Unbefriended and Unrepresented: Better Medical Decision Making for Incapacitated Patients without Healthcare Surrogates

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Abstract
How should we make medical decisions for incapacitated patients who have no available legally-authorized surrogate decision maker? Because these patients lack decision making capacity, they cannot authorize treatment themselves. Because they lack a surrogate, nobody else can authorize treatment either. Clinicians and researchers have referred to these individuals as “adult orphans” or as “unbefriended,” “isolated,” or “unrepresented” patients. Clinicians and researchers have also described them as “unimaginably helpless,” “highly vulnerable,” and as the “most vulnerable,” because “no one cares deeply if they live or die.”

The persistent challenges involved in obtaining consent for medical treatment on behalf of these individuals is an immense problem in ethics and patients’ rights. Some commentators describe caring for the unbefriended as “one of the most difficult problems in medical decision making.” Others call it the “single greatest category of problems” encountered in bioethics consultations.

 Appropriately, this problem is getting more attention. Major policy reports from both legal and medical associations have focused on decision making for the unbefriended. Perhaps most notably, the elite mainstream media has repeatedly covered the problem of the unbefriended in the United States. Decision-making for the unbefriended has also been the primary topic of recent day-long or multi-day conferences, both themed, subject-specific conferences, and individual sessions at several national and regional professional association meetings.

Finally, the problem of the unbefriended has received increasing attention not only in the meeting halls of conferences, but also in the pages of academic literature. New articles have been printed in law journals, medical journals, nursing journals, long-term care journals, and bioethics journals. Even the popular media is covering the problem.

The purpose of this Article is to help improve the quality of healthcare decision making for the unbefriended. I hope that this comprehensive and systematic explanation of both the problem and the available solutions will empower both public and clinical policymakers to develop more informed and more circumspect policies and procedures.

Keywords

Disciplines
Health Law and Policy

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INTRODUCTION

How should we make medical decisions for incapacitated patients who have no available legally-authorized surrogate decision maker? Because these patients lack decision-making capacity, they cannot authorize treatment themselves. Because they lack a surrogate, nobody else can authorize treatment either. Clinicians and researchers have referred to these individuals as "adult orphans" or as "unbefriended," "isolated," or "unrepresented" patients. Clinicians and researchers have also described them as "unimaginably helpless," "highly vulnerable," and as the "most vulnerable," because "no one cares deeply if they live or die." The persistent challenges involved in obtaining consent for medical treatment on behalf of these individuals is an immense problem in ethics and patients' rights. Some commentators describe caring for the unbefriended as "one of the most difficult problems in medical decision making." Others call it the "single greatest category of problems" encountered in bioethics consultations.

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elite mainstream media has repeatedly covered the problem of the unbefriended in the United States.\textsuperscript{8} Decision-making for the unbefriended has also been the primary topic of recent day-long or multi-day conferences,\textsuperscript{9} both themed, subject-specific conferences, and individual sessions at several national and regional professional association meetings.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{UNREPRESENTED PATIENTS: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE HARV. ETHICS LEADERSHIP GRP. BY THE CMTY. ETHICS COMM. 4 (2016).}  


Finally, the problem of the unbefriended has received increasing attention not only in the meeting halls of conferences, but also in the pages of academic literature. New articles have been printed in law journals, medical journals, nursing journals, long-term care journals, and bioethics journals. Even the popular media is covering the problem.
But while the problem has been increasingly recognized and acknowledged, it has not yet been adequately mitigated or resolved. In 1987, the Hastings Center released *Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and Care of the Dying.* The eminent bioethics think tank observed that “no decision making mechanism is widely available to find attentive surrogates for the many people without them. There is also as yet no consensus on the proper solution.”

Nearly thirty years later, far too little has changed. There is still no consensus on the proper solution. Across the United States, few jurisdictions have developed laws or policies that adequately protect this most vulnerable population. “Existing mechanisms to address the issue of decision-making for the unbefriended are scant and not uniform.” Most facilities are “muddling through on an ad hoc basis.”

In 2015, the Institute of Medicine made substantially the same pessimistic observations in its own comprehensive report on end-of-life care. And in 2016, American Geriatrics Society updated its earlier 1996 position statement. The AGS identified “significant state-to-state variability in legal approaches to unbefriended

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19. *Id.* at 25.
patients.”25 And it concluded that these variations “create confusion for health care providers,” resulting in “harms including treatment delays or prolongation of potentially burdensome treatments.”26

The purpose of this Article is to help improve the quality of healthcare decision making for the unbefriended. I hope that this comprehensive and systematic explanation of both the problem and the available solutions will empower both public and clinical policymakers to develop more informed and more circumspect policies and procedures.

In Section I, I review traditional mechanisms to protect prospective autonomy. The law has devised several tools, such as advance directives and surrogates, that permit individuals to control their future medical treatment in the event that they lose decision-making capacity.27 Unfortunately, none of these tools are available for the unbefriended.28 In Section II, I more carefully define “unbefriended patient,” assess the size of the unbefriended population, and examine demographics and causal factors.

In Section III, I describe four risks and patient safety problems arising from being unbefriended in the U.S. healthcare system. Unbefriended patients are exposed to overtreatment, undertreatment, and placement in an inappropriate setting.29 In addition to these physical risks, they are likely to receive healthcare discordant with their values and preferences.30

The best way to avoid these risks is to avoid becoming unbefriended in the first place. So, in Sections IV and V, I examine key means of prevention. Section IV mechanisms can be employed by clinicians without legal change: (1) vigilant and ultra-careful capacity assessment, (2) more advance care planning, and (3) diligent

25. Id.
26. Id.
28. Id. at 1077.
30. Id.
searching for surrogates. Section V mechanisms require legislation to authorize longer or more flexible default surrogate lists. If more people are authorized to make healthcare decisions, it is less likely the patient will be unbefriended.

Unfortunately, prevention is not always successful. Some patients are "unavoidably" unbefriended. In Section VI, I describe the main officially available solution: guardianship. But guardianship is rarely the right solution. First, there is a broad consensus that guardianship should be only a last resort. Second, the process is too slow and cumbersome to be responsive to the patient's medical needs.

Consequently, both legislatures and individual health systems or facilities have developed other more accessible mechanisms on their own. But these mechanisms vary in how they balance speed and fairness. In Section VII, I examine mechanisms that lack adequate due process. These include having the healthcare decision authorized: (1) by the attending physician herself, (2) by a second physician, or (3) by an "interdisciplinary team." Finally, in Section VIII, I describe solutions that are more accessible than guardianship, yet still afford adequate procedural due process. These often include tiered approaches that correlate the amount of oversight to the gravity of the decision at hand. These solutions typically require

31. See Farrell et al., supra note 3, at 15.
32. See id.
36. See id. at 1; Farrell et al., supra note 3.
37. See infra Part VII.
39. See infra Part VIII.
consent either from the ethics committee or from an external and independent committee.\textsuperscript{41}

Ultimately, we must balance speed and fairness. On the one hand, we want a decision-making process that is accessible, quick, convenient, and cost-effective. On the other hand, we want a process that provides the important safeguards of expertise, neutrality, and careful deliberation. This Article offers a comprehensive organization and framing of various models that are specified in law or implemented at the institutional level. My intent is to that this examination will help public and institutional policymakers determine where to best strike the balance.

\textit{I. Traditional Mechanisms to Protect Prospective Autonomy}

Patient autonomy is highly valued in the United States.\textsuperscript{42} Patients with decision-making capacity can make their own healthcare decisions.\textsuperscript{43} Moreover, patients retain the right of self-determination even when they lose the capacity to make healthcare decisions for themselves.\textsuperscript{44} Our society’s individualistic norms place “such a strong emphasis on the voice of the patient” that medical decisions should “continue to be guided by that voice as much as possible.”\textsuperscript{45} For example, in the seminal \textit{In re Quinlan} case, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Karen did not lose her right to choose when she lost capacity.\textsuperscript{46} That right could be exercised on her behalf by her family.\textsuperscript{47}

The law has devised three main tools to promote “prospective autonomy,” the right to control one’s future medical treatment in the event that one loses decision-making capacity.\textsuperscript{48} The first mechanism

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra} note 34, at 3-101 to 3-102.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals, supra} note 27, at 1074. A fourth mechanism is guardianship. See \textit{infra} Section VI.
\item \textsuperscript{43} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{46} See \textit{In re Quinlan}, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72 (N.J. 1976).
\item \textsuperscript{47} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals, supra} note 27, at 1074.
\end{itemize}
is the instructional advance directive or living will. But most of us do not write such directives. The second mechanism is the proxy directive or durable power of attorney for healthcare, designating another person, a surrogate, to direct the course of our medical treatment upon our incapacity. But most of us do not appoint surrogates either. Therefore, the third mechanism by which our prospective autonomy is protected and promoted is the most common: through the informal selection of surrogates based on statutory priority lists.

Essentially, the issue is one of consent. Clinicians need consent to administer treatment or diagnostic interventions. Two situations are relatively straightforward. First, if the patient has capacity, then she can provide or refuse that consent herself. Second, in emergency situations, even if the patient lacks capacity, her consent is implied. So, there is no need for patient or surrogate consent in emergencies. But outside these two situations, clinicians need consent through some vehicle of prospective autonomy. Our focus is on consent mechanisms for incapacitated patients in non-emergency situations.

A. Decision Making Capacity

Essential to an understanding of prospective autonomy is an understanding of decision-making capacity. If the patient has capacity, then there is no need for either advance directives or surrogates. Adult patients—both those 18 years of age or older and emancipated minors—are presumed to have capacity until determined otherwise.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients' Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1834, 1834 (2007).
55. See Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 27, at 1074.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892D(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
57. See Appelbaum, supra note 54, at 1834.
58. Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 27, at 1075.
59. Id.
This presumption is rebutted only after the attending physician, often with confirmation from a second physician, determines that the patient lacks one or more of the three essential attributes of capacity.\(^6\) First, the patient must possess the ability to understand both her own condition and the treatment’s significant benefits, burdens, risks, and reasonable alternatives.\(^6\) Second, the patient must be able to reason and deliberate about her treatment choices.\(^6\) Third, the patient must be able to make and communicate a decision.\(^6\)

Capacity is decision specific. This means that a patient lacking capacity to make a complex decision might still have capacity to make other decisions.\(^6\) It also means that incapacity is not a status-based judgment.\(^6\) Being elderly or diagnosed with dementia does not automatically make one incapacitated.\(^6\)

In 2017, the Idaho Legislature found that many individuals with developmental disabilities are erroneously presumed to lack capacity.\(^6\)

The term developmental disability covers a wide range of conditions, many of which do not impair the ability of the person to make competent medical decisions. However, this right has been often denied to such persons, with a demand that the person have a guardian. This is not only a denial of the fundamental rights of the person, it can lead to expensive and unneeded court proceedings.\(^6\)

\(^{60}\). Id.

\(^{61}\). Id.

\(^{62}\). Id.

\(^{63}\). Id.

\(^{64}\). Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 27, at 1075.

\(^{65}\). Id.

\(^{66}\). Id.


Accordingly, Idaho enacted a statute that provides even individuals who are "developmentally disabled" may have capacity and thus may consent to their own care.69

B. Emergency Exception and Implied Consent

In emergency situations, healthcare decision making for the unbefriended is reasonably straightforward. The patient lacks capacity to consent and there is no reasonably available surrogate.70 Clinicians cannot get "actual" consent for needed treatment. But this is not problematic. There is no need to obtain patient or surrogate consent, because consent to treatment is implied.71 The emergency makes it necessary, or apparently necessary, for providers to act before there is opportunity to obtain consent.72

Emergency situations are typically defined as those in which, "according to competent medical judgment, the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures are reasonably necessary" and a "delay in treatment could reasonably be expected to jeopardize the life or health of the person affected or could reasonably result in disfigurement or impaired faculties."73

For example, a 2011 Missouri bill provided that healthcare may be provided to an unbefriended patient without consent if:

70. See id.
71. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-512 (2016); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2397(a)((2)–(3)) (West 2016); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8(h) (West 2016); CAL. PROB. CODE § 3210(b) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.6-104(3) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2510(a)(4) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504(i) (2016); IND. CODE § 16-36-3-3 (2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-7(2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 27- 431.063 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13(c)(1) (2016); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-q(2) (McKinney 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-40(A) (2016) ("Health care may be provided without consent to a patient who is unable to consent if no person authorized . . . is available immediately, and in the reasonable medical judgment of the attending physician or other health care professional responsible for the care of the patient, the delay occasioned by attempting to locate an authorized person, or by continuing to attempt to locate an authorized person, presents a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or loss or impairment of the functioning of a bodily member or organ, or other serious threat to the health of the patient.").
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 892D(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1979); Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007); Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 772 (Tex. 2003). The emergency exception might be characterized for addressing urgent healthcare decision making on behalf of the temporarily unbefriended.
In the reasonable medical judgment of the attending physician or other healthcare professional responsible for the care of the patient, the delay occasioned by attempting to locate an authorized person or by continuing to attempt to locate an authorized person presents a substantial risk of death, serious permanent disfigurement, or loss or impairment of the functioning of a bodily member or organ, or other serious threat to the health of the patient.  

The law in every other state is substantially similar.  

In short, the law concerning treatment decisions in emergency situations is reasonably well settled. Therefore, the challenges confronting healthcare providers for the unbefriended primarily concern non-emergency treatment. The remaining decision-making mechanisms focus on how treatment decisions are made for incapacitated patients in non-emergency situations.

C. Advance Directives and POLST

Arguably, if patients left sufficiently clear and complete instructional advance directives (living wills), there would be no need for surrogates. Providers could simply consult the patient's own *ex ante* instructions for guidance. But more than three decades of experience shows that it is difficult to effectively implement this form of “directed decision-making.” Most individuals do not complete advance directives. Most of those that are completed are not available when needed. And, even when completed and available, instructional advance directives are often

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75. *E.g.*, O.C.G.A. § 31-9-3(b) (2016) (“In addition to any instances in which a consent is excused or implied at law, a consent to surgical or medical treatment or procedures suggested, recommended, prescribed, or directed by a duly licensed physician will be implied where an emergency exists.”).
76. On the other hand, some have argued for expanding the scope of the emergency exception to cover some of these other cases. J. Bernstein, *Presumed Consent: Licenses and Limits Inferred from the Case of Geriatric Hip Fractures*, 18(1) BMC MED. ADD PERIOD? ETHICS 17 (2017).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
insufficiently clear and detailed to obviously apply to the patient’s current situation. Accordingly, prospective autonomy is usually promoted not through instructional advance directives but through substitute decision-makers collectively known as “surrogates.”

D. Agents and Durable Powers of Attorney for Healthcare

Every state has established a process that allows competent individuals to appoint an agent to decide about healthcare when they become unable to decide for themselves. While terminology varies from state to state, this type of surrogate is normally referred to as a “proxy,” an “agent,” a “healthcare representative,” or an “attorney-in-fact.”

This appointment can be made through a legal form typically referred to as an advance directive or a durable power of attorney for healthcare (DPAH). While short and simple, these appointment forms require the strict observation of certain formalities. For example, the individual must often sign the form in the presence of two witnesses who are neither related to the individual nor employed at a facility where the individual is a patient or resident.

The agent’s power is often referred to as “springing” because it is triggered when the patient loses capacity; and it vanishes when the

81. Id. In contrast, POLST forms overcome some of the obstacles of advance directives. Thaddeus M. Pope, Controlling the Misuse of CPR with Certified Patient Decision Aids and POLST, 17(2) AM J. BIOETHICS 35 (2017); Thaddeus M. Pope & Melinda Hexum, Legal Briefing: POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment), 23(4) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 353 (2012).
82. Id.
83. Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 27, at 1075.
85. Id.
86. Id. See also Joshua A. rolnick et al., Delegalizing Advance Directives – Facilitating Advance Care Planning, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2106 (2017). For some individuals, like long-term care residents, it may be difficult to comply with the mandatory execution formalities. These individuals are surrounded by facility employees who can neither serve as agent nor witness an appointment. But, in many states, these residents and patients can still designate a surrogate informally. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507(b)(1) (2016). The individual makes the designation directly to the supervising provider in the presence of a witness. Id. The provider then confirms the designation on the medical record and has that signed by the witness. Id.
87. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 34, § 7.05, at 7-69, 7-71, 7-74 to 7-78.
patient regains capacity.\textsuperscript{88} Whenever authorized to act, the agent typically has the right to make all healthcare decisions that the patient could have made for herself, unless the patient has explicitly limited the agent’s authority.\textsuperscript{89} And providers must comply with decisions made in good faith by an agent to the same extent they would have to comply with decisions made by the patient herself.\textsuperscript{90}

\textbf{E. Default Surrogates and Proxies}

If there is no advance directive, no court-appointed guardian, and no patient-appointed agent, then the healthcare provider can select the surrogate.\textsuperscript{91} This is sometimes referred to as “devolved decision-making.”\textsuperscript{92} The provider makes the designation pursuant to default surrogate statutes in almost every state.\textsuperscript{93}

Because most individuals have neither completed nor effectively implemented advance directives appointing healthcare agents, most states have enacted “default statutes.”\textsuperscript{94} These laws specify a hierarchy of surrogates to consent to medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated individuals.\textsuperscript{95} These surrogates are automatically designated based on their familial, or otherwise defined, relationship to the incapacitated individual.\textsuperscript{96}

These statutes specify a priority list of individuals whom the physician should or must designate.\textsuperscript{97} Typically, at the top of this hierarchy are the patient’s spouse, adult child, parent, and adult sibling.\textsuperscript{98} The hierarchy prioritizes those relatives who are typically more likely to know the convictions and beliefs of the patient and more likely to be concerned for the patient.\textsuperscript{99} Default surrogates are

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{88} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals}, supra note 27, at 1075.
\textsuperscript{89} Id.
\textsuperscript{90} Id.
\textsuperscript{91} Id.
\textsuperscript{92} Id.; see also Karp & Wood, \textit{Incapacitated and Alone}, supra note 4, at 21.
\textsuperscript{93} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals}, supra note 27, at 1076.
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 1074. \textit{See also infra Section V.}
\textsuperscript{95} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals}, supra note 27, at 1074.
\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 1076.
\textsuperscript{97} Id.
\textsuperscript{98} Id.
\textsuperscript{99} Id.
\end{flushleft}
the most numerous type of surrogate. Therefore, the sequence and manner in which they are designated from the list has great significance. But there are material differences among the states.

