civil rights lawyers have made real

14.1% to $46,038 in 2008, well below the national average. Id.
changes in the lives of their clients. The gains brought through the legal system take hold best when the state’s culture supports these legal efforts with quality public education, public health, and supportive civic institutions that can minimize economic inequality.