Beyond “Negotiation 2.0”: Teaching Negotiation in the Multi-Stakeholder, Multi-Level, and Multi-Processes World of Public Policy

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Editors’ Note: The authors assess the prospects for teaching public policy negotiation and mediation across Asia. They find that the doctrines they were presented with as embedded elements of teaching materials presume a number of factors that are associated strongly with Western culture, but which are hard to find in public policy dispute management in Japan, Singapore, or Korea. Yet contrary to the perhaps-expected response that the training and teachings must now be thoroughly modified to respond to the context, the authors find themselves concluding, in part at least, that their societies would benefit if targeted ways can be found to use the Western insights to help open up public policy processes in their societies.

Introduction

The Trip from Negotiation 1.0 to 2.0

Using our experience teaching public sector negotiation and mediation, we argue here that “Negotiation 2.0” is still making two naïve
assumptions that underlie “Negotiation 1.0,” namely: a) the negotiation starts when the parties first sit at the table; and b) the negotiations at the table are the most important ones.

“Negotiation 2.0” was the catchy term initially used by the Rethinking Negotiation Teaching (RNT) project to represent an effort to revitalize negotiation pedagogy by developing more nuanced tools and concepts that can apply to the various challenges faced by today’s negotiation professionals. To date, the project has looked extensively at psychological, technological, and “wicked” aspects of real-life negotiation (more about “wickedness” later). We argue, however, that these aspects, together with the complexity and uncertainty of multi-party, public sector negotiations, make it necessary for us to teach students both: a) how to negotiate the negotiation process and structure that will be used – including who will negotiate, how the negotiators communicate with interested parties not at the table, etc.; and b) how to manage a multi-party process – who may/should be at the table, away from it, or both, and who may be interacting in multiple ways, in various groupings, in multiple forums besides the visible one for which the negotiation is being designed and in which it is conducted by the facilitator or mediator.

Simply put, context – including antecedents of the situation, contemporaneous political and economic related issues, culture, and other dimensions as well as the parties not present at the table – matters! Context shapes and can be shaped before and during the official negotiations. To teach students context awareness and related negotiation skills, we need to introduce them both conceptually and experientially to complex, real-like and real-life situations, while emphasizing that no design or skill is one-size-fits all. Each negotiated decision process may require an interactive pre-negotiation, to identify and get the necessary parties to the table, negotiate (design jointly) the process those parties will follow, and obtain the support necessary to make process implementation possible and worthwhile.

To demonstrate, we will discuss in this chapter our experiences of teaching negotiation to public-sector professionals and graduate-level students, most of whom will work in the public sector. We analyze the gaps that remain unaddressed even with the innovations introduced in Negotiation 2.0. We describe some of the changes we have made in our teaching to advance and improve our pedagogy. Some of the approaches and devices we use can transfer to other fields in which negotiation is taught. Moreover, people from these other fields – lawyers, business people, mediators and other interveners – may have to take part in public disputes and need to be equipped to do so.

To begin this discussion, we briefly introduce the current journey from Negotiation 1.0 to 2.0. Then some of the gaps we believe to be
in need of attention will be described by two of the chapter authors, who have extensive experience teaching negotiation in South Korea and Japan. In the next three sections we discuss some innovative solutions, including the use of very real, complex cases analyzed over several class sessions, and then the use of real-life projects to introduce students to different aspects of convening stakeholders, including process design, which we believe to be in pressing need for a place in every classroom.

Theories of negotiation have evolved from contributions of multiple disciplines and have applied to a wide variety of fields and scales, ranging from family disputes to diplomatic negotiations. The main benefit of participating in typical negotiation seminars lies in the applicability of lessons to many different settings. Instructors often go beyond their own professional backgrounds and deliver training programs and lectures for audiences in fields different from their own. One consequence of this custom is the gradual standardization of negotiation pedagogy. In the classroom, most instructors talk about the same descriptive issues, such as the disadvantages of “lose-lose” negotiation, and offer the same prescriptions, such as distinguishing between positions and interests and focusing on the latter, and seeking mutual gains by trading among issues. Another consequence, perhaps more fraught with real risks, is that the instructors have persuaded themselves that the wisdom they are conveying is universally applicable, hence the pervasive lack of attention to context specifics and to what they might entail for these prescriptions. Our trainees can emerge ill-equipped for context awareness and lacking adaptive skills.

Even though many instructors do tailor their lectures to some extent to different audiences, the main content components and teaching materials are repeatedly used in different settings. We see this standardized training practice as the main characteristic (see Lewicki and Schneider 2010), and one of the weaknesses, of first generation of negotiation teaching, which the project editors initially called “Negotiation 1.0.”