F. Guardians and Conservators

In cases of conflict among potential surrogates or when no surrogate is reasonably available, it is sometimes necessary to petition a court to appoint a surrogate. A court-appointed surrogate is typically referred to as a “guardian” or “conservator.” The petition is usually filed by a relative or by the administrator of a healthcare facility where the patient resides. The court-appointed guardian may be a family member, a friend, a disinterested stranger, a non-profit or for-profit agency, or a public program. Since the appointment is usually not directed by the patient herself, judicial appointment is sometimes referred to as “displaced decision-making.”

After the appointment, the court is supposed to supervise and monitor the guardian’s choices on behalf of the patient to ensure that the patient is getting appropriate medical care. Because this entire process can be cumbersome and expensive, comparatively few surrogates are guardians. Moreover, the guardianship system is currently the subject of significant scrutiny and reform.

For example, while capacity is decision-specific, guardianship is typically all-or-nothing. Once the patient is assessed as “incompetent,” the guardian has full power to make most, if not all,
decisions for the patient, even if the patient retains capacity to make some decisions or even all decisions some of the time.\textsuperscript{110} Policymakers are working to encourage the use of less restrictive alternatives; more limited, tailored guardianship orders; and more procedural due process protections.\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{G. Decision Making Standards}

Through whichever of these mechanisms treatment decisions are made for an unbefriended patient, the decision-making standards are approximately the same. These standards are usually specified in state statutes in the U.S., and there is substantial uniformity across the country.\textsuperscript{112}

A surrogate is an “extension of the patient”\textsuperscript{113} and stands in the shoes of the patient. Accordingly, the surrogate is “obligated to suppress his or her own judgment in favor of ‘channeling’ what the [patient] would have done.”\textsuperscript{114} The surrogate “must make the medical choice that the patient, if competent, would have made and not one that the surrogate might make for himself or herself.”\textsuperscript{115} There is generally a two-step hierarchy; surrogates should apply these standards sequentially: (1) substituted judgment and then (2) best interest.\textsuperscript{116}

Under the substituted judgment standard, surrogates must engage in some speculation and “infer” patients’ wishes from their prior statements and conduct.\textsuperscript{117} Laws across several states are substantially similar. Alabama, for example, provides that a surrogate must make decisions “that conform as closely as possible to what the

\begin{footnotes}
\item{110} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals}, supra note 27, at 1076.
\item{111} Id. See also ABA Commission on Law and Aging, \textit{Guardianship and Supported Decision-Making Law and Practice}, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/resources/guardianship_law_practice.htm.
\item{112} Id. at 1077.
\item{113} AMA, \textit{CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS}, Opinion 8.081.
\item{115} \textit{In re Guardianship of Browning}, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990). Added period and space after so.
\item{116} Pope, \textit{Legal Fundamentals}, supra note 27, at 1076.
\item{117} Id.
\end{footnotes}
patient would have done or intended under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{118} A surrogate must take into account "any evidence of the patient's religious, spiritual, personal, philosophical, and moral beliefs and ethics."\textsuperscript{119}

There is often no reliable evidence of the unbefriended patient's expressed wishes, values, or preferences. When this is the case, surrogates cannot apply the substituted judgment standard, and therefore must apply the best interest standard.\textsuperscript{120} Surrogates must shift focus from the patient's autonomy to the patient's welfare.\textsuperscript{121} In the absence of subjective evidence about a patient's wishes, a surrogate must rely on more objective grounds, on an outcome that best promotes the patient's well-being.\textsuperscript{122}

Typically, these seven factors are used to guide the application of the best interest standard: (1) the patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and cognitive functioning; (2) quality of life, life expectancy, and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; (3) the various treatment options and the risks, side-effects, and benefits of each; (4) the nature and degree of physical pain or suffering resulting from the medical condition; (5) whether the medical treatment being provided is causing or may cause pain, suffering, or serious complications; (6) the pain or suffering to the patient if the medical treatment is withdrawn; and (7) whether any particular treatment would be proportionate or disproportionate in terms of the benefits to be gained by the patient versus the burdens caused to the patient.\textsuperscript{123}
II. Who Are Unbefriended and Unrepresented Patients?

The mechanisms directed at protecting prospective autonomy that are described in the last section help most incapacitated individuals. But none are available to protect the unbefriended. In this Section, I define the “unbefriended patient” and describe some competing terminology. I then assess the size of the unbefriended population, its demographics, and its causal factors. Importantly, the number of unbefriended patients continues to grow significantly.

A. Definition of “Unbefriended Patient”

The unbefriended are incapacitated individuals who cannot be helped by any of the standard legal mechanisms that protect and promote prospective autonomy. First, they have not left an instructional advance directive (a living will). Or, even if they have an instructional advance directive and it is available, it does not address the relevant clinical circumstances.124 Second, the unbefriended have not appointed a healthcare agent (power of attorney). Or, if they have appointed an agent, none is reasonably available. Third, they have no court-appointed guardian.

This is normally the point at which default decision making mechanisms would be useful. But the unbefriended have no available friends or family to make medical decisions as “default” surrogates.125 Unbefriended patients may have outlived, lost contact with, or been abandoned by family members. Or they may be loners who have spent much of their lives disconnected and in social isolation.

124. Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 27, at 1075. While most unbefriended patients are individuals who have lost decision-making capacity, there are two other categories (1) individuals such as the mentally disabled who never had capacity, and (2) minors who have not yet acquired capacity. See id. at 1075.

125. Pope, Legal Fundamentals, supra note 27, at 1074. Sometimes, a patient’s unbefriended status is a factor not so much due to the non-existence of a surrogate, but to the unavailability of a surrogate, at the relevant time. For example, an unbefriended patient might have relatives, but those relatives may be unresponsive, uninvolved, or incapable of making treatment decisions for the patient. Id. at 1077.
B. Competing Terminology

Many different terms have been used to describe the unbefriended. Here are just eight words and phrases: "adult orphans,"126 "friendless patients,"127 "unrepresented patients,"128 "patients alone,"129 "solo citizens,"130 "patients without a surrogate decision maker,"131 "patients without proxies,"132 "patients for whom no surrogate is identified as reasonably available, willing, or competent to act."133

The Reader has already seen that I employ the term "unbefriended." Some commentators have criticized this term, because of its negative connotation. It arguably stigmatizes, insults, and demeans this population. And it signals to the young that their lives are not valuable. I am sympathetic to these concerns. But I continue to use the term "unbefriended," because it seems to have the most currency in the bioethics, medical, and legal literature.134

126. Farrell et al., supra note 3, at 14.
130. See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 31.
Moreover, it is the term used by the American Bar Association. Most recently, the American Geriatrics Society used the term “unbefriended” in its 2016 Position Statement, “Making Medical Treatment Decisions for Unbefriended Older Adults.”

Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish two related though distinct concepts: “unbefriended” and “unrepresented.” One might limit the term “unbefriended” to describe individuals who have no available and willing friends or family. In contrast, one might limit the term “unrepresented” to describe individuals who have no legally authorized decision maker.

There are four possible relationships between being “unbefriended” and being “unrepresented”:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<th>Unbefriended</th>
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<td>Not unrepresented</td>
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In category 1, the individual is both unbefriended and unrepresented. She has no family or friends who are available and willing to serve as surrogate. Nor does she have a court-appointed guardian. In category 2, the individual is not unbefriended. She has available friends or family. Or perhaps she has care-providers at her long-term care facility. Nevertheless, she is unrepresented, because her friends, family, or professional care-providers are not legally authorized decision makers. In category 3, the individual is unbefriended, because she lacks available friends or family. But, she is not unrepresented because she has a guardian or other decision maker.
maker. Finally, in category 4, the individual is neither unbefriended nor unrepresented. It would be better to use these separate terms with narrower and more precise meanings. But that is not common usage.

C. Size of the Unbefriended Patient Population

There are more than 70,000 unbefriended patients and long-term care residents in the United States. The majority of the unbefriended are believed to live in hospitals and long-term care facilities. There are two significant hospital studies. One found that 16 percent of patients admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU) were unbefriended. The other found that 5 percent of patients who died in the ICU were unbefriended. There is one key long term care study. It estimated that these individuals make up about 3 to 4 percent of the nursing home population.

These are the three studies most often cited to substantiate the size of the unbefriended population. Still, other studies corroborate these estimates. For example, a British study of hospitals found an unbefriended rate of 4 percent. While clinicians usually discuss a

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137. I computed this by adding 45,500 (3.5 percent of the 1.3 million in long-term care) and 25,000 (5 percent of the 500,000 in intensive care units).
139. *Who Decides?*, supra note 131, at 34.
141. See *Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone*, supra note 4, at 20; Gillick, supra note 140, at 88; Miller & Cugliari, *supra* note 140.
do not resuscitate order with the patient’s surrogate, 4 percent of respondents explained that they were unable to do that either because "there was no nominated person important to the patient" or because "attempts . . . to contact the nominated person were unsuccessful." Similarly, a study conducted by the American Bar Association, the Society of Critical Care Medicine, and the Society of Hospital Medicine surveyed 45,000 physicians; nearly 50 percent of respondents reported seeing at least one unbefriended patient per month.

Some state specific studies also confirm the size of the problem. A North Dakota study estimated there are 300 to 700 unbefriended individuals in that state. If that figure were extrapolated nationwide, there would be 129,000 unbefriended. A Massachusetts study estimates around 3200 to 3800 unbefriended in that state. A Minnesota nursing facility survey identified an unbefriended rate of just under 2 percent. Social services staff from Minnesota Volunteers of America estimated they handle approximately 250 calls per year regarding end-of-life decisions about people who have impaired decision-making capacity with no legally designated decision maker.

D. Demographics and Causal Factors

These are significant numbers, and they continue to grow. While (a) the elderly is the largest group of unbefriended, they are not the

145. Id.
147. Schmidt, supra note 2 at 84.
only group who may be adversely affected by a lack of a surrogate—or a "reasonably available" surrogate. There are five other key populations of unbefriended individuals: (b) minors, (c) the homeless, (d) the mentally disabled, (e) individuals in same-sex relationships, and (f) individuals who have family or friends but who are nevertheless unbefriended due to a plethora of legal and other reasons. I group these various populations into three categories: (1) permanently unbefriended, (2) legally unbefriended, and (3) temporarily unbefriended.

1. Permanently Unbefriended

Incapacitated patients without surrogates in four populations are properly described as "permanently unbefriended." These four populations are: (1) the elderly, (2) the homeless, (3) the mentally ill, and (4) patients whose potential surrogates are unwilling or unable to serve.154 These individuals literally have no one to make treatment decisions on their behalf. No available surrogate even exists.

a. The Elderly

Most of the unbefriended are elderly. For example, take Great-Aunt Sue, who "outlived her husband, never had any children, and has survived all of her siblings and their children."155 The 2010 U.S. Census indicates there were approximately 40,000,000 people over the age of 65 living in the U.S., 13 percent of the total population.156 This is a 15 percent increase in that age group since 2000.157 It is one

152. See generally Silverman, supra note 150.
154. Parekh & Adorno, supra note 153, at 2. One study flags the prevalence of transgender individuals among the unrepresented. Courtwright et al., supra note 143.
157. Id.
of the fastest growing age groups.\textsuperscript{158} Moreover, the 65 and older age group will continue to grow at unprecedented rates because the boomer generation, born between 1946 and 1964, is one of the largest generations in U.S. history.\textsuperscript{159}

Because of a lower marriage rate, a higher divorce rate, and fewer children, among other factors, many in this growing population are aging alone.\textsuperscript{160} Nearly one-half of those 75+ and 30 percent of those 65+ live alone.\textsuperscript{161} Social isolation is a significant and growing problem among the elderly and especially among the extreme elderly.\textsuperscript{162} This negatively affects the health of these individuals while they still have capacity.\textsuperscript{163} And it causes them to become unbefriended when they lose capacity.

\textit{b. The Homeless}

The homeless are another group who are likely to be permanently unbefriended. Often, it is difficult or impossible even to identify homeless patients.\textsuperscript{164} Obviously, when the patient cannot be identified, it is difficult, even impossible, to identify her or his surrogate. Moreover, even when clinicians can identify the person,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{158} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Karp & Wood, supra note 107, at 149.
\item \textsuperscript{162} See U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, \textit{Hearing: Aging Without Community: The Consequences of Isolation and Loneliness} (April 27, 2017); Harry Owen Taylor et al., \textit{Social Isolation, Depression, and Psychological Distress Among Older Adults}, J. AGING & HEALTH, Oct. 17, 2016, DOI:10.1177/0898264316673511.
\item \textsuperscript{164} See QUINN, supra note 21, at 111.
\end{itemize}
many homeless individuals do not have family or friends who are willing and able to make decisions on their behalves.165

For example, Michelle Bateman, a 43-year-old woman, remained unconscious in the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania for four months before she was identified and her family located.166 She went into cardiac arrest on August 13, 2010, and was brought to an area hospital and later transferred to Penn, but never regained consciousness.167 Because no one could determine her identity and no family members were immediately present, the hospital was left to absorb all costs of treatment and presumably all decisions relating to that treatment.168 Meanwhile, her family placed missing person reports and made phone calls, and the hospital ran nationwide fingerprint checks and asked for help from local TV stations and newspapers, but to no avail.169 Finally, four months later, in December 2010, a friend recognized her picture in the newspaper and contacted her family.170

c. Mentally Disabled

A third category of permanently unbefriended are those with mental disabilities. This category typically includes two populations: (1) developmentally disabled: people with conditions such as mental retardation, autism, cerebral palsy, or epilepsy, and (2) people who are mentally ill: people with conditions such as schizophrenia, manic-depressive disorder, and serious depression. Although these populations often overlap significantly with the homeless population, many others are served by special institutions.171 Because mentally

165. James J. O’Connell, Raging Against the Night: Dying Homeless and Alone, 16(3) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 262, 263 (Fall 2005); John Song, Edward R. Ratner, & Diane M. Bartels, Dying While Homeless: Is It a Concern When Life Itself Is Such a Struggle?" 16(3) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 251, 251 (Fall 2005); Wendi M. Norris et al., Treatment Preferences for Resuscitation and Critical Care among Homeless Persons, 127(6) CHEST 2180, 2181 (2005).


167. Id.

168. Id.

169. Id.

170. Id.

171. Seena Fazel, Vivek Khosla, Helen Doll & John Geddes, The Prevalence of Mental Disorders
disabled patients are often easily identifiable and are especially vulnerable, many laws and programs have been developed specifically for their benefit and protection.\textsuperscript{172}

\textit{d. Unwilling or Unable}

Finally, some patients are unbefriended despite the \textit{existence} of family or friends. Although family or friends may exist, they are \textit{unavailable} to make treatment decisions.\textsuperscript{173} They might not be found or reachable by healthcare providers.\textsuperscript{174} They may be unwilling to participate because of time constraints, physical location, or a poor relationship with the patient.\textsuperscript{175} Other times, even if the potential surrogate is willing to participate, they may be unable to participate because of their own capacity issues or because the patient herself did not want them to serve.\textsuperscript{176}

\textbf{2. Legally Unbefriended}

In contrast to the permanently unbefriended, the "legally unbefriended" have someone available and willing to make treatment decisions on their behalf. But because of legalities, these patients may still become unbefriended. There are two key populations of legally unbefriended patients: (1) patients in same sex relationships, and (2) patients in other non-traditional relationships.

\textit{a. Same Sex Couples}

Before June 26, 2013, only a minority of states legally recognized same-sex marriages.\textsuperscript{177} Consequently, same-sex partners were often

\textsuperscript{172} See infra Part VIII.
\textsuperscript{173} Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen § 5-605(a) (West 2016) (providing four definitions of "unavailable").
\textsuperscript{174} Id.
\textsuperscript{175} Id.
\textsuperscript{176} Id.
not recognized as a patient’s “spouse” for purposes of healthcare decision-making, unless the spouse had been appointed a surrogate in an advance directive.\textsuperscript{178} This barrier was removed when the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires every state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state.\textsuperscript{179}

\textbf{b. Non-Traditional Relationships}

Other non-traditional relationships are also at risk of being unbefriended. A recent study of over 100,000 patients found that only 93 percent identified a member of their nuclear family as next of kin.\textsuperscript{180} Four percent selected friends or relatives outside their nuclear family as surrogates, including “baby momma,” “common law spouse,” and “live-in soul mate.”\textsuperscript{181} One percent chose unrelated individuals to whom they had a different social tie, including “landlady,” “priest,” “roommate,” or “sponsor.”\textsuperscript{182} While those in the study had capacity to identify and nominate these non-nuclear family surrogates—if they had not already done so in an advance directive—incapacitated individuals have no such opportunity. Because many states do not recognize these relationships as authorizing healthcare decision-making, these patients may become legally unbefriended.

Alternatively, one might say that patients in same-sex relationships are not “unbefriended.” After all, they have close friends available to serve as surrogates. Yet, these patients remain “unrepresented,” because their friends are not legally authorized or recognized to serve as substitute decision makers.


\textsuperscript{180} Andrew B. Cohen, Mark Trentalange & Terri Fried, Patients with Next of Kin Relationships Outside the Nuclear Family, 313(13) JAMA 1369, 1369 (2015).

\textsuperscript{181} Id. at 1370. See also Colleen Galambos et al., Analysis of Advance Directive Documentation to Support Palliative Care Activities in Nursing Homes, 41 Health & Social Work 228, 231 (2016) (finding in a study of 1900 nursing home residents that 14 percent designated “other relative,” 2 percent designated “friend,” and 8 percent designated an “unknown” individual).

\textsuperscript{182} Cohen, Trentalange & Fried, supra note 180, at 1370.
3. Temporarily Unbefriended

The permanently unbefriended have no available surrogate. The legally unbefriended have a willing and available surrogate, but that person is not authorized to serve as surrogate. In contrast, the temporarily unbefriended "have" a surrogate that is legally authorized and willing to serve. But the surrogate is not available within the relevant timeframe for healthcare decision-making. There are two main populations of temporarily unbefriended patients: (1) minors and (2) those with momentarily unreachable surrogates.

a. Minors

With a few limited exceptions, individuals under the age of majority, typically 18, may not legally consent to medical treatment. Consent must be given by a parent, guardian, or other legally authorized adult. Typically, a parent will attend doctors' appointments with minor children, but children often present to a medical facility without an adult. In the absence of an adult who can legally consent, physicians are urged to refrain from treating minors in non-emergency situations. Physicians who provide care without proper consent may be subject to civil liability.

There are many reasons why parents or guardians might not be available. First, family living arrangements vary greatly, and many children reside with an adult who is not a legal guardian, such as a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or stepparent. Second, children may be brought to medical facilities by a childcare provider. It is increasingly common for both parents to work, resulting in children

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 428.
187. Id.
189. Id.
spending large amounts of time with childcare providers. Such providers are not legal guardians, and, therefore, do not have legal authority to consent to treatment. Third, children may be traveling out-of-state without a parent when a need for treatment arises. In certain states, noncustodial parents may not consent to medical treatment. Or the parents may go on vacation, leaving their minor child at home. Fourth, many children live in foster homes, and often no one has asked the court to appoint a legal guardian.

These challenges may seem surprising given the enhanced communication available in today’s culture. But many hospitals and emergency personnel find it difficult or impossible to achieve real-time contact with parents or guardians, as many facilities do not have adequate systems in place to achieve this. Some states have expanded the ability of individuals to appoint proxies and agents. For example, in 2015, Florida enacted legislation permitting parents or guardians to appoint an agent who can authorize non-emergency medical treatment for a minor.

b. Momentarily Unreachable Surrogates

Just as parents may be momentarily unreachable to make healthcare decisions for their children, other types of surrogates may also be temporarily unreachable. One study found that 45 percent of incapacitated patients’ next-of-kin could not be reached to make treatment decisions.

190. Id. at 1189.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1190.
193. Id.
194. Berger, supra note 188, at 1194.
195. Id. at 1190.
197. Id.
199. Id.
III. Risks and Patient Safety Problems

Unbefriended patients are vulnerable to many undesirable, and possibly dangerous or life-threatening, situations. They often have multiple chronic conditions such as Alzheimer's disease, cancer, heart problems, diabetes, and kidney failure.201 With no available formal decision-making mechanism, their healthcare providers are left in a quandary.202

On the one hand, they might treat the patient without consent. On the other hand, providers might refuse to treat until they can obtain valid consent. Providers in the U.S. take both approaches, exposing the patients to two different types of risks: overtreatment and undertreatment.203 In addition, because there is no one to authorize discharge, the unbefriended often remain in inappropriate healthcare settings.204 Finally, apart from physical risks, the unbefriended are likely to receive treatment that is discordant with their preferences and values.205

A. Physical Risks from Overtreatment

The unbefriended are often overtreated. The absence of an authorized surrogate often results in “maximum medical intervention, whether or not a medical ‘full court press’ is clinically and ethically warranted.”206 The unbefriended receive unnecessary or unwanted treatment for various reasons, including physicians’ fear of civil liability for failure to treat, institutional fear of regulatory sanctions, physicians’ economic incentives to treat, and physicians’ general interventionistic philosophy of medicine.207

201. Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 12.
202. Id. at 20–21.
204. Id. at 19–20.
205. Id.
B. Physical Risks from Undertreatment

Not only are the unbefriended overtreated, they are also undertreated. Many physicians refuse to provide any type of treatment without informed consent. Consequently, important decisions may be “postponed dangerously, [or] forgone altogether.” Some physicians will wait until an emergency, and then consent is implied, and therefore, there is no need for a surrogate to authorize treatment.

However, delaying treatment while waiting for emergency situations may result in longer periods of suffering and indignity, and increases the chance of morbidity to the patient. The absence of a surrogate can “stymie decision-making and possibly leave . . . patients to linger in pain and discomfort.” The Institute of Medicine found it ethically “troublesome” to wait “until the patient’s medical condition worsens into an emergency so consent to treat is implied.” Such an approach “compromises patient care and prevents any thorough and thoughtful consideration of patient preferences or best interests.”

C. Physical Risks from Inappropriate Setting

Unable to secure consent for discharge, the unbefriended patient often remains at the wrong healthcare setting, such as a hospital, for too long. The delay lengthens the patient’s stay and the risk of nosocomial infections. Whether through interacting with other
patients or just being in the hospital environment, 10 percent to 20 percent of patients develop urinary tract infections, pneumonia, or other hospital-acquired infections. The longer the stay, the higher the risk. Furthermore, the unbefriended patient may be deprived of needed care such as the benefits of hospice. Or they might progressively lose their ability for rehabilitation.

D. Risks to Patient Autonomy

Physical harm is not the only type of risk posed to the unbefriended. A serious affront to individual self-determination is also a threat. Whether overtreated or undertreated, the unbefriended are susceptible to treatment decisions that do not conform to their personal values, morals, or beliefs. The Institute of Medicine observes: "'Unbefriended' patients who have neither decision-making capacity nor a surrogate decision maker are at particular risk of not having their wishes known or followed." For instance, several studies report that physicians often make decisions based upon their own preferences. They may not know the patient, or they may not be willing or able to take the time to learn the patient's preference. A treatment decision that is not based upon a patient's own preferences and values is particularly offensive in a society that places a premium on personal autonomy. To the extent that a patient's preferences and values can be ascertained, treatment decisions should be determined through substituted


217. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, PREVENTING HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS 1 (2016).


219. MOYE ET AL., supra note 149, at 28. Of course, the lack of a surrogate may not be the only obstacle to discharge. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Herbst, Permanent Patients: Hospital Discharge Planning Meets Housing Insecurity, 47(1) HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6 (Jan.-Feb. 2017).

220. See DYING IN AMERICA, supra note 23, at 147-52.

221. Id. at 146.

222. Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, supra note 38, at 370 ("Without a surrogate, decisions may be less open, less clearly articulated, and more susceptible to judgments about the patient's social and individual worth."); see Norris et al., supra note 165, at 2185.
judgment; otherwise, they should be consistent with the patient’s best interests.

IV. Prevention Is the Best Solution

Before examining “special” decision-making mechanisms for the unbefriended, it is important to first examine ways to prevent a patient from becoming unbefriended in the first place. Using established autonomy-protective strategies can often preclude the need to resort to “alternative” decision-making mechanisms. Three key preventative strategies are: (1) vigilant and ultracareful capacity assessments, (2) more and better advance care planning, and (3) diligent searching for surrogates.

A. Vigilant and Ultracareful Capacity Assessment

Obviously, the best person to make healthcare decisions for the patient is the patient herself. With support, time, and good communication, seemingly unbefriended individuals may be able to make decisions that at first blush appear not to be possible. The individuals might not actually be unbefriended. But for a diagnostic or assessment error, clinicians would assess them as still having capacity to make their own treatment decisions. 223

Many bioethicists are concerned that unbefriended individuals are more likely to be the victim of an incorrect determination of incapacity by a physician. 224 Indeed, patients often present to a hospital with an initial appearance of incapacity that later “dissipates under scrutiny.” 225 For example, in one reported case, an elderly woman who entered Massachusetts General Hospital for a heart

223. See Michael Church & Sarah Watts, Assessment of Mental Capacity: A Flow Chart Guide, 31 The Psychiatrist 304, 304–306 (2007) (reviewing “properly supported processes” sufficient to enable the patient to make the decision in question, such as: multiple learning trials with corrected feedback and enhanced structure using computer-based presentations); Norris et al., supra note 165, at 2185.
225. Cristina Papanikos, Establishing the Guardianship, 8 FLA. GUARD. PRAC. § 12.16; Lesley Charles et al., Physician Education on Decision-Making Capacity Assessment, 63 CANADIAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN e21 (2017) (finding that physicians are poorly trained and vary in their approaches to assessing capacity).
condition found herself just days later declared mentally ill and
transferred involuntarily to a nursing home. A subsequent, more
detailed evaluation convinced the original judge to void the
guardianship and restore her freedom.

Capacity is not all-or-nothing. While nearly half of long-term-care
residents may lack capacity, a quarter still had partial capacity. For
example, although patients may lack the capacity to make complex
treatment decisions, they may have sufficient capacity to appoint a
surrogate. The Volunteers of America-Minnesota program found
that even though half its clients had a cognitive impairment, they still
had sufficient capacity to complete an advance directive. An
unbefriended patient might still have capacity to share what she
thinks “about death, life, her current living situation, and her hopes
for the future.” In short, the unbefriended should be allowed to
participate in making decisions to the extent that they can.

bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2008/01/18/old_sick_and_unbefriended/.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, supra note 38, at 369.
230. See Gillick, supra note 140, at 87; AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW AND AGING &
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS 52 (2008); Scott Y. H. Kim and Paul S. Appelbaum, The Capacity to
Appoint a Proxy and the Possibility of Concurrent Proxy Directives, 24 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 469
231. ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 8.
232. See Baumrucker et al., supra note 131, at 587. The concept of the “least restrictive alternative” is
a centerpiece of guardianship reform. See MENTAL HEALTH LEGAL ADVISORS COMM., THE HANDBOOK
ON GUARDIANSHIP AND THE ALTERNATIVES 6 (2007).
233. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES art.12 (2008). In
states that utilize the traditional process, substantial efforts are underway to develop practical
alternatives and guardian prevention methods. Darlene Payne Smith & Sharon B. Gardner, Complex
Family Matters in Guardianship, Advanced Elder Law and Advanced Guardianship, in ADVANCED
GUARDIANSHIP COURSE 2009 ch.11 at 1 (Houston, TX: State Bar of Texas, 2009). For instance, the
Texas legislature recently mandated the development of an additional program to assist those
individuals with mental disabilities and no guardian in making decisions. H.B. 1454, 2009 Leg., 81st
Sess. (Tx. 2009). The statute requires the Health and Human Services Commission to develop and
evaluate two Volunteer Supported Decision-Making Advocate Programs. Id.; The programs will assist
these individuals in making life decisions such as where to live and with whom and where to work. Id.;
See Volunteer Supported Decision-Making, TX. COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES,
6, 2017).
Particularly encouraging is the growth of “supported decision making.” 234 This is a process in which adults who need assistance with decision making—for example, some people with intellectual or developmental disabilities—receive the help they need and want to understand the situations and choices they face—so they can make life decisions for themselves—without the need for a substitute decision maker.235

Perhaps the patient really does lack capacity. Even then, that may not be a necessary or permanent condition. Perhaps the incapacity is caused by medical conditions such as infections, dehydration, delirium, malnutrition, pain, or medication side effects. Perhaps it is caused by sensory deficits such as hearing or vision loss. Perhaps incapacity is caused by psychological conditions such as stress, grief, or depression. Many of these conditions can be treated. Thereby, the patient’s capacity could be restored.236


236. MOYE ET AL., supra note 149, at 21 (reporting in some cases “a clinical intervention improves capacity (e.g. delirium clears or medication enhances acuity)” and emphasizing “attention to enhancing and restoring capacity”); Moye et al., supra note 143 (offering checklists on how to enhance capacity); Courtwright et al., supra note 143 (finding 20% of unrepresented patients had “fluctuating” capacity); AM. BAR ASS’N, PRACTICAL TOOL, supra note 33, at 6 (2016).
B. More and Better Advance Care Planning

Better capacity assessment can reduce the number of unbefriended patients. Some can make treatment decisions for themselves. Others can at least nominate an agent or surrogate to make treatment decisions on their behalf. But these are limited solutions. Many unbefriended are permanently unconscious or otherwise "definitely" incapacitated.237 Yet, even for many of these patients, prevention can help. But it must come earlier.

If patients leave adequate guidance about their post-capacity treatment, then they can avoid the risks of being unbefriended. All individuals are strongly encouraged to engage in advance care planning.238 Even isolated individuals who are unable to appoint a family member might still be able to appoint a friend or a "professional" surrogate.239

A Minnesota program nicely illustrates the use of advance care planning to prevent at-risk individuals from becoming unbefriended.240 From 2008 to 2011, supported in part by a grant from the Minnesota Department of Human Services, the Volunteers of America-Minnesota (VOAMN) ran a program called "The Unbefriended Elders: Matching Values with Decisions."241 The program served elderly residents of certain counties who had no written healthcare directive on file and who were at risk of guardianship proceedings because of the absence of any available default surrogate.242 The program consisted of local volunteers who were trained to identify and work with the unbefriended before they became incapacitated.243 The volunteers helped the at-risk elderly to complete healthcare directives and identify, locate, and support potential surrogate decision makers.244 Evaluations of the project

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237. See Gillick, supra note 140, at 87.
238. END OF LIFE CARE AUDIT, supra note 144 at 10; Farrell et al., supra note 3.
239. See Gillick, supra note 140, at 90.
240. ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 8.
241. Id. at 8–9.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
indicate 62.5 percent of those served completed healthcare directives and 80 percent named an agent.245

The program evaluators concluded that it is very feasible to serve this vulnerable population, and that there is a growing need for training and education regarding their unmet needs.246 The grant that funded the VOAMN project expired and the program has formally ended.247 But the Care Management and Consultation branch of the VOAMN still provides assistance for the unbefriended and those caring for them.248

Even if a patient has not engaged in advance care planning before admission to a hospital or long-term care facility, it still may not be too late. Clinicians should, at least at that point, clarify the patient’s preferences about who should serve as surrogate in the event the patient loses capacity. Indeed, these very inquiries are legally mandated both by state law249 and by the Patient Self Determination Act.250

Furthermore, some have suggested that electronic physician orders for life sustaining treatment registries can help track the wishes of the unbefriended.251 Several additional states have enacted Provider

246. Id. at 42.
247. ORTIZ, supra note 7, at 9.
249. For example, a New York Statute mandates the following:
   Within a reasonable time after admission as an inpatient to the hospital of each adult patient, the hospital shall make reasonable efforts to determine if the patient has appointed a health care agent or has a guardian. . . . With respect to a patient who lacks capacity, if no such health care agent, guardian or potential surrogate is identified, the hospital shall identify, to the extent reasonably possible, the patient’s wishes and preferences, including the patient’s religious and moral beliefs, about pending health care decisions, and shall record its findings in the patient’s medical record.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2994-g(1) (2015).
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) legislation. In just the past several years, these include: Delaware, Indiana, and Nevada. While limited to a certain set of life-sustaining treatments for seriously ill patients, POLST permits individuals to create clear, actionable, transferable orders for their post-capacity treatment, so to better avoid some of the risks of being unbefriended.

The promise of advance care planning may be even greater today. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) included advance care planning in the 2016 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. There are now two new current procedural technology (CPT) codes for these services: 99497 and 99498. The former covers “advance care planning including the explanation and discussion of advance directives such as standard forms (with completion of such forms, when performed), by the physician or other qualified healthcare professional; first 30 minutes, face-to-face with the patient, family member(s), and/or surrogate.” The latter covers the same for “each additional 30 minutes.”

In short, these new CPT codes address one of the most significant barriers to advance care planning: inadequate Medicare reimbursement. If physicians are paid to explore end-of-life options, then these discussions will occur more often. Indeed, the evidence supports this. Nearly 14,000 providers billed almost $35 million for advance care planning conversations for about 223,000 patients from January through June 2016.


255. Id. at 366 n.13.

256. Id.

257. Id.


While more advance care planning can help limit the number of unbefriended, it will never be a complete solution. Among other obstacles, homeless, institutionalized, or migratory individuals may lack access to appropriate witnesses or notaries to complete an advance directive.260

C. Diligent Search for Surrogates

Better capacity assessment and more advance care planning are two proven prevention strategies.261 A third is diligent searching.262 For many individuals who are initially thought to be unbefriended, a diligent search often turns up an available surrogate.263 The search should be, and is often legally required to be, aggressive and rigorous.264 Before reverting to “special” mechanisms for the unbefriended, many states first require a very careful documentation of efforts to locate “natural” surrogates.265

For example, facility staff should contact nursing homes, neighbors, and relevant service agencies.266 They should attempt to legally gain access to a patient’s home or apartment.267 They should construct a genogram (a graphic of a person’s family relationships and medical history) and an eco-map (a graphic of the systems at play in a person’s life).268 Staff should examine patients’ personal effects, health records, social media, and other records such as

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261. See Advance Care Planning, supra note 258, at 362, 367 n.1.
262. See Sapatkin, supra note 166; Farrell et al., supra note 3.
263. See id.
264. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 313.005(b) (stating the “attending physicians shall make a reasonably diligent effort to contact . . . persons eligible to serve as surrogate decision-makers”).
265. See FLA. STAT. § 765.401(h) (2016).
266. L.M. Peterson, Clinical Decision Making for the Unbefriended Patient, 17 LAHEY CLINIC J. MED. ETHICS 1, 3 (2010).
267. Id.
benefits and pension plans. In this way, surrogates were found for nearly half of those who were initially thought to be unbefriended.

Of course, there is not always time to engage in all these efforts. But even if the identification of a surrogate is not possible, prior healthcare providers and others may have information about a patient’s history, past relationships, wishes, values, or priorities. Even if a surrogate cannot be found, providers may still be able to gather “scattered bits and pieces of information, clues from a patient’s past.” In short, even an unsuccessful search can be valuable, because clinicians may gather evidence that clarifies a patient’s values relating to healthcare, and preferences regarding treatment under different circumstances.

This is important, because whoever makes the treatment decision should exercise substituted judgment to the extent possible. Decision making on other grounds is illegitimate. For example, a 2012 decision of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts reversed a lower court’s order authorizing an abortion and sterilization of a 32-year-old mentally ill woman. While incapacitated, the woman clearly and consistently had expressed her opposition to an abortion. Similarly, a lawsuit in Washington, D.C., alleged that the D.C. government consented to elective surgeries for mentally disabled residents without considering their wishes. Only if

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269. See Peterson, supra note 266, at 8.; MOYE ET AL., supra note 149, at 41–42; Moye et al., supra note 143 (including detailed checklists on how to locate friends and family).

270. See Robichaud & Griggins, supra note 132, at 8. On the other hand, social work resources are limited. Resources devoted to extensive searching are resources that cannot benefit other patients.