While key principles of a de-contextualized version of negotiation pedagogy apply to many different fields and have the advantage of saving time and resources in preparing training materials, the authors of this chapter have found a need to address some issues specific to the public decisions field. We have developed and used some tools and concepts that account for the process complexity, multiple stakeholders, the intractability to be expected in values-laden disputes, and other elements of negotiation common to public affairs settings. Portions of Negotiation 1.0 – especially basic principles of integrative
negotiations some have taken to calling the *Harvard model* – stand the test of time and even “travel” well across scales, space, cultures and institutional structures. We see the challenges for Negotiation 2.0 as the sorting out and preservation of the components that travel, while innovating in the areas that need contextual adaptations, such as designing negotiation processes, adapting to cultural specifics, and crafting implementable agreements.

Before we proceed, we must introduce the public policy context and what distinguishes it from other negotiated decision contexts. Public decision situations often pose “wicked problems” and occur within complex and uncertain environments. Wicked problems have already been discussed extensively in volume two of the Rethinking Negotiation Teaching series, and several additional writings on the subject appear as chapters 17-21 in this volume. On the other hand, process and contextual complexity have received little or no attention. Some of the key dimensions of process complexity and uncertainty are:

1) numerous stakeholders with differing interests and perceptions of the shared reality, which can manifest at the table, within constituencies, and between constituencies and their representatives;

2) a mix of formal and informal deliberations and decision processes that can unfold in multiple forums over long time periods (more than a year is not unusual);

3) uncertain and contested knowledge, coming from multiple sources (technical, academic, political, and “local”) whose methods, validation, and presentation differ and whose legitimacy is often poorly understood and questioned by proponents of other knowledges (Ozawa 1991; Fuller 2011);

4) low feedback about decision consequences because they accrue slowly, at times beyond the lifetime of the decision makers (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Shmueli, Kaufman, and Ozawa 2008; Kaufman 2011); and

5) imbalance of sociopolitical power among stakeholders, especially in developing countries.

The challenges posed by the wicked and complex nature of public disputes require that mediators especially, but also negotiators, pay more than the usual attention to certain aspects of the process, including *when and how the process is convened* and negotiated, and *how communication is managed among the many parties at and away from the table during the process*. These are the two contributions to Negotiation 2.0 pedagogy that we wish to make in this chapter.
Two Contributions to Negotiation 2.0: “Convening the Table” and Managing Many Parties

Understanding the challenges and strategies for convening and for multi-party process design, we argue, is an essential set of ideas and skills for today’s students of public policy as well as law, business, and other disciplines. The Arab Spring is just one of many recent political developments that demonstrate the need for business leaders, legal experts and other stakeholders to have the capacity to engage each other to handle complex problems in the public arena that exceed the scope of problems governments can handle by themselves. Getting the parties and process “right” is a key skill for handling wicked and complex problems.

Challenges of Convening the Table

Negotiation 1.0 typically assumes (and reflects this assumption in classroom simulations) that the parties to a conflict are obvious, willing to participate, and capable of doing so. These presumptions are a luxury in the world of public affairs disputes. How do we identify the parties that should be at the table? How should we choose the stakeholders who will participate, and in what capacities (party, observer, expert, etc.)? How can we get the appropriate representatives for each stakeholding group to come to the table? How can we maintain the legitimacy of the process while doing so? These are only a fraction of the questions with which the mediators/facilitators, who design and manage such processes, have to deal.

Stakeholders, including governments and their agencies, are often reluctant to negotiate because of their previous, and often quite acrimonious, experiences with each other. They may feel that the other side is selfish, irrational, and perhaps even an enemy determined to eliminate its opponents’ way of life (Mnookin 2010). Such parties make poor negotiating partners, but they are a fact of life in the public decisions context. Therefore, we need to equip students with both awareness and some tools for contending with these challenges.

The reluctance to negotiate in the public arena increases when the parties take into account the multiple forums that they have for pursuing their interests. Public policy negotiations are necessarily embedded within a system of existing formal policy and planning processes, in which multiple venues exist for defining problems, generating solutions, and making decisions (e.g., legislatures, courtrooms, and public consultations). Parties may perceive that some or all of these are preferable to an ad-hoc forum for negotiation outside such formal venues, especially if the problem is wicked and their counterparts are seen as unreasonable.
In practice, many experts in consensus building in the field of public policy recommend investing significant time and resources in a pre-negotiation phase to get the right parties to the table, negotiating the right set of issues, in the right conditions, and at the right time. In other words, it is better to go slow in setting up the negotiation so that the group can go fast when the negotiations get underway. There is widespread agreement about the importance of preparing for negotiations and therefore of teaching students about it. Even within the Negotiation 1.0 framework, we typically teach individual preparation [e.g., figuring out interests and best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNAs)]. Negotiating the public negotiation process before engaging in it in a multi-party situation parallels the individual preparation stage, is as necessary, and is as important to teach.

One portion of the preparation to negotiate public disputes is called convening. This pre-negotiation process can be initiated by a process sponsor. (For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is a frequent convener in environmental disputes.) As in the case of individual preparation, there are tricks of the trade for public decisions. For example, to make headway in protracted, stalled conflicts, conveners may choose to involve new parties – such as engineers or business people – to change the agenda and open up new opportunities for cooperation. Conveners and managers of negotiations also need to ensure that their negotiations comply with existing laws and regulations and that there is some visible linkage between the negotiated outcome and the related policies and programs that government agencies, or occasionally other parties, choose to implement.