271. Id. at 7.

272. See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 18.


275. Id.

276. Id. at 141.

277. Id. at 137.

evidence of patient wishes is not available should surrogates make healthcare decisions on the grounds of objective best interests.

V. Prevention with Better Default Surrogate Lists

Healthcare providers can and should take measures to help prevent individuals from becoming unbefriended. But lawmakers can help too. If the statutory list of authorized surrogates were longer or broader, then it is more likely that a surrogate will be found. Similarly, if the list allowed clinicians more flexibility in nominating a surrogate, then it would be more likely that a surrogate will be found.279

A. Longer Default Surrogate Lists

Most individuals have either not completed, or at least not effectively implemented, advance directives appointing healthcare agents or durable powers of attorney.280 In response, most states have enacted “default statutes,” which specify a hierarchy of surrogates to consent to medical treatment on behalf of incapacitated individuals.281 These surrogates do not need to be designated or appointed by the patient or by a court.282 Instead, they are automatically designated, based on their familial, or otherwise defined, relationship to the incapacitated individual.283 U.S. statues normally provide a list in order of priority.284 Most give spouses the


281. Id. at 215-16.

282. Id.

283. Id. In most states, the surrogate is authorized solely because of her familial relationship to the patient. But some, like North Dakota, add a condition that the family member must have “maintained significant contacts with the incapacitated person.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13 (2017).

highest priority and typically also include, in various sequences, parents, siblings, adult children, and grandparents.\textsuperscript{285}

With a broader and longer statutory list of authorized surrogates, it is more likely that a surrogate can be found, and, thus, less likely that a patient will be unbefriended.\textsuperscript{286} After all, one catches more fish with a bigger net.\textsuperscript{287} Recently, several states expanded their default surrogate lists.\textsuperscript{288} In addition, some states’ default priority lists are now broader because of unrelated legislation. For example, the term “spouse” in all surrogate lists now includes same-sex partners.\textsuperscript{289} Most notable among these surrogate list amendments is that many states have amended their laws to allow “close friends,” or some variation of “interested adult,” to make decisions when no family member is available.\textsuperscript{290}

\textsuperscript{285} ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(A)(6); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507; D.C. CODE § 21-2210; FLA. STAT. § 765.401(g); O.C.G.A § 31-9-2(7); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 40/25(a)(7); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-805; MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(a)(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322; N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-12-13; OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2)(g); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5461; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(A)(7); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-8; WIS. STAT. § 50.06; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-406.

\textsuperscript{286} MOYE ET AL., supra note 149, at 20 (reporting that 95% of interviewees “believe that a Default Consent provision would decrease the number of guardianships overall . . . reserving public guardianship as truly a last resort function”). My own informal interviews revealed that clinicians in Indiana and Minnesota push families to seek guardianship when the default surrogate list does not clearly recognize their authority. Some states, like Delaware, also have comparatively shorter lists of eligible relatives. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507. In contrast, other states include, near the bottom of the list, “nearest living relative” or “close adult relative.” See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. tit. § 21-2210; FLA. STAT. § 765.401. The shorter the list of surrogates, the more likely it is that patients will be unbefriended. On the other hand, the variations in statutory lists may be mitigated by the fact that “overwhelmingly . . . clinical practice is to talk with everyone who is present and demonstrating knowledge . . . concern for the patient.” David Godfrey, Clinical Realities in Healthcare Decision Making, 38(4) BIFOCAL 57, 57 (April 2017).

\textsuperscript{287} Cf. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 575 n.2, 581 n.9 (2003). On the other hand, while a longer surrogate list helps prevent patients from becoming unbefriended, this may not necessarily improve the quality of healthcare decision making. Some default surrogate lists recognize surrogates who may not perform well.


\textsuperscript{290} ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(d) (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(A)(6) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19a-571 (2016); D.C. CODE § 21-2210 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 765.401(g) (2016); O.C.G.A § 31-9-2(7) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503 (2016); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 40/25(a)(7) (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-805 (2016); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-605(a)(2) (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5 (2017); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (2016); N.D.
For example, New Mexico permits "an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values and who is reasonably available" to act as a surrogate when no family member listed in the statutory hierarchy is available.\textsuperscript{291} Similarly, Pennsylvania allows "an adult who has knowledge of the principal’s preferences and values, including, but not limited to, religious and moral beliefs, to assess how the principal would make healthcare decisions."\textsuperscript{292} The Veterans Health Administration also includes "close friend" in its default surrogate list.\textsuperscript{293}

The Delaware Health Care Decisions Act purports to include close friends as default surrogates.\textsuperscript{294} When no family member is available, the statute authorizes "an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values and who is reasonably available" to make medical treatments.\textsuperscript{295} But the statute awkwardly authorizes a close friend only if the chancery court appoints that person as a guardian.\textsuperscript{296} Commentators often write that Delaware includes close friends as default surrogates,\textsuperscript{297} but since providers cannot informally designate close friends, close friends are not really part of Delaware’s default priority list.

\textsuperscript{291} N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(c) (West 1997). However, the statute further dictates that a surrogate "may not be an owner, operator or employee of a health-care institution at which the patient is receiving care." Id. § 24-7A-5(j).
\textsuperscript{292} 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5461 (West 2006).
\textsuperscript{293} 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e)(4) (2009); VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., HANDBOOK 1004.01, INFORMED CONSENT FOR CLINICAL TREATMENTS AND PROCEDURES 1 (2009) [hereinafter VHA HANDBOOK].
\textsuperscript{294} 16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2507(b)(3)(a) (West 2016).
\textsuperscript{295} Id. § 2507(b)(2–3).
\textsuperscript{296} Id. § 2507(b)(4–5).
Over the past several years, several additional states have added "close friends" as authorized surrogates in their default statutes.\textsuperscript{298} For example, in 2010, a Georgia bill added "adult friends" to its list of default surrogates.\textsuperscript{299} This new category includes an "adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is generally familiar with the patient's health care views and desires, and who is willing and able to become involved in the patient's health care decisions and to act in the patient's best interest."\textsuperscript{300}

In 2010, New York also added "close friend" as its ultimate default surrogate or decision-maker of last resort.\textsuperscript{301} Under the New York Family Health Care Decisions Act, "close friend" includes an individual "who has maintained such regular contact with the patient as to be familiar with the patient's activities, health, and religious or moral beliefs, and who presents a signed statement to that effect to the attending physician."\textsuperscript{302} In 2011, New Jersey introduced legislation, closely patterned after the New York act, which would have authorized the patient’s close friend as the ultimate default surrogate.\textsuperscript{303}

In 2014, Louisiana added "adult friend" to the end of its priority list.\textsuperscript{304} An adult friend is one "who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is generally familiar with the patient’s health care views and desires, and who is willing and able to become involved in the patient’s health care decisions and to act in the patient’s best interest."\textsuperscript{305} The statute requires the adult friend to sign

\textsuperscript{298} See, e.g., infra note 299. Close friends are also included in healthcare decisions statutes of many foreign jurisdictions. See, e.g., Guardianship Act of 1987 (NSW) cl 3E (Aust.).
\textsuperscript{299} O.C.G.A. § 31-9-2 (2010).
\textsuperscript{300} S.B. 367, 150th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010).
\textsuperscript{301} N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(1)(f) (McKinney 2017). Like most state statutes, New York's contains certain restrictions on who may serve as a surrogate, even if the individual would otherwise qualify as a close friend. Id. § 2994-d(2). Notably, healthcare providers typically cannot qualify as close friends. Id.
\textsuperscript{302} N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-a(4) (McKinney 2017).
\textsuperscript{305} Id.
B. More Flexible Default Surrogate Lists

Instead of making the default list longer, some states have given healthcare providers more flexibility and discretion. Instead of specifying a strict sequence in hierarchical priority, these lists allow the providers to select the individual they judge will make the best surrogate.

Tennessee has an interesting variation on the statutory default priority list that places the physician in a powerful position. A recent Tennessee court case held that despite existing custom, a patient’s next of kin is not automatically authorized to make healthcare decisions upon the patient’s incapacity. If a patient has not appointed an agent and a court has not appointed a guardian, then the treating physician is authorized to appoint a decision maker. The statutory default list is not a mandate but only a guideline. The physician does not mechanically follow the sequence in the statute.

Instead, the physician must choose "an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, who is reasonably available, and who is willing to serve." Physicians may consider family members or next of kin, but are not bound to do so. They may choose any adult, so long as that person satisfies the listed criteria.

Like Tennessee, West Virginia similarly gives an attending physician or advanced nurse practitioner discretion to select the best
qualified surrogate, even if that person would be lower in a common ranking of surrogates.\textsuperscript{314}

Colorado and Hawaii have similar variations on the default priority list, but which leave the physician with some discretion, though less than in Tennessee and West Virginia.\textsuperscript{315} After determining that a patient is incapacitated, the attending physician may initiate proceedings to nominate a surrogate decision maker to act on behalf of the patient.\textsuperscript{316} The physician seeks out as many interested persons as possible, including the patient’s spouse, family, and close friends\textsuperscript{317}. There is no automatic hierarchy.\textsuperscript{318} Instead, all interested parties must meet and decide amongst themselves who will be the decision maker.\textsuperscript{319}

Hopefully, the group will choose the person who is most familiar with and most likely to honor the patient’s wishes and values. The nominated individual is then legally authorized to make decisions for the patient, and should make decisions based on the substituted judgment or best interest standard.\textsuperscript{320}


\textsuperscript{315} COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(3) (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(c)-(d) (West 2016). A 2006 roundtable meeting of the Elder Law Section of the Colorado Bar addressed that this statute needs to be amended to provide for an isolated individual with no close family or friends. ELDER LAW SECTION, COLO. BAR ASS’N, MEETING OF ELDER LAW SECTION OF THE CBA 7 (2006), http://www.mentoredforgood.net/repository/Inside_Bar/Elder/ELS%20Minutes%20January%202016.pdf.

\textsuperscript{316} COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(3); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(b).

\textsuperscript{317} COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(1.5)(a); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(b).

\textsuperscript{318} COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(a); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(d).

\textsuperscript{319} COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(a); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(d).

\textsuperscript{320} COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(V); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327E-5(g). The nominated Colorado surrogate, like default surrogates in several other states, may elect to withhold or withdraw artificial nourishment or hydration only under certain conditions. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-103(6)(a). Two physicians—the attending and a second, independent physician—must certify that such care is only “prolonging the act of dying and is unlikely to result in the restoration of the patient to independent neurological functioning.” Id. The statute requires that the healthcare facility provide the assistance of its medical ethics committee to any surrogate decision maker who is deciding to withhold or withdraw medical treatment. Id. § 15-18.5-103(6.5).
C. First Time Default Surrogate List

While a number of states have recently amended already existing priority lists, more than a half dozen other states considered adding completely new default surrogate lists for the first time.321 For example, seeking a mechanism for medical decision making that would “minimize extraneous delay,” Massachusetts considered enacting a default surrogate list.322 The proposed priority included: (1) guardian, (2) spouse, (3) adult child, (4) parent, (5) adult sibling, (6) adult grandchild, and (7) close friend.323

In 2014, New Hampshire enacted legislation that created a strict priority list of default surrogates.324 The statute provides that if there is no reasonably available agent or guardian, a physician or an advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) may identify a surrogate.325 The list includes: the patient’s (1) spouse or civil union partner, unless there is a divorce proceeding, separation agreement, or restraining order limiting that person’s relationship with the patient; (2) adult child; (3) parent; (4) adult sibling; (5) adult grandchild; (6) close friend; (7) agent with financial power of attorney; and (8) guardian of the estate.326

In 2014, New Jersey considered legislation that would have created a strict priority list of default surrogates.327 “A health care facility shall designate one person from the following list, as applicable, from the class highest in priority when persons in prior classes are not reasonably available, willing, and competent to act, to serve as surrogate for an adult patient who is determined to lack decision-making capacity.”328 The list included the patient’s: (1) spouse, partner in a civil union couple, or domestic partner, if not

321. AM. BAR ASS’N Comm’n on Law and Aging, supra note 84, at 3.
323. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
legally separated from the patient; (2) adult child; (3) parent; (4) adult sibling; and (5) close friend.\textsuperscript{329}

In 2015, Vermont considered legislation that would have authorized “surrogates.”\textsuperscript{330} But unlike other states, these surrogates could make decisions only about DNR (do-not-resuscitate) orders or COLST (clinician orders for life sustaining treatment).\textsuperscript{331} The bill defined “surrogate” to include the patient’s: (1) spouse, (2) adult child, (3) adult sibling, (4) adult grandchild, and (5) clergy person.\textsuperscript{332} It also included an “interested person” who has “exhibited special care and concern for the patient” and who is personally familiar with the patient’s values.\textsuperscript{333}

In 2017, Nebraska and Massachusetts considered default surrogate legislation. The Nebraska bill would have established a strict sequence: (1) spouse unless legally separated, (2) adult child, (3) parent, (4) adult brother or sister, and (5) “an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values.”\textsuperscript{334} In contrast, the Massachusetts bill was more flexible, allowing the physician to “select a proposed surrogate who is ranked lower in priority if, in his or her judgment, that individual is best qualified.”\textsuperscript{335}

In 2017, both Oklahoma and Montana successfully enacted default surrogate legislation. The Oklahoma statute provides a strict sequence: (1) guardian, (2) healthcare proxy, (3) attorney-in-fact, (4) spouse, (5) adult children, (6) parents, (7) adult siblings, (8) other adult relatives of the patient in order of kinship, and (9) close friends.\textsuperscript{336} But none of these individuals may act if they were “convicted of, pled guilty to, or pled no contest” to specified crimes,

\textsuperscript{329} Id.
\textsuperscript{331} Id.
\textsuperscript{332} Id.
\textsuperscript{333} Id.
or if they were "found to have committed abuse, verbal abuse or exploitation." 337

In contrast, Montana adopted a more flexible approach like Colorado. The attending clinician shall make reasonable efforts to locate and notify as many interested persons as practicable. These are the patient's spouse, parents, adult children, siblings, grandchildren, and close friends. The clinician informs the "interested persons" of the patient's lack of decisional capacity and asks that they select a lay proxy decision-maker. Those interested persons—and others they invited—must make reasonable efforts to reach a consensus as to who among them will make medical treatment decisions on behalf of the patient. 338

D. Limitations of Default Surrogate Laws

Expanded or more flexible default surrogate laws offer protection to the unbefriended by expanding the categories of individuals who qualify as authorized healthcare decision makers. For example, even those patients who have no available family may still have a close friend.

But expanding default surrogate lists remains only a limited solution. Even close friend laws are of little value to patients who do not have any known or reasonably available close friends. Many times, such patients have had meaningful interactions only with healthcare providers. But providers are almost always prohibited from serving as surrogates, even if they would otherwise qualify as close friends. 339

339. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-5(C) (West 2017); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-d(2) (McKinney 2017) ("An operator, administrator, or employee of a hospital or a mental hygiene facility from which the patient was transferred, or a physician who has privileges at the hospital or a health care provider under contract with the hospital may not serve as the surrogate for any adult who is a patient of such hospital, unless such individual is related to the patient by blood, marriage, domestic partnership, or adoption, or is a close friend of the patient whose friendship with the patient preceded the patient's admission to the facility.").
Perhaps the most vivid example of the limitations of default surrogate lists comes from Colorado. That state already had a flexible default list. But clinicians still confronted significant numbers of unbefriended patients. So, policymakers found it necessary to develop a special decision making mechanism for the unbefriended.

VI. Guardianship Is Rarely a Good Solution

Default surrogate laws are preventative. They help assure that an individual who knows and cares about the patient will be a legally authorized decision maker. But even longer or more flexible default surrogate lists cannot help everyone. For that subset of individuals there is one more standard solution: guardianship. Indeed, in most states, guardianship remains the only officially recognized mechanism by which treatment decisions can be made on behalf of the unbefriended.

But guardianship is neither a preferred nor an adequate solution. Commentators have overwhelmingly concluded that the disadvantages of guardianship significantly outweigh the advantages. Consequently, guardianship is generally considered to be a last resort option, to be used only after all other less restrictive alternatives have been exhausted. Even then, providers are often unable to obtain a guardian or at least obtain one soon enough to make the healthcare decisions at hand.

In this Section, I first (a) summarize why guardianship is not seen as a good solution. I then look at four specific types of guardians: (b)

340. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18.5-104(3) (West 2017).
341. Id.
342. See infra Section VIII.
343. See supra Section V.
344. See supra Section V.
346. See infra Section VI.A.
347. AM. BAR ASS'N, PRACTICAL TOOL, supra note 33, at 6.
348. Id.
private guardians, (c) volunteer guardians, (d) public guardians, and (e) temporary and emergency guardians.

A. Problems with Guardianship

Guardianship is a legal relationship that is created by state courts when a judge determines that individuals are incapacitated and unable to make decisions on their own behalf. The court creates a relationship in which the guardian is given legal authority to make decisions for an incapacitated individual—referred to as the ward—regarding that person or that person’s property, or both. Every state provides for guardianship. Indeed, most states provide no other healthcare decision-making mechanism for the unbefriended. So, especially for the unbefriended, “there might be no alternative to a guardianship if such an adult becomes incompetent without executing appropriate planning documents.”

On the surface, this might appear to be entirely appropriate and adequate. The formal judicial process helps to assure neutrality, impartiality, and public accountability. The procedural due process afforded by the courts helps to assure that all perspectives and alternatives are aggressively pursued, and it provides important protections against improper decision making. While the courts may lack expertise in healthcare decision making, they can draw on the advice and recommendations of treating and independent clinicians. Consequently, guardianship might appear to be a mechanism ideally suited to protecting vulnerable unbefriended

351. Id.
353. Id.
354. DAYTON ET AL., supra note 345, at § 34:10.
355. See id.
356. See id.; THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 34, at § 3.26[A][2].
357. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 34, at § 3.26[A][2], Lou-Anne M. Beauregard, Ethics in Electrophysiology: Who Speaks for this Man?, 35 PACING & ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 564, 566 (2012).
358. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 34, at § 3.26[D].
Indeed, the American College of Physicians posits that a court-appointed guardian should be utilized in every case.

Nevertheless, despite the widespread utilization of the guardianship procedure, commentators generally believe that the disadvantages of guardianship significantly outweigh the advantages. The five main deficiencies are: (1) slow speed, (2) high cost, (3) limited competence, (4) low availability, and (5) restricted authority.

1. Too Slow.

Perhaps the most frequently mentioned criticism of guardianship is the time that it takes. In terms of speed, court proceedings are problematic, because they are very time consuming, and, in these situations, time is of the essence.Guardianship proceedings regularly take at least six to eight weeks, and they frequently take much longer than that.

Medical decisions must be made in the interim, because the patient will need diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. A 2010 study noted the lack of data describing how decisions are made for patients while they are awaiting a court-appointed guardian. The study

359. Dayton, supra note 345, at § 34:10.
361. See Moye et al., supra note 143; Quinn, supra note 21, at 112; Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, Limits of Advance Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self Determination Act, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 249, 290 (1997).
366. Smith & Luck, supra note 11, at 167; S. Brown, "Medical Decision Making for the Unbefriended: Who Will Decide?"
367. Pamela B. Teaster et al., Public Guardianship: In the Best Interest of Incapacitated
revealed that, in many cases, a treatment decision was necessary prior to the appointment of a guardian. Many commentators charge that it is "morally untenable and clinically unconscionable" for a patient to wait.

To some degree, the waiting period problem can be mitigated. For example, to speed up the process, the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in New Hampshire has coordinated its efforts with the court. For example, hearings are now held by teleconference, and the social work staff prepares petitions in just the way that the court needs. But courts in many jurisdictions will be unable to move faster.

2. Too Expensive

Not only are guardianship procedures too slow but they are also too expensive. In terms of cost, guardianship proceedings require a significant investment. A facility must pay medical experts to assess the patient's capacity, and must pay an attorney to prepare and argue the petition. It must often pay for a guardian ad litem, another attorney or an independent evaluator, to represent the interests of the ward, and the facility must pay filing fees and other court costs. All these expenses will likely total $5,000 to $8,000.
3. Too Unavailable

Even if guardianship worked in terms of time and costs, there is often no guardian for the court to appoint. In terms of availability, an appointed guardian is typically and ideally a willing family member or friend. Companies also provide professional guardianship services for families who can afford them. However, neither of these options is viable for unbefriended individuals without family, friends, or resources. Courts are forced to find other alternatives, such volunteer guardians and public guardians; unfortunately, even these resources are usually inadequate to meet the need.

4. Too Incompetent

Even if guardianship were more accessible in terms of time, cost, and availability, it is unclear what caliber of decision-making guardians can provide. In terms of competence, in most guardian situations, the guardian does not know the patient and is unable to make decisions based on the patient’s morals and values. Moreover, most states have no provision for guardian licensing, certification, or registration. Guardians are poorly trained, and, given very high caseloads, they are often unable to properly supervise their wards. In short, it is unclear whether guardians can or do make

377. QUINN, supra note 21, at 73.
378. Id. at 86–89; Ellen Waldman, No Family? Resources Still Available for Aging Seniors, ASHLAND DAILY TIDING (Feb 22, 2017, 2:00 AM), http://www.dailytidings.com/news/20170222/no-family-resources-still-available-for-aging-seniors
379. QUINN, supra note 21, at 95, 99, 104.
380. Id. at 104.
381. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 52–53.
382. Jeff Kelly, Maggie Kowalski & Candice Novak, Courts Strip Elders of their Independence, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 13, 2008), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/01/13/courts_strip_elders_of_their_independence/. The Boston Globe published an article discussing the dire guardianship situation in Massachusetts, and noted that there are no prerequisite training requirements to become a guardian. Id. The article discusses how “guardianship businesses” open up, but the compensation is so low that, in order to survive, the businesses take on too many wards to adequately monitor all of them; the wards become neglected and ignored, some receiving only two visits a year from their guardian. Id. The article notes that some.wards are too overburdened to properly monitor the guardians and fail to demand the filing of required paperwork. Id. For instance, guardians in Massachusetts are required to file an inventory of property and an annual accounting. Id. But in one county, 262 of the 308 guardian cases in the probate court had no filing at all. Id. See also U.S. GAO, THE EXTENT OF ABUSE BY GUARDIANS IS UNKNOWN, BUT SOME MEASURES EXIST TO HELP PROTECT
better decisions for unbefriended patients than other potential surrogates, such as attending physicians and ethics committees.383

Encouragingly, efforts to improve the guardianship system are ongoing. For example, in the U.S. in 2011, at least 27 states passed new adult guardianship legislation.384 The Third National Guardianship Summit, convened by 10 national organizations in October 2011, resulted in 43 standards for the performance of guardians and 21 recommendations for court and legislative action.385 At the federal level, legislation like the Guardian Accountability and Senior Protection Act would provide funding for state courts to assess and improve handling of adult guardianship proceedings.386

But, even if enacted tomorrow, the impact of reform remains years away. The current guardianship situation is not generally perceived as effective for the unbefriended.387 It is encumbered with “onerous formalities”388 that are “untenable most of the time.”389 Consequently, guardianship is generally viewed as an option of last resort.390

5. Limited Authority

Finally, assuming one were able to navigate the time, costs, availability, and competence obstacles, one more obstacle remains.

OLDER ADULTS (2016).
383. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 53.
387. QUINN, supra note 21, at 104.
388. Frank, supra note 127, at 75.
390. Lisa Nerenberg, Unbefriended Elders Receive Court Protection in California, 27(3) AGING TODAY 10 (2006); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4650 (2016) ("[A] court is normally not the proper forum in which to make healthcare decisions, including decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment."); QUINN, supra note 21, at 99.
Guardians often lack—or perceive that they lack—authority to make certain treatment decisions. 391 For example, in Georgia, an appellate court affirmed the dismissal of a hospital’s petition for an “emergency guardian.” 392 St. Joseph’s/Candler Health System wanted an emergency guardian to authorize the discharge of its patient, Claudine Tapley Farr. 393 But the court denied the request, because there was no “emergency,” no “immediate and substantial risk of death or serious physical injury, illness, or disease.” 394 When courts apply similar rules, hospitals may be relegated to serving as de facto homeless shelters.

Although Georgia narrowed the role of guardians, other states expanded their role. 395 Minnesota and Michigan now permit guardians to make end-of-life decisions. 396 In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that guardians have the authority to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, without court approval, when “all interested parties agree that removal is in the ward’s best interest.” 397 In 2013, Michigan enacted legislation that permits guardians to consent to a DNR order. 398

B. Private Guardians

Even if a treating facility engages in the cumbersome, lengthy guardianship process for an unbefriended patient, there is often yet another obstacle: a shortage of available guardians. 399 Most guardians are family or friends. 400 But these are obviously unavailable to the

393. Id.
394. Id. at 616.
397. In re Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d at 747.
400. Id. at 5.
unbefriended. Professional guardians are willing to serve only if they will be compensated and compensation usually comes from the patient’s estate.\textsuperscript{401} But since the unbefriended are often indigent, professional guardians are usually unavailable.\textsuperscript{402} Frequently, there is nobody else. In short, it is often difficult to find individuals willing to serve as guardians for the unbefriended.\textsuperscript{403}

\textbf{C. Volunteer Guardians}

In response to the challenges with obtaining private guardians, some states have developed volunteer programs. For example, in Akron, Ohio, under the leadership of Probate Judge Elinore Marsh Stormer, Jewish Family Service recruits, screens, and trains volunteer guardians to serve as surrogate decision makers.\textsuperscript{404}

Similarly, the Colorado Guardianship Alliance (the Alliance) developed a program to recruit volunteers to serve as court appointed guardians for the unbefriended.\textsuperscript{405} It screens all potential guardians and requires them to go through a training program, free of charge.\textsuperscript{406} When a medical facility or nursing home has an incapacitated patient, it calls the Alliance, which provides a volunteer guardian, when possible.\textsuperscript{407} The guardian may determine where the ward should live, make medical treatment decisions, and see that daily needs such food, clothing, and shelter are met.\textsuperscript{408} The guardian provides annual reporting to the Alliance as well as to the court.\textsuperscript{409}

\textsuperscript{401} Karp & Wood, \textit{Incapacitated and Alone} supra note 4, at 9–10.
\textsuperscript{402} \textit{Id}. at 14.
\textsuperscript{403} GEORGIA APPLESEED, \textit{supra} note 399, at 6.
\textsuperscript{405} Guardianship Alliance Programs and Services, ABILITY CONNECTION COLO., http://www.abilityconnectioncolorado.org/guardianshipallianceofcolorado/volunteer-guardian-program/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). This program may be superseded by 2016 legislation in Colorado that provides an intramural mechanism for healthcare decision making on behalf of the unbefriended. See \textit{infra} Section VIII.
\textsuperscript{406} Guardianship Alliance Programs and Services, supra note 405.
\textsuperscript{407} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{408} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{409} \textit{Id}.
As in Akron and Colorado, citizens in Indiana forged a statewide initiative to create and fund volunteer guardianship programs. The Indiana Adult Guardianship Services Project (IAGSP) was formed in 2008 and is heavily involved in this initiative. Its stated purpose is to "build a framework of community-based adult guardianship services projects/programs across the state." IAGSP sponsors research projects to further explore the ethics, standards, and regulations surrounding guardianships. As of 2014, IAGSP was working to implement pilot guardianship programs in six counties across the state. It convened a multidisciplinary task force to support development of these programs.

Importantly, Indiana law provides that the court may appoint a volunteer advocate for a senior or incapacitated adult. These guardians may consent to medical care or other treatment needs for an incapacitated adult. As a result of the statewide initiative, Wishard Health Services began funding the Wishard Volunteer Advocates Program. There are dozens of trained volunteers who have served as court-appointed guardians of more than 300 unbefriended patients in Marion County, Indiana hospitals and nursing homes.

The program has experienced significant success. Program consultants report seeing fewer unbefriended patients re-admitted, and greater Medicaid reimbursement to hospitals, due to the

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411. Id.
412. Id.
414. Id. at 12.
415. Id. at 1. The task force consists of various organizations and state agencies, including the Indiana State Guardianship Association (ISGA). Id. at 4. The ISGA is a non-profit organization formed to strengthen guardianship and related services through networking, education, and tracking, and commenting on legislation. Id. at 10. The 2012 report appears to be the last one available.
416. IND. CODE § 29-3-8.5-1 (2016).
417. IND. CODE § 29-3-8.5-4(a)(1)(2016).
418. See id.
guardians who assist patients with the application process. In short, the volunteer program trained enough volunteers to create an effective and quality mechanism. In 2011, the Center for At Risk Elders assumed the responsibilities of the Wishard program, now known as the CARE Volunteer Advocates Program.

D. Public Guardians

Recognizing that the general guardianship situation is poor, most U.S. states have implemented variations of traditional guardianships. Notable among these variations are "public guardianship" programs. These programs follow four different models. Most public guardians are either publicly funded social service organizations or county government public officials.

For instance, Mr. Yeager was an unbefriended individual in Colorado. His physician concluded that attempting resuscitation would be futile. The court affirmed the right of the Morgan County Department of Human Services to authorize a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order and granted the Department unlimited authority to make medical decisions on behalf of Yeager. A minority of states have taken a different approach, instead establishing public guardians as either officials of the court or as employees of an independent state office within the executive branch of government.

Unfortunately, in whatever form they have been established, public guardianship services suffer from three serious problems. First, the programs are generally overburdened, understaffed, and

420. Id. at 2171.
422. See TEASTER ET AL., supra note 367, at 16.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 17.
427. Id. at 592–93.
428. Id. at 595.
429. See TEASTER ET AL., supra note 367, at 23.
underfunded. At the same time, some jurisdictions give guardians ridiculously high numbers of clients, far above the recommended 1:20 ratio. Second, education and training requirements vary considerably. Only 15 states have licensing, certification, or regulation systems. Third, public guardians often have—or at least perceive that they have—limited authority regarding decisions surrounding life-sustaining treatment. Sometimes, they decline to exercise their authority, because they assume that patients are "safe" as long as they are in the hospital.

Some states have moved to develop new or better public guardianship programs. For example, in Oregon, individual counties have long been permitted to fund and establish their own public guardian programs. But almost none of the counties could sustain their programs. So, in 2009 the state convened a task force and renewed it in 2011. The task force estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 Oregon adults needed public guardianship services. Following the task force's recommendations, in 2014, the legislature authorized the Oregon Office of the Long-Term Care Ombudsman, an independent state agency, to appoint a public guardian. The first

431. Teaster, Wood, Schmidt & Lawrence, supra note 430, at 93.
432. Id. at 101, 197.
433. Id.
436. See id.
The public guardian was appointed in late 2014.\footnote{440} The program has begun to provide services but is still being developed.\footnote{441}

Nebraska also recognized that its “present system of obtaining a guardian...for an individual which often depends on volunteers is inadequate.”\footnote{442} So, like Oregon, Nebraska established the public guardian as a decision maker of last resort.\footnote{443} In January 2015, the state started to develop processes, guidelines, and personnel policies to implement the law.\footnote{444} The Nebraska public guardian program is now in operation and has handled more than 100 cases.\footnote{445}

Most recently, Colorado has also been considering a public guardian program.\footnote{446} In 2013, a multi-disciplinary collaborative prepared a white paper that colorfully illustrates the problems of the unbefriended.\footnote{447} For example, the white paper reports how the unbefriended remain in acute care with disproportionately burdensome treatment.\footnote{448} But for the lack of an authorized decision maker, they could be moved to a more appropriate, less restrictive, and less costly setting.\footnote{449}

Among other examples, the Colorado Collaborative for Unrepresented Patients described a patient who had dry gangrene that

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{440} ORE. LEG. COMM. SERVS., GUARDIANSHIPS & OREGON PUBLIC GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR 3 (Sept. 2011).
\footnote{441} Wall, supra note 438; Oregon Long Term Care Ombudsperson, Public Guardian, OREGON.GOV, https://www.oregon.gov/LTCO/Pages/Oregon-Public-Guardian.aspx. Notably, the Oregon Public Guardian and Conservator Program (OPG) prioritizes cases into three levels of priorities. Public Guardian, supra. Healthcare decisions fall into the third category. Id. Because of the OPG's “limited capacity” to provide services, it is “only serving individuals who fall into the highest of these priorities.” Id.
\footnote{442} L.B. 920, 103d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2014) (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-4101 to 4118 (West 2017)).
\footnote{443} Id.
\footnote{446} See generally, COLO. COLLABORATIVE FOR UNREPRESENTED PATIENTS, ADDRESSING GAPS IN HEALTHCARE DECISION MAKING FOR UNREPRESENTED ADULTS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE INCLUSION OF A PUBLIC HEALTHCARE GUARDIAN IN THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP (2013), https://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Supreme_Court/Committees/Committee.cfm?Committee_ID=41
\footnote{447} See generally, id.
\footnote{448} Id. at 7.
\footnote{449} See id. at 7.
\end{footnotes}
was not causing sepsis.\textsuperscript{450} Since this was not an emergency, clinicians could not act on the basis of implied consent.\textsuperscript{451} Since there was no authorized decision maker, clinicians had to wait until the condition deteriorated.\textsuperscript{452} In 2014, the Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court appointed a task force that recommended a pilot public guardianship program.\textsuperscript{453} But unlike Oregon and Nebraska, no bills have been introduced.

\textit{E. Temporary and Emergency Guardians}

Yet another variation on traditional guardianship is to allow for temporary and emergency guardianships.\textsuperscript{454} Such petitions are filed with the court when there is no time to conduct normal "plenary" or full guardianship hearings, which may take several weeks or months.\textsuperscript{455} These procedures are neither as cumbersome nor as expensive as full guardianship.\textsuperscript{456}

Temporary and emergency guardians are authorized to make one or a series of decisions, but do not have unlimited or ongoing decision-making powers.\textsuperscript{457} They are appointed to make the immediate treatment decisions only and then their authorization ends.\textsuperscript{458} For instance, Indiana provides for emergency guardian appointments when an adult needs immediate attention and there is no known person who can consent to treatment.\textsuperscript{459} A temporary

\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{450}.]
\item \textit{Id.} at 8.
\item \textit{Id.} at 8.
\item \textit{Id.} at 8.
\item \textit{CoLO. COLLABORATIVE FOR UNREPRESENTED PATIENTS, supra note 446}, at 8.
\item Related to these are "single court transactions," where the judge directly makes the treatment decision. See \textit{Quinn, supra note 21}, at 112; \textit{Va. CODE ANN. \S 37.2-1101} (West 2016), amended by S.B. 371, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012).
\item E.g., \textit{CAL. PROB. CODE \S 3208} (West 2016); \textit{FLA. PROB. RULE 5.900} (2017); \textit{O.C.G.A. \S 31-36A-7} (2016) (placement only); \textit{IND. CODE \S 16-36-1-8} (2016); \textit{N.J. CT. RULE 4:86-12} (2016) (special medical guardian); \textit{S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. \S 34-12C-4} (2016); \textit{VA CODE ANN. \S 37.2-1101(B)} (West 2016), amended by S.B. 371, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2012).
\item See \textit{Karp \& Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4}, at 29.
\item \textit{Id.}
\item \textit{Id.}
\item \textit{IND. CODE \S 29-3-3-4} (2017).
\end{enumerate}
guardian is appointed for a maximum of 90 days, or until a permanent guardian is appointed.\textsuperscript{460}

In 2010, Georgia gave hospitals and other healthcare facilities the right to petition the court for expedited appointment of a temporary guardian to make medical decisions.\textsuperscript{461} The statute provides: "In the absence, after reasonable inquiry, of any [other surrogate] to consent for the patient, a hospital or other healthcare facility or any interested person may initiate proceedings for expedited judicial intervention to appoint a temporary medical consent guardian."\textsuperscript{462} But the law restricts the guardian from withdrawing life-sustaining procedures unless specifically authorized by the court.\textsuperscript{463}

\textbf{VIII. Mechanisms Lacking Adequate Due Process}

If we cannot prevent the individual from becoming unbefriended through better capacity assessment, advance care planning, or expanded default surrogate lists, and if guardianship is not a reasonable option; then we need some mechanism by which to authorize treatment decisions.\textsuperscript{464}

Fortunately, the laboratories of the states are busy experimenting with solutions.\textsuperscript{465} Nevertheless, the dominant approach is the "solo" physician model in which the attending physician alone makes the

\textsuperscript{460} Id.
\textsuperscript{463} O.C.G.A. § 29-4-18(i) (2017).
\textsuperscript{464} This briefing does not address some related issues. First, it does not address decision-making mechanisms for special and extraordinary medical situations such as sterilization and the administration of psychotropic medication. Additional protections are usually required in such situations. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (West 2016). Second, this briefing does not address the situation in which the incapacitated unbefriended patient "objects" to treatment. Third, while this briefing focuses on healthcare decision making, such decisions are often intertwined with those concerning finances. For example, it might be necessary to authorize someone to sell a patient's property so that she or he can qualify for Medicaid and long-term care placement. Fourth, this briefing does not address the participation of the unbefriended in biomedical research.
\textsuperscript{465} Godfrey, supra note 286, at 58 ("Fourteen states have developed nine different statutory models.").
healthcare decision herself. But that approach affords little oversight and protection. Consequently, many commentators argue that more is needed. But "how much" of a second opinion is required? In this Section, I describe models which afford too little procedural due process: (a) solo physician unilateral authority, (b) second physician confirmation, (c) California interdisciplinary teams, and (d) California prison healthcare.