Public dispute resolution interveners agree that conflict assessment is a crucial step towards convening the negotiation table (Susskind and Cruikshank 2006; Kim 2007). Conflict assessments are generally conducted by an intervener who begins by identifying potential stakeholders, including both the known vocal parties and others whose interests may be affected by the decision at hand, but who have not yet manifested their interest. Then the intervener conducts a series of in-depth interviews with each party to identify their interests and willingness to participate in the proposed decision (which could be a disputed project or an initiative for change). The conveners’ preliminary analysis results in their assessment of whether the negotiation should proceed, which representatives should be at the negotiation table, what approach seems most suitable, and what logistics and resources are needed. A conflict assessment also helps the broader convening process, since the interviews (and the report of responses, shared with all interviewees) also allow the stakeholders to probe the
proposed process, influence its shape, and learn more about the intentions and competence of the conflict assessor, the process, and the convener.

**Multi-party Conflicts and Process Design**

Our second contribution revolves around the oft-unrecognized, multi-party nature of most negotiations. Negotiations are multi-party if there are more than two entities – individuals, groups, organizations – whose interests are at stake in the negotiation, whether or not they are at the table. Public affairs usually involve not only multiple negotiating stakeholders but also multiple levels within some of the parties, and several levels of negotiations. The direct negotiating parties usually represent constituencies that often comprise several organizations with similar interests. Even seemingly hierarchical organizations may have several decision-makers and factions. Some stakeholders, such as legislators, may be involved in negotiations indirectly, especially if the decision under consideration impacts their constituencies or requires a change in laws or regulations. The staffs of government agencies, while not at the table, may have to be consulted if the options being considered impact elements under their purview. Wise representatives spend as much time communicating with, and helping their constituents keep up with the negotiation as they do seeking solutions amongst themselves (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Watkins 1999; Susskind 1999).

Once convened, the public negotiation process requires careful design so that the scale (number of parties, issues, relationships, etc.) and complexity of the real world (coalitions, parties with different roles and responsibilities, involving constituencies and the broader public effectively, managing the media, etc.) are represented and managed effectively. The number of representatives may have to be limited in order to provide sufficient space for dialogue and negotiation, though some public decision processes have managed to enable meaningful dialogue with high numbers of participants. Mediators often hold meetings with those not at the table to inform them about the process’s activities and development and to discuss strategies with those representing their interests. The legitimacy of public decision processes hinges on keeping constituencies informed.

Process decisions create and distribute opportunities and burdens among the parties. Multi-party negotiations in the public sector carry a large management and adaptation burden compared to negotiations between a few private individuals or businesses. One reason is the absence of an overarching organizational structure, and of procedural rules and shared vocabularies. Although interdependent, the parties
in public disputes are often laterally rather than hierarchically related. They conduct the negotiations according to a process designed ad hoc for their particular situation, down to the selection of decision rules (e.g., whether the support of two-thirds of the participants carries a decision, or whether consensus is sought). The choice of decision rule affects the power balance among parties. For example, when the decision rule requires unanimity, some parties can log-roll (i.e., trade their yes vote with others to protect their important interests). With a majority decision rule, weaker parties have to form coalitions to advance their interests. Their ability to do so will likely depend on their own resources, as well as on whether the process encourages or impedes communication away from the table among representatives. Then unless the communication within the decision process is managed, the participants run the risk of spending more time building and maintaining coalitions (usually around a negotiated and thus inflexible position) than in understanding and defining the problem appropriately and seeking creative solutions.

Other process challenges involve managing the logistics of multi-stakeholder meetings, sustaining the participation commitment, investing genuine meaning in the representation, learning about technical issues (e.g., scientific, legal, and economic), co-constructing the information base to be used for the decisions, and helping stakeholders produce implementable decisions.

**Can/Should Negotiation 1.0 or 2.0 Training Address the Convening and Process Design Challenges?**

Conventional negotiation training programs, especially short ones, rarely articulate such procedural aspects. Reasons for this omission include the lack of time in a course with a negotiation teaching agenda that is already quite ambitious, instructors who may have mastered the theory but sometimes have no practice experience, and lack of adequate tools to enable students to practice some of these skills. Simulations typically capture the negotiation moment itself (one face-to-face round), with stakeholders and issues already identified. This is very different from real public negotiation processes. These processes involve a number of face-to-face and away-from-the-table rounds among painstakingly identified parties who develop the issue mix, the timeline, and the decision rules and logistics as part of the negotiation process. Similarly, current role-play negotiation simulations are mostly designed for few stakeholders, with roughly equal power.

Neither convening nor multi-party process design is specifically addressed in most simulation materials and case studies. Public dis-
pute simulations and cases are more difficult to design if they are to reflect even a fraction of their real complexity. (Two such simulations, *Francilienne* and *Silver County*, are described later in this chapter; see also Druckman