A. Solo Physician Unilateral Authority

There is significant disagreement about how to handle healthcare decision making for the unbefriended. But the dominant approach is for the attending physician to make the healthcare decision herself. Sometimes, this approach is explicitly authorized by state law. For example, in South Carolina, healthcare services may be provided without the consent of the patient or surrogate if, "in the reasonable judgment of the attending physician or other healthcare professional, the healthcare is necessary for the relief of suffering or restoration of"


467. I owe this phrasing to Paul McLean, vice president of the nonprofit Community Voices in Medical Ethics and blogger and social network coordinator for the affiliate Community Ethics Committee. I have recently outlined basic notions of procedural due process. Thaddeus M. Pope, Procedural Due Process and Intramural Hospital Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Texas Advance Directives Act, 10 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93 (2017) [hereinafter Pope, Procedural Due Process]. Theories of procedural fairness can also be found outside constitutional law. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS & JAMES E. SABIN, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN TO SHARE MEDICAL RESOURCES? (2002); Jocelyn Downie et al., Next Up: A Proposal for Values-Based Law Reform on Unilateral Withholding and Withdrawal of Potentially Life-Sustaining Treatment, 54(3) ALBERTA L. REV. 803 (2017).

468. See Pope, Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended, supra note 466, at 182. On the other hand, only 11 percent of respondents in a recent survey conducted by the ABA Commission on Law and Aging, the Society for Hospital Medicine, and the Society for Critical Care Medicine reported that they would "make a decision yourself, abiding by professional ethics and standards." David Godfrey, Older Adults and Healthcare Decision Making in Clinical Settings, JUSTICE IN AGING ISSUE BRIEF (Mar. 2017), at 2–3, http://www.justiceinaging.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Older-Adultsand-Health-Care-Decision-Making-in-Clinical-Settings-Issue-Brief.pdf. Nearly 50% would consult a second physician, risk management, or an ethics committee. Id. Around 40% would seek a guardian. Id.

469. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571(a) (2016). Sometimes physicians are given far narrower roles with respect to the unbefriended. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R432-31-11(3) (2017). For example, in Utah, physicians may "complete and sign new Life with Dignity Orders for individuals with prior forms who no longer have capacity to complete new orders, and who do not have a surrogate/guardian to authorize the new order." Id.
bodily function or to preserve the life, health, or bodily integrity of the patient.\textsuperscript{470} The healthcare provider is not liable for providing, in good faith, healthcare without consent unless the provision of care is negligent.\textsuperscript{471} A 2011 Missouri bill was virtually identical.\textsuperscript{472}

With respect to life-sustaining treatment, North Carolina provides: “If none of the [surrogates] is reasonably available then at the discretion of the attending physician the life-prolonging measures may be withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision of the attending physician.”\textsuperscript{473} Oregon’s law is virtually identical.\textsuperscript{474} Connecticut law oddly provides that the physician need only “consider” the patient’s wishes and need only “consult” the surrogate.\textsuperscript{475}

While only a handful of states authorize clinicians to treat without consent, some commentators have suggested including healthcare providers on the statutory priority list of authorized surrogates.\textsuperscript{476} After all, even when there is no available family member or close friend, there is almost always an available physician. Indeed, there is evidence that some patients prefer physicians over guardians as surrogate decision makers.\textsuperscript{477} In short, there is some legal authorization and even broader clinical practice of physicians making healthcare decisions for their unbefriended patients.

Nevertheless, many are uncomfortable with this status quo. Some have charged it with “unacceptable ethical arbitrariness.”\textsuperscript{478} The Institute of Medicine warns that “having a single health professional

\textsuperscript{471} S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-70(D) (2016).
\textsuperscript{473} N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (2016).
\textsuperscript{474} O.R. REV. STAT. § 127.635(3) (2016).
\textsuperscript{475} CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571(a) (2016).
\textsuperscript{477} Norris et al., supra note 165, at 2184. Many states specifically prohibit healthcare providers or employees of a facility to which a patient has been admitted from serving as a patient’s surrogate unless they are related to the patient or are a close friend whose friendship preceded the patient’s admission. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2303(h) (2016).
\textsuperscript{478} See Ozar, supra note 9. Ozar also argues that having a physician as surrogate is problematic because of the regular rotation of hospitalists, physicians who specialize in hospital-based medicine. Id. The patient needs a “longitudinal partner.” Id.
make unilateral decisions for an unbefriended patient is ethically unsatisfactory in terms of protecting patient autonomy and establishing transparency.\textsuperscript{479}

Notably, 38 states and the District of Colombia expressly prohibit a patient’s providers from serving as their own patient’s surrogate or court appointed guardian.\textsuperscript{480} Commentators have increasingly challenged the basis for this widespread prohibition.\textsuperscript{481} But its persistence is a powerful statement that public policy disfavors clinicians serving as surrogates for their patients even with their consent.

There are three main concerns. First, there are long-standing and well-grounded concerns that giving physicians unilateral authority to make treatment decisions is risky due to conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{482} When the treating physician is the decision maker, she suffers from a conflict of interest, given both her own and her facility’s financial incentives. For example, The Greater New York Hospital Association lost $13 million in nine months awaiting appointment of guardians for 400 undischarged patients.\textsuperscript{483} Similar studies across the field show that hospitals have a strong financial incentive to have an

\textsuperscript{479} Dying in America, supra note 23, at 146.


\textsuperscript{482} See Larson & Eaton, supra note 361, at 290; Who Decides?, supra note 131, at 38.

\textsuperscript{483} Winsor C. Schmidt, Public Guardianship Issues for New York: Insights from Research, 6(3) Elder L. Atty. 31 (Fall 1996); Winsor C. Schmidt, Endowed Chair and Distinguished Scholar in Urban Health Policy, Univ. of Louisville Sch. of Medicine, Presentation at Third National Guardianship Summit, slide 63 (Oct. 12, 2011). See also Winsor C. Schmidt, Development and Trends in the Status of Public Guardianship: Highlights of the 2007 National Public Guardianship Study, 33(5) Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 728 (Sept.-Oct. 2009) (reporting that Florida saved $3.9 million in health care costs in one year with appropriate public guardian services for 2,208 individuals); Pamela B. Teaster & Karen A. Roberto, Virginia Public Guardian and Conservator Programs: A Profile of Programs, Report to the Virginia Department for the Aging (2003) (finding that Virginia saved $5.6 million in health care costs with public guardian services for 85 patients); Vera Institute of Justice, Guardianship Practice: A Six-Year Perspective 7 (Dec. 2011) (reporting their New York City guardianship project saved Medicaid $2.5 million for 111 clients).
expeditious mechanism to make healthcare decisions for unbefriended patients.484

Second, when the treating physician is the decision maker, the decision may be too influenced by the physician’s own personal values and biases.485 Non-clinician surrogates regularly make decisions guided by their own values, rather than the patient’s values.486 The evidence of such physician biases is too voluminous even to digest here. Examples include the impact of the physician’s race on treatment487 and the incentive to make decisions that comport with the interests of hospital management.488 The risk is especially high, because the unbefriended—physically disabled, homeless, racial minorities—are often the targets of negative assumptions.489

Third, this “solo” decision making may result in less carefully considered treatment plans. When physicians need not reduce the result of their thought processes and justify their treatment recommendation, they may not think through the plan as carefully.490 Clinicians “will give more careful consideration . . . if they are

484. Schmidt, supra note 2, at 95–96 (collecting studies); see also Parekh & Adorno, supra note 153, at 14; MASSACHUSETTS GUARDIANSHIP POLICY INSTITUTE, 2017 REPORT 1 (2017), http://guardianship.institute/pdf/2017+Report+With+Meetings.pdf (finding public guardianship could save $10 million); Courtwright et al., supra note 143 (“Compared to the general inpatient population, a greater percentage of unrepresented patients were underinsured (15.6 per cent versus 64 per cent”); Nina Bernstein, To Collect Debts, Nursing Homes Are Seizing Control Over Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/nyregion/to-collect-debts-nursing-home-seizing-control-over-patients.html?_r=0 (reporting that nursing homes seek guardianship when the healthcare agent fails to pay).

485. See Pope, Adult Orphans and the Unbefriended, supra note 466, at 182.


490. See Pope, Procedural Due Process, supra note 467, at 140-42 (arguing that decisions are better when the decision maker must state not only the end result but also the process by which they reached it); Volpe & Steinman, supra note 11.
required to state not only the end result of their inquiry but the
process by which they reached it."

B. Second Physician Confirmation

While the solo physician approach is the most common in practice,
it is only explicitly authorized in fewer than five states. Another
approximately ten states authorize attending physicians to make
treatment decisions on behalf of the unbefriended only with some
confirmation or "double-check" on their clinical decision making.

This additional review is widely perceived as an important
safeguard. The Ethics Committee of the American Geriatrics
Society maintains that the patient’s team of treating providers should
make a decision. Second physician confirmation normally takes
one of three forms: (1) concurrence of a second physician, (2)
concurrence of an institutional committee, or (3) concurrence of an
external committee. The first model is described here, and the second
two are described in following sections.

For example, in Tennessee, if no family or close friend is
reasonably available, the treating physician is then authorized to
make medical decisions, but only after obtaining concurrence from a
second independent physician. Texas law similarly provides: "if
none of the [surrogates] is available, then treatment decisions 'must
be concurred in by another physician who is not involved in the

491. United States v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 (1964); cf. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE:
492. See e.g., Bonnie Booth, Doctor’s Request to End Patient’s Care Denied, AM. MED. NEWS (June 12,
2006); John Agar, Judge Rules Lawton Woman’s Life Must Be Preserved, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE,
25 April 2006. Several years ago, in Michigan, a physician was treating 97-year-old Hazel Wagner, a
heart attack victim with no chance of recovery. Agar, supra. The patient was screaming to the physician,
"Help me Jesus!" Id. The physician petitioned the court to end life support efforts, but the court denied
the petition. Id. The court ruled that the petition would have to come from the patient’s guardian and that
a physician’s role was not to advocate, but simply to advise. Id.
493. THE RIGHT TO DIE, supra note 34, at § 3.25[A][3][a].
494. Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, supra note 38, at 371; Farrell et al., supra note 3.
495. Ethics Committee of the Am. Geriatrics Soc’y, Making Treatment Decisions for Incapacitated
Older Adults without Advance Directives, 44(8) J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 986, 986 (1996).
496. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806(c)(5) (2016) (alternatively allowing confirmation from an
ethics committee).
treatment of the patient or who is a member of an ethics or medical committee of the healthcare facility.\textsuperscript{497}

Likewise, in North Carolina, "the patient’s attending physician, in the attending physician’s discretion, may provide healthcare treatment without the consent of the patient or other person authorized to consent for the patient if there is confirmation by a physician other than the patient’s attending physician of the patient’s condition and the necessity for treatment."\textsuperscript{498} Arizona similarly provides: "If the health care provider cannot locate any of the [surrogates], the patient’s attending physician may make health care treatment decisions for the patient after the physician consults with . . . a second physician who concurs with the physician’s decision."\textsuperscript{499}

In 2014, Louisiana proposed making the attending physician the surrogate of last resort.\textsuperscript{500} The bill provided that if no other decision maker is reasonably available, then the patient’s attending physician "shall have the discretion to provide or perform any surgical or medical treatment or procedures . . . and may also make decisions regarding continued services needed by the patient, including but not limited to approving the placement or transfer of the patient to another facility."\textsuperscript{501} But the bill would have required that "prior to taking such action, the attending physician shall obtain confirmation from another physician of the patient’s condition and the medical necessity for such action."\textsuperscript{502}

\textsuperscript{497} TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 166.039(e),166.088(f) ("If there is not a qualified relative available . . . an out-of-hospital DNR order must be concurred in by another physician who is not involved in the treatment of the patient or who is a representative of the ethics or medical committee of the health care facility in which the person is a patient.").

\textsuperscript{498} N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 90-21.13(c1) (2016).

\textsuperscript{499} ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3231(B) (2016). The statute prefers that the attending physician consult with and obtain the recommendations of an institutional ethics committee. \textit{Id.} But if this is not possible, then concurrence of second physician is sufficient. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{500} S. Res. 302, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (proposed section § 40:1299.53 (D)).

\textsuperscript{501} \textit{Id.} Similarly, Article 7 of Taiwan’s new Hospice and Palliative Care Law authorizes the palliative care team to act as sole decision makers on behalf of an incompetent, terminally ill patient’s best interests if no family member is available. Yi-Chen Su, \textit{When Ethical Reform Became Law: The Constitutional Concerns Raised by Recent Legislation in Taiwan}, 40(7) J. MED. ETHICS 484, 484 (2014).

\textsuperscript{502} S. Res. 302, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (proposed section § 40:1299.53 (D)).
Since 1993, Oregon has had a mechanism for making life-sustaining treatment decisions for the unbefriended. But it has had no mechanism for making decisions regarding major medical treatment. So, in 2011, Oregon enacted a new law permitting a hospital "to appoint a health care provider...who has received training in health care ethics." If the appointed provider is the patient's attending physician, then that individual must obtain a second opinion from another healthcare provider.

In Mississippi:

[C]onsent may be given by an owner, operator or employee of a residential long-term health-care institution at which the patient is a resident if there is no advance health-care directive to the contrary and a licensed physician who is not an owner, operator or employee of the residential long-term health-care institution at which the patient is a resident has determined that the patient is in need of health care."

But this power to consent is limited to those healthcare services determined necessary by the physician. And it does not include the power to consent to "withholding or discontinuing any life support, nutrition, hydration or other treatment, care or support."

In West Virginia, the surrogate of last resort can include "any other person or entity, including, but not limited to, public agencies, public guardians, public officials, public and private corporations and other persons or entities which the Department of Health and Human

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503. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.635(3) (West 2016) ("If none of the persons described in subsection (2) of this section is available, then life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn upon the direction and under the supervision of the attending physician.").
505. S.B. 579 § 2(a), 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011). I thank Barbara Glidwell, the longtime patient advocate at Oregon Health Sciences University, for her generous telephone interview (Sept. 27, 2011).
506. S.B. 579 § 2(a), 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2011).
508. Id.
509. Id.
Resources [DHHR] may from time to time designate." In a 2003 regulation, the DHHR designated three categories of individuals and entities as eligible surrogates for patients in DHHR facilities: (1) any organization authorized under state or federal laws, or under contract with the DHHR, to advocate for individuals in DHHR facilities; (2) any organization authorized under federal or state laws, or under contract with DHHR, to provide surrogacy, guardianship, or conservator services for persons in DHHR facilities; and (3) any DHHR employee not otherwise precluded from serving as a surrogate.511

C. California Interdisciplinary Teams

A second physician confirmation entails more robust vetting than a solo physician approach. Similarly, slightly more robust than second physician confirmation is a special decision-making mechanism for the unbefriended in California long-term care facilities. A 1992 statute authorizes these facilities to establish interdisciplinary teams (IDTs), sometimes known as Epple committees,512 to make decisions for unbefriended residents.513

An IDT must include at least two to four members: "the resident’s attending physician, a registered professional nurse with responsibility for the resident, other appropriate staff in disciplines as determined by the resident’s needs, and, where practicable, a patient representative, in accordance with applicable federal and state requirements."514

512. IDTs are sometimes known as “Epple Committees” because they are named after the California State Assemblyman, Bob Epple, who sponsored the legislation that created them. See H.D., 3209, 1991-92 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992).
IDTs are widely recognized as “the best solution to a troubling problem.” Indeed, looking to this IDT model, California considered a “surrogate committee” for other, non-long-term-care patients. But none was enacted as part of the 1999 Health Care Decisions Act. So, the IDT model is not officially available for California hospitals.

Despite two decades of apparently successful use, in 2013, California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform (CANHR) filed a lawsuit in Alameda County Superior Court challenging the constitutionality of the IDT statute. Finally, nearly two years later, in February 2015, Judge Evelio Grillo issued a tentative ruling in two parts. First, he rejected CANHR’s several claims that the IDT statute was “facially” unconstitutional, because a California appellate court had already upheld its constitutionality 20 years ago. Second, Judge Grillo asked the parties to address CANHR’s “as applied” challenges.


517. The original bill, A.B. 891 (1999) (Alquist), proposed new Probate Code sections 4720 to 4725, which would have addressed decision making for the unfriended. Indeed, the problem of the unfriended was an original and key motivation for the entire Health Care Decisions Act. But, these provisions were politically controversial. They were removed so that the rest of the bill could move forward. CAL. L. REV. COMM’N, MEMO 99-39, 1 (Oct. 6, 1999), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/1999/M99­39.pdf; CAL. L. REV. COMM’N, 2000 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS LAW AND REVISED POWER OF ATTORNEY LAW 31 (2000), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Printed-Reports/Pub208.pdf.


CANHR made three “as applied” challenges to the IDT statute. First, CANHR argued that the IDT statute is unconstitutional because there is no absolute requirement that a “patient representative” be present.521 CANHR alleged that many long-term care facilities regularly fail to include a patient representative.522 Second, CANHR contended that IDTs lack authority to prescribe anti-psychotics.523 Third, CANHR contended that IDTs lack authority to make end-of-life decisions, for example, complete a POLST or refer to hospice.524

In his tentative ruling, Judge Grillo suggested that since the IDT statute specifically requires that there be a patient representative “where practicable,” CANHR might prevail, if it can demonstrate that long-term care facilities regularly and customarily fail to include patient representatives.”525 Indeed, the leading case on the IDT statute held:

While there may be exigent circumstances in which the participation of such a representative is not practicable, due to temporary unavailability, illness, or similar causes, the Legislature clearly required the routine and ongoing participation of a patient representative in such medical care decisions to ensure that nothing is over-looked from the patient’s perspective.526

On the other hand, it is unclear who counts as a “patient representative.”527 For example, social workers often serve as advocates for patients.528 But it is unclear whether they are disqualified as “patient representatives” because they are employed by the facility.

521. Id. at 21.
522. Id. at 23.
523. Id. at 25.
524. Id. at 33.
525. Id. at 24.
Judge Grillo also indicated the need for further litigation on CANHR’s other two arguments. He suggested that IDTs may lack authority to make treatment decisions regarding either antipsychotics or end-of-life care. Judge Grillo observed that the leading case construing the IDT statute had determined that the law "by its own terms applies only to the relatively nonintrusive and routine, ongoing medical intervention, which may be afforded by physicians in nursing homes; it does not purport to grant blanket authority for more severe medical interventions.

Judge Grillo entered a final judgment in January 2016. Both parties cross-appealed the order and it remains stayed pending appeal. While a ruling for CANHR might make the process better comport with procedural due process, that would entail some serious risks. Restricting the authority of IDTs to make end-of-life decisions consigns the unbefriended to the prospect of a prolonged and potentially unnecessarily painful death. Restricting the authority of IDTs to prescribe antipsychotics leaves the unbefriended unplaceable in nursing facilities, which may result in unnecessary decompensation and hospitalization.

Pending the outcome of the litigation, the California Legislature has been considering bills that would amend the IDT statute. A 2016 bill would have required that IDTs include “independent” medical consultants and “independent” patient advocates. CANHR objected that these individuals would not be sufficiently independent since they would still be hired and “paid” by the long-term care facility.

530. Id. at 32, 40.
531. Id. at 25.
534. I thank Robert Gibson for helping me appreciate the significance of this case.
A 2017 bill would have added notice requirements to the IDT statute.\textsuperscript{536} It would have required the facility to communicate to the resident orally and in writing that: (1) the attending physician determined the resident lacks capacity, (2) the facility was unable to locate a surrogate, (3) the medical intervention recommended, (4) the role of the IDT, and (4) the right of the resident to challenge the determinations. CANHR objected that this notice comes too late. Coming after the capacity determination and IDT meeting, it "does not give the resident a reasonable opportunity to participate in the team-decision process."\textsuperscript{537}

\textit{D. California Prison Healthcare}

Just as the challenges to the IDT statute were heating up in 2015, California enacted a statute authorizing healthcare decisions for unbefriended prisoners.\textsuperscript{538} Under this law, the prison physician or dentist files a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings to request appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. But despite the procedural due process protections afforded by a formal proceeding, the law includes an odd loophole.

On the one hand, the statute provides that "an employee of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or other peace officer, shall not be appointed surrogate decisionmaker for health care for any inmate patient."\textsuperscript{539} On the other hand, the statute includes a broad exception for staff not engaged in direct care of the inmate.

The individual is a health care staff member in a managerial position and does not provide direct care to the inmate patient. A surrogate decisionmaker appointed under this subparagraph may be specified by his or her functional role at the institution, such as "Chief Physician and

\textsuperscript{539} CAL. PENAL CODE § 2604(q)(2).
Surgeon” or “Chief Medical Executive” to provide clarity as to the active decisionmaker at the institution where the inmate patient is housed, and to anticipate potential personnel changes.\(^{540}\)

This hardly seems sufficient to mitigate bias and conflict of interests that healthcare management will have with respect to inmate patients.

\textit{VIII. Mechanisms with Sufficient Due Process}

In the last section, I argued that several prominent approaches lack adequate due process: (1) solo physician unilateral authority, (2) second physician confirmation, (3) California IDT, and (4) California prison healthcare. In contrast, other approaches are sufficiently fair. These include: (a) tiered approaches correlating the amount of oversight to the gravity of the decision at hand, (b) approaches requiring ethics committee consent, (c) approaches requiring external consent, and (d) approaches for discharge and transfer.

\textit{A. Tiered Approaches Correlating Oversight to Gravity}

At first glance, New York’s 2010 Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA) looks like it authorizes the solo physician approach. But on closer examination, it becomes clear that the discretion of the attending physician narrows as the invasiveness or burden of the treatment rises.\(^{541}\) Specifically, the FHCDA divides treatment into three categories: (1) routine medical treatment, (2) major medical treatment, and (3) life-sustaining treatment.\(^{542}\)

\(^{540}\) \textit{CAL. PENAL CODE § 2604(q)(2)(B).} There is also an exception if the DOCR employee is a “family member or relative of the inmate patient.” Id. § 2604(q)(2)(A).

\(^{541}\) Varughese et al., \textit{supra} note 40, at 80.

\(^{542}\) A fourth category of medical treatment is emergency treatment. \textit{See supra} Section I.B. For decision-making purposes, some even identify a fifth category: futile treatment. \textit{See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra} note 4, at 17; \textit{also Application of Justice Health; re a Patient} (2011) 80 NSWLR 354, 354 (Austl.).
1. Routine Medical Treatment

Routine medical treatment includes those treatments, services, and procedures for which providers do not ordinarily seek specific consent. Examples of such treatment include drawing blood for tests or providing medication for high blood pressure. These interventions involve little or no risk to patients and are clearly beneficial. An attending physician is authorized to unilaterally decide about the provision of routine medical treatment for unbefriended patients.

2. Major Medical Treatment

Major medical treatment includes those treatments, services, and procedures that involve the use of general anesthesia; any significant risk to the patient; or any significant invasion of bodily integrity requiring an incision, producing significant pain, or having a significant recovery period. Examples of such treatment include lumbar puncture, colonoscopy, and hernia repair.

These types of decisions carry greater risks and burdens and incorporate important nonmedical considerations. Accordingly, the decision-making process is more extensive. First, the attending physician must consult with the staff directly responsible for the patient's care, including nurses, social workers, nurse aids. Second, the attending physician must obtain an independent concurring determination from a second physician.

543. The New York State Health Facilities Association has developed model forms that help assure compliance with the statute. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, NEW YORK'S FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT, MODEL NURSING HOME FORMS FOR THE FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT, www.nyshfa.org/files/2014/01/FHCDA_Forms2.doc.

544. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(3)(B) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 3(a)(1), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). In these cases, pursuant to its institutional policy that is not expressly authorized by Ohio law, the Cleveland Clinic also requires a “social work consultation” to locate surrogates, to assess whether guardianship is appropriate, and to confirm that the patient’s best interests are being served. Cleveland Clinic Policy on Medical Decision-Making for Patients Lacking Decision-Making Capacity Who Do Not Have a Surrogate Decision-Maker, CLEVELAND CLINIC (Apr. 20, 2009), http://my.clevelandclinic.org/Documents/Bioethics/Policy_on_Patients_without_Surrogates.pdf (hereinafter Policy on Decision-Making).


546. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(4)(B)(ii) (McKinney 2011); see also Assemb. B. 4098 § 2(b)(2), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). In facilities other than general hospitals, the medical director shall make the independent determination that the recommendation is appropriate. Assemb. B.
3. Life-sustaining Treatment

Life-sustaining treatment includes the use of any medical device or procedure to sustain a vital bodily function. Typical treatments include cardiopulmonary resuscitation, mechanical ventilation, dialysis, and clinically assisted nutrition and hydration.\(^{547}\)

Because of the life and death stakes, decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment are subject to the closest scrutiny. An attending physician may make such decisions only if she or he determines, with the concurrence of an independent physician, that the treatment either "would violate accepted medical standards" or "offers the patient no medical benefit because the patient will die imminently, even if the treatment is provided."\(^{548}\) Otherwise, withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment requires judicial approval.\(^{549}\)

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) follows a process very similar to that outlined in the New York FHCDA. For those treatments or procedures that involve minimal risk, practitioners can make a decision after attempting to explain the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment to the patient.\(^{550}\) In contrast, for procedures that require signature consent, both the attending physician and the

\(^{547}\) N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2994-a(19), 2994-g(3)(A)-(4)(A) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 1, 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011).

\(^{548}\) N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(5)(b) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 3(b)(2), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011).

\(^{549}\) N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g(5) (McKinney 2011); Assemb. B. 4098 § 3(b), 214th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2011). The Cleveland Clinic does not have a substantive rule like New York. Instead, it requires both a "concurring medical opinion" and approval of a "multidisciplinary subcommittee of the ethics committee." See Policy on Medical Decision-Making, supra note 544. Before the June 2010 enactment of the FHCDA, New York authorized attending physicians to write DNR orders for unbefriended patients when resuscitation would be medically futile. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966(1)(a) (McKinney 2010).

\(^{550}\) 38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f) (2017); VHA HANDBOOK, supra note 293, at 1004.01(14)(c). Still, treatment must not be provided indefinitely without review of the treatment plan at least every six months by the attending practitioner of record and the service chief, or designee, to ensure that clinical objectives are being met and the treatment plan is in the best interests of the patient. \textit{Id.}
chief of service or his or her designee must indicate approval of the treatment decision in writing. 551

In the VHA, as in New York, decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment require a more elaborate process. They must be reviewed by a multidisciplinary committee appointed by the facility director. 552 The committee functions as the patient’s advocate and may not include members of the treatment team. 553 The committee must submit its findings and recommendations in a written report to the chief of staff, who must note his or her approval of the report in writing. 554 After reviewing the record, the facility director may concur with the decision to withhold or withdraw life support or request further review by regional counsel. 555

A new Colorado statute also authorizes a tiered approach. 556 For routine treatments and procedures that are “low-risk and within broadly accepted standards of medical practice,” the attending physician may make health care treatment decisions. 557 For treatments that otherwise require a “written, informed consent, such as treatments involving anesthesia, treatments involving a significant risk of complication, or invasive procedures,” the attending physician shall obtain the written consent of the surrogate—another physician—and a consensus with the medical ethics committee. 558 For end-of-life treatment that is nonbeneficial and involves withholding or withdrawing specific medical treatments, the attending physician shall obtain an independent concurring opinion from a physician other than the surrogate, and obtain a consensus with the medical ethics committee. 559 In 2017, Montana enacted a virtually identical statute. 560

551. VHA HANDBOOK, supra note 293, at 1004.01(14)(c)(2).
552. Id. at 1004.01(14)(c)(3)(b).
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 1004.01(14)(c)(3)(d).
Like New York, the VHA, Colorado, and Montana, some foreign jurisdictions also follow a tiered approach. In New South Wales, for example, medical treatment for unbefriended patients may be carried out without consent so long as it is "minor."\textsuperscript{561} But for "major" treatment, consent must be obtained from a Guardianship Tribunal.\textsuperscript{562}

**B. Approaches Requiring Ethics Committees**

Whether or not authorized by law, many treatment decisions for the unbefriended are made by physicians without institutional or judicial review, and even without the concurring opinion of another physician.\textsuperscript{563} In other words, much decision making is informal and \textit{ad hoc}. As discussed above, many commentators and policy makers have expressed concern with leaving treatment decisions solely in the hands of individual physicians or other facility employees.

To address these concerns, the American Medical Association, among others, has recommended a more thorough process to better ensure accountability, objectivity, and independence. Specifically, the AMA recommended consulting "an ethics committee to aid in identifying a surrogate decision-maker or to facilitate sound decision-making."\textsuperscript{564} Below, I review the advantages of ethics committees. I then review laws both requiring and recommending ethics committee review. Finally, I look at institutional policies requiring ethics committee consent even when not legally mandated.


\textsuperscript{561} Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 37 (2)-(3) (Austl.).

\textsuperscript{562} Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW) s 36(1)(b) (Austl.).

\textsuperscript{563} See supra note 468 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{564} CODE OF MEDICAL ETICS § 8.081 (A. MED. ASS'N 2015); AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, SELECTION OF HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING SURROGATES, CEJA Report 3-A-04. The AMA recently revised its code. It now provides "Consult an ethics committee or other institutional resource when . . . no surrogate is available." CODE OF MEDICAL ETICS § 2.1.2(f) (A. MED. ASS'N 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ama-code-medical-ethics.
1. Advantages of Ethics Committees

A committee has some advantages over a single decision maker.\(^{565}\) With an individual decision maker, there is always a concern that the decision will be based upon financial incentives or upon the peculiar biases of that person.\(^{566}\) A committee, on the other hand, can better offer various perspectives and can utilize a multifaceted array of both medical and ethical considerations.\(^{567}\) A committee is more likely to view a patient as an individual, considering, in addition to the medical benefits and burdens, any known moral or personal values and the nature of a patient’s previous lifestyle.\(^{568}\) At the same time, committees provide quicker, more accessible, and more personalized decisions than the court system.

On the other hand, committees are sometimes impractical because of the necessary logistics. First, it often takes too much time: (1) to convene a committee, (2) to thoroughly evaluate patients and their treatment options, (3) to collectively deliberate, and (4) to issue a decision.

Patients in need of medical care often do not have this much time. Decisions must be made quickly. Many facilities deal with this by

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\(^{565}\) Just as a committee may offer more perspectives and greater deliberation than an individual decision maker, some jurisdictions require the involvement of additional individuals. While not authorized as surrogates, these individuals do provide some oversight of and support for those making the treatment decisions. See Karp \& Wood, *Incapacitated and Alone*, supra note 4, at 37–38. One example is the long-term care ombudsman or patient advocate. *Id.* at 35. Another is the "independent mental capacity advocate" required by the U.K. Mental Capacity Act of 2005. See Mental Capacity Act 2005, c.9 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9.


\(^{567}\) See generally Insoo Hyun et al., *When Patients Do Not Have a Proxy: A Procedure for Medical Decision Making When There is No One to Speak for the Patient*, 17(4) J. CLINICAL ETHICS 323 (2006); Moye et al., *supra* note 143.

\(^{568}\) Hyun et al., *supra* note 567, at 327–328. This article cites two case examples of patients without a surrogate. *Id.* Mr. T was an older gentleman; his physician recommended that a feeding tube be inserted, due in part to Mr. T’s poor nutrition. *Id.* A committee was convened, and after discussion with the patient and the nursing home where he had been living, the committee advised against the tube. *Id.* They noted that eating was one of his only remaining pleasures, and the life-extending benefits to Mr. T were unimpressive. *Id.* In contrast, Mr. A’s physician also recommended a feeding tube, due to Mr. A’s poor nutrition. *Id.* But Mr. A was much younger and had better prospect for an improved quality of life. Hyun et al., *supra* note 567, at 327–328. The committee noted that the feeding tube was very effective for short-term nutrition, and recommended the tube for Mr. A. *Id.* These decisions exemplify how committees can evaluate medical decisions subjectively, based on the individual characteristics of each patient, as opposed to simply the objective medical benefits. *Id.* at 328.
having treatment decisions for the unbefriended reviewed by just a subgroup, which is more easily convened.\textsuperscript{569} A second practical obstacle is that these committees are usually burdened with under-funding, understaffing, and under-trained members.

2. \textit{Laws Requiring Ethics Committee Consent}

Not only are ethics committees used in many states without any specific mandate or authority, but several states have enacted statutes allowing institutional committees to guide decision making for the unbefriended.\textsuperscript{570} The New York approach is described above. This approach is widely supported.

In Alabama, for example, decisions may be made by “a committee composed of the patient’s primary treating physician and the ethics committee of the facility where the patient is undergoing treatment or receiving care, acting unanimously.”\textsuperscript{571} If there is no ethics committee, then decisions can instead be made:

[B]y unanimous consent of a committee appointed by the chief of medical staff or chief executive officer of the facility and consisting of at least the following: (i) the primary treating physician; (ii) the chief of medical staff or his or her designee; (iii) the patient’s clergyman, if known and available, or a member of the clergy who is associated with, but not employed by or an independent contractor of the facility, or a social worker associated with but neither employed by nor an independent contractor of the facility.\textsuperscript{572}

\textsuperscript{569} See Griggins, \textit{supra} note 389, at 8.


\textsuperscript{571} ALA. CODE § 22-8A-11(d)(7) (2016). “In the event a surrogate decision is being made by an ethics committee or appointed committee of the facility where the patient is undergoing treatment or receiving care, the facility shall notify the Alabama Department of Human Resources for the purpose of allowing the department to participate in the review of the matter.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{572} \textit{Id.}
In Georgia, with respect to DNR orders, "an attending physician may issue an order not to resuscitate" for a patient, provided three conditions are satisfied. First, the physician must determine with the concurrence of a second physician, in writing in the patient's medical record, that such patient is a candidate for non-resuscitation. Second, "an ethics committee or similar panel" must concur in the opinion of the attending physician and the concurring physician that the patient is a candidate for non-resuscitation. Third, the patient must be receiving inpatient or outpatient treatment from, or is a resident of, a healthcare facility other than a hospice or a home health agency.

As discussed above, many states authorize attending physicians to make decisions regarding routine medical treatment. But safeguards typically increase proportionately with the gravity of the treatment. These safeguards often include the approval of an ethics committee. For example, in the VHA, ethics committees are utilized for decisions involving withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Such decisions by an ethics committee must be approved by a multidisciplinary committee acting as the patient's advocate.

Most recently, Colorado and Montana adopted approaches requiring ethics committee consent. Effective in late 2016, a Colorado attending physician "may designate another willing physician to make health care treatment decisions as a patient's proxy
decision-maker."⁵⁸¹ But the attending must first (1) obtain the "independent determination of the patient's lack of decisional capacity,"⁵⁸² and (2) "consult[] with and obtain[] a consensus on the proxy designation with the medical ethics committee."⁵⁸³ If the health care facility does not have a medical ethics committee, the facility can use the medical ethics committee at another health care facility."⁵⁸⁴ In 2017, Montana enacted a virtually identical statute.⁵⁸⁵

3. Laws Recommending Ethics Committee Consent

Some states prefer, but do not strictly require, ethics committee review. In Arizona, for example, an attending physician may make a treatment decision after consulting and obtaining the recommendation of an institutional ethics committee.⁵⁸⁶ But the statute recognizes that may not always be possible. If it is not possible, the statute alternatively allows a physician to make the treatment decision after consulting with and obtaining the concurrence of a second physician.⁵⁸⁷

Similarly, Arkansas provides that if none of the specified individuals eligible to act as a surrogate are reasonably available, then the "designated physician may make healthcare decisions for the principal" after she "consults with and obtains the recommendations of an institution's ethics officers."⁵⁸⁸ Alternatively, the designated physician may "obtain concurrence from a second physician" who is "not directly involved" in the patient's health care and independent of the designated physician.⁵⁸⁹

⁵⁸² COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(I)(B).
⁵⁸³ COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18.5-103(4)(c)(I)(D).
⁵⁸⁵ S.B. 92, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017). Montana also allows an advanced practice registered nurse to be a surrogate. Id.
⁵⁸⁶ ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3231(B) (2016).
⁵⁸⁷ Id.
⁵⁸⁹ Arkansas Health Care Decisions Act, 2017 Arkansas Laws Act 974. "Independent" means the second physician: (1) Does not serve in a capacity of decision making, influence, or responsibility over
Finally, even when not given a formal decision-making role, ethics committees are often given at least a consulting role in treatment decisions for the unbefriended. For example, a 2011 Oregon statute expressly provides that a healthcare facility may appoint an ethics committee to “participate in making decisions.”

4. Institutional Policies Requiring Ethics Committee Consent

In addition to these decision-making processes specifically authorized by state or federal law, it is important to note that many facilities in other U.S. states authorize institutional committees to make treatment decisions for the unbefriended even though not expressly authorized by law. Such innovation is important in the absence of explicit authorizing law. “[T]he legal risk of not pursuing a guardianship (which would provide clear legal authority for any decision made) is generally considered quite low, and the benefits of not requiring an extensive legal proceeding... quite high.”

the designated physician; and (2) Does not serve in a capacity under the authority of the designated physician’s decision making, influence, or responsibility. Id.

590. S.B. 579 § 2(b), 2011 Leg., 76th Sess. (Or. 2011).
591. Eric D. Isaacs & Robert V. Brody, The Unbefriended Adult Patient: The San Francisco General Hospital Approach to Ethical Dilemmas, 83(6) S.F. MED. 1, 25 (2010 (describing the process at San Francisco General Hospital); Who Decides?, supra note 131. This is what Karp and Wood refer to as “flying below the radar screen.” See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 38-40; Kapp, supra note 22, at 12 (noting physicians act as “de facto surrogates... covertly and with hesitation”). Isaacs and Brody argue that it is unclear that a more elaborate process does or would produce better results. Isaacs & Brody, supra. For example, judges usually follow the medical recommendation. Because the New York SDMC votes to go forward with the medical procedure in 96 percent of cases, some have observed that this review “may not substantially improve decisions.” See Miller, Coleman & Cugliari, supra note 38, at 371; In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (“Until we see evidence of some abuse by an informal forum, we believe its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.”); Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 41 (describing concerns about “the due processization of medical decision-making”); Kapp, supra note 22, at 34 (arguing that requiring legally authorized surrogates may reduce beneficent behavior on the part of facility staff who often “functioned in essence in the role of family for the resident who had no one else”). On the other hand, the prospect of accountability matters. Thaddeus M. Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: The Procedurally Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 323 (2009); Who Decides?, supra note 131.
593. Courtwright et al., supra note 143.
For example, the California Health Care Decisions Act fails to address medical decision making for the unbefriended. Nevertheless, the Santa Clara County Medical Association wanted a less cumbersome and more immediately responsive decision-making process than guardianship. So, in 2001, it developed a model policy for facilities in the county. It has since been adopted not only by institutions in Santa Clara, but also by institutions in other parts of California.

One hospital that adopted the model Santa Clara policy noted that it wanted to make “appropriate healthcare decisions” for unbefriended patients in “a timely and transparent manner.” Here, basically, is how it works. Once a patient is determined to be unbefriended, the policy calls for the physician of record to ask the chair of the ethics committee to appoint and chair a “multidisciplinary committee” to make treatment decisions. The policy recommends, but does not require, that a community member and a representative of the patient’s cultural, ethnic, or religious community serve on the committee. The attending physician is a nonvoting member of the committee. Consensus is required, and in cases of withholding and withdrawing treatment, the approval of the hospital’s medical director is also required.

C. Approaches Requiring Independent External Consent

Review by an institutional committee provides more accountability than review by an attending physician alone. But some are

594. See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 35–36. While not specifically authorized in California law, the Santa Clara policy has received judicial endorsement and deference. Id.
596. See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 35–36.
598. Id. at 2.
599. Id. at 3.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 4.
602. See Pope, supra note 591, at 321.
concerned that such a process is still too much of an "inside job." Ethics committees are, after all, primarily comprised of individuals who are economically dependent upon the facility.

Responsive to this concern, New York, Texas, and Iowa have enacted statutes that authorize extra-institutional, "external" surrogate committees to make treatment decisions for certain unbefriended persons. While the Iowa committees serve all unbefriended patients, the New York and Texas committees serve only certain current and former residents of facilities for the mentally disabled. In contrast, Florida authorizes independent social workers to make treatment decisions for any unbefriended person.

1. New York Surrogate Decision Making Committee

In 1985, the New York legislature determined that the judicial process to appoint a guardian was not meeting the needs of its mentally disabled citizens. So, it enacted legislation establishing a "statewide quasi-judicial surrogate decision-making process." At the heart of this process is the Surrogate Decision Making Committee (SDMC).

The SDMC consists of volunteers appointed by the state Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy. These volunteers

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604. See Pope, supra note 591, at 277–78. In addition, intramural mechanisms are of little use for the chronically ill who will present across multiple care settings.
605. IOWA CODE § 135.29(1) (2010); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.05(c)(i) (McKinney 2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 597.042(a) (West 1999).
606. IOWA CODE § 135.29(2); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(b) (McKinney 2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 597.001(2) (West 2015).
609. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.01 (McKinney 2009).
610. Id. § 80.05(b).
come from four distinct categories: (1) physicians, nurses, psychologists, or other healthcare professionals; (2) family or advocates of a mentally disabled person; (3) New York attorneys; and (4) other individuals with "recognized expertise" in the treatment of mentally disabled persons. 611 Sitting in panels of four, these volunteers make treatment decisions for the unbefriended patient. 612

A SDMC must first determine, through clear and convincing evidence, that a patient lacks capacity. 613 The committee then decides whether the proposed treatment is in the best interest of the patient. 614 In making its decision, the SDMC fully considers any evidence of the patient's previously expressed desires. 615 A decision by an SDMC is legally valid consent, as if the person had made a capacitated decision on her or his own behalf. 616 But, the SDMC's decision is valid only for the specifically proposed treatment presented, not for any future medical care. 617 And certain designated individuals, including staff at the patient's residential facility, may appeal the decision to court. 618 The use of SDMCs became statewide in 2001. 619

The program boasts that it is superior to judicially appointed guardians because it is inexpensive, expeditious, and ethical. 620 First, there is no cost for training or hearings. 621 There are no court costs or attorneys' fees. 622 Second, an average decision takes only 14 days,
and expedited hearings are available.\textsuperscript{623} Hearings are held statewide at the convenience of the individuals involved.\textsuperscript{624} Third, the committees utilize a person-centered approach to medical decision making.\textsuperscript{625}

In 2009, the regulations governing SDMCs were amended to conform the program to statutory amendments that expanded the jurisdiction of the program.\textsuperscript{626} SDMCs are now available to a wider range of individuals served by the New York Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. For example, individuals who receive home or community based care, or who are only provided with case management or service coordination services, are now eligible for SDMC services.\textsuperscript{627} Similarly, individuals who have been discharged from mental hygiene facilities into nursing homes or the community are now eligible to have SDMC decisions made on their behalf.\textsuperscript{628} Lastly, the SDMCs are now authorized, subject to very specific safeguards, to make decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.\textsuperscript{629}

2. Texas Mental Retardation Committees

Like New York, Texas has also implemented a surrogate decision-making committee program to make decisions on behalf of its unbefriended citizens who suffer from mental retardation and related conditions.\textsuperscript{630} The committees are appointed by the Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services and consist of three to

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{623} Pataki, \textit{supra} note 619, at 14.
    \item \textsuperscript{624} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{625} \textit{Surrogate Decision Making Committee (SDMC), EAC NETWORK}, http://eac-network.org/surrogate-decision-making-committee/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
    \item \textsuperscript{626} XXXI N.Y. Reg. 13 (Mar. 11, 2009), available at https://docs.dos.ny.gov/info/register/2009/mar11/pdfs/rules.pdf. \textit{See also} NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, \textit{SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDING THE FAMILY HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT TO INCLUDE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES AND PATIENTS IN OR TRANSFERRED FROM MENTAL HEALTH FACILITIES} (June 21, 2016).
    \item \textsuperscript{628} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{629} Id.
    \item \textsuperscript{630} TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. \S 597.042 (West 1999); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE \S\S 9.281–9.299 (2016).
\end{itemize}
five volunteers. Volunteers must attend a four-hour training. When a committee is convened, it reviews written documentation as well as oral testimony from the patient, the provider, and any other interested person. It then decides if the proposed treatment is in the best interest of the individual.

In 1999, proposed Texas legislation would have authorized similar “surrogate decision making committees” for patients in hospitals and nursing homes. The bill called for the Texas Board of Human Services to adopt rules regarding the appointment of such committees to, among other things, “ensure the independence of each committee member” and “govern the minimum number” of members. Unfortunately, the bill died in committee.

3. Iowa Office of the Substitute Decision Maker

Iowa also has external surrogate committees. But in contrast to the external committees in New York and Texas, external committees in Iowa are not limited to any specific population of unbefriended patient. Iowa law provides that individual counties may establish “local substitute medical decision-making boards.”

These boards “may act as a substitute decision maker for patients incapable of making their own medical care decisions if no other substitute decision maker is available to act.” But they may not consent to stopping life-sustaining treatment.

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633. Id.
634. Id.
636. Id.
638. IOWA CODE § 135.29(1) (2010).
639. Id. § 135.29(2).
640. Id. § 135.29(1).
641. Id. § 135.29(2).
require that local substitute medical decision-making boards include one or more members from three categories: (1) physicians, nurses, or psychologists; (2) attorneys or social workers; and (3) other individuals with "recognized expertise or interest in" the unbefriended.643

In March 2012, the Iowa Department of Public Health adopted amendments to the requirements and procedures for local substitute medical decision-making boards.644 The changes remove references to a "statewide" substitute medical decision-making board that was repealed by the legislature in 2010.645 Unfortunately, the local committees have not fared much better. Since 1989, only seven of 99 Iowa counties ever developed committees.646 While state regulations still authorize any Iowa county to establish a committee, there has not been a local committee for more than ten years.647 Consequently, 2017 legislation eliminates the authorizing statute because the program is "unfunded or outdated."648

Most recently, Iowa revived its state Office of the Substitute Decision Maker.649 First established in 2005, the OSDM is an analog of public guardianship programs in other states.650 The OSDM is available to be appointed by the court as a substitute decision maker of last resort.

4. Florida Independent Social Workers

While professional decision making for the unbefriended is usually vested primarily with physicians, it is sometimes vested with other

643. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 641-85.3(1) (2012).
645. Id. at 1.
646. Correspondence from Diana Nicholls-Blomme, Iowa Department of Public Health (May 4, 2012).
647. Id.
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clinicians, individuals, and entities. In Florida, for example, the ultimate surrogate in the default priority list is “a clinical social worker . . . selected by the provider’s bioethics committee and . . . [not] employed by the provider.” While these social workers have the authority to consent to major medical treatment, “decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures will be reviewed by the facility’s bioethics committee.” Some Florida social workers have formed companies to serve these surrogate functions.

In 2015, South Carolina considered similar legislation. Following Florida’s lead, South Carolina also proposed adding “clinical social worker” to the very end of its priority list, for those individuals without even close friends. As in Florida, such a surrogate must be selected by the healthcare facility’s bioethics committee and must not be employed by the facility. And social workers cannot make decisions to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures without review by the healthcare facility’s bioethics committee.

Relatedly, in Texas, if no other surrogate is reasonably available and willing to consent to treatment on behalf of a patient, treatment decisions may be made by “a member of the clergy.” In 2011, Texas extended this surrogate decision-making process not only to

651. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(h) (West 2016).
652. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.401(1)(h).
653. Id.
654. See Karp & Wood, supra note 107, at 150 (noting that a “burgeoning number of not-for-profit and for-profit agencies . . . has developed to serve the at-risk, ‘unbefriended’ population”). It is increasingly important to carefully examine the qualification and incentives of these and other professional guardians. Parekh & Adorno, supra note 153. I thank Carol S. Huffman, owner of a Florida-based surrogate service, Social Work Advantage, for a telephone interview (Jan. 12, 2012). They thank Ken Goodman for a telephone interview (Feb. 3, 2012).
656. Id.
657. Id.
658. Id.
patients in hospitals, nursing homes, and home care, but also to inmates in county or municipal jails. A recent report recommended using certified chaplains.

D. Discharge and Transfer Decisions

One particular challenge with unbefriended patients is authorizing discharge from an acute care hospital to some other more appropriate care setting. This challenge often goes unmet. Many of the mechanisms described above—for example, intramural ethics committees—help only when the unbefriended individual remains a patient at that same facility. But some states have addressed the discharge and transfer problem. For example, both New Jersey and Tennessee recently considered special mechanisms for this type of decision.

New Jersey proposed the creation of “transition authorization panels.” These panels would be comprised of three persons to “authorize the transition of an eligible patient from a participating hospital to a specific post-acute care provider, and to make transition-related financial arrangements.” The panel members would be drawn from three classes of persons: (1) those designated by the hospital, (2) those designated by the director of the county social

664. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 31-36A-1 to 31-36A-7 (Temporary Health Care Placement Decision Maker for an Adult).
667. Id.
services agency of the county in which the hospital is located, and (3) those designated by the State of New Jersey Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly.\textsuperscript{668}

While the New Jersey legislation failed, the Tennessee legislation succeeded. Tennessee amended its conservatorship statute to permit hospitals to petition the court to appoint an “expedited limited healthcare fiduciary” to make decisions about discharging an unbefriended patient who no longer needs hospital care.\textsuperscript{669} The authority of this “limited healthcare fiduciary” lasts for only 60 days and is for the “limited purpose of consenting to discharge, transfer, and admission and consenting to any financial arrangements or medical care necessary to affect such discharge, transfer or admission to another healthcare facility.”\textsuperscript{670}

New York, unlike New Jersey and Tennessee, has, since 2010, had an elaborate mechanism by which decisions can be made for unbefriended patients.\textsuperscript{671} But there were still some gaps. One of those is the ability of the decision maker for unbefriended patients to authorize discharge to hospice.\textsuperscript{672} The problem was that these decisions did not comfortably fall within the three then-existing statutory categories: (1) routine medical treatment, (2) major medical treatment, and (3) the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.\textsuperscript{673} Consequently, potential hospice patients could not get the type and level of care that best served their interests. They were deprived of the comfort and benefit of hospice care.\textsuperscript{674}

To fill this gap, New York legislators introduced bills in both 2014 and 2015 that would expressly create a means to elect hospice on

\textsuperscript{668} Id.
\textsuperscript{669} TENV. CODE ANN. § 34-1-133 (2016); Roche, Jr., \textit{supra} note 663.
\textsuperscript{670} TENV. CODE ANN. § 34-1-133 (2016).
\textsuperscript{672} Effiong & Harman, \textit{supra} note 671, at 747; Kirk & Dubler, \textit{supra} note 218.
\textsuperscript{673} See Karp & Wood, \textit{Incapacitated and Alone, supra} note 4, at 20.
\textsuperscript{674} Kirk & Dubler, \textit{supra} note 218.
behalf of hospice-eligible unbefriended patients. 675 Basically, the attending physician must make the recommendation in accordance with standard surrogate decision-making standards. 676 The attending physician must then obtain both a concurring opinion by another physician and approval by the facility’s ethics committee. 677 The bill passed the assembly and is now codified. 678 Many other states continue to struggle with discharges and transfers, because intramural mechanisms are insufficient.

CONCLUSION

Most authors addressing the strengths and weaknesses of existing healthcare decision-making mechanisms for the unbefriended invoke the language of balance and equilibrium. 679 Muriel Gillick, for example, writes that “a balance must be struck between the need to protect [the unbefriended] from caregiver bias and institutional self-interest, on the one hand, and a stranger’s excessive distance on the other.” 680 Diane Meier writes that the decision maker must be responsive yet independent. 681

This is an appropriate way to frame the question. On the one hand, we want a decision-making process that is accessible, quick, convenient, and cost-effective. On the other hand, we want a process that provides the important safeguards of expertise, neutrality, and careful deliberation. 682 The attending physician may be too close and the court appointed guardian may be too far. In striking the balance, we can take guidance from the sliding-scale approach taken in New York and in the VHA that provides oversight proportionate to consequences of the decision.

675. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2994-g (2016).
676. See id.
677. Id.
678. Id.
679. See, e.g., Gillick, supra note 140, at 91; Meier, supra note 566, at 376.
680. See Gillick, supra note 140, at 91.
681. Meier, supra note 566, at 376.
682. See Karp & Wood, Incapacitated and Alone, supra note 4, at 47–48; Hyun et al., supra note 567, at 5.
We must gather and review data to assess how these and other currently implemented processes are working. The status quo is unacceptable. The majority of states must legally authorize workable decision-making mechanisms. Failing that, facilities should follow the model of facilities in Santa Clara and Cleveland, and seriously consider adopting policies and processes on their own.
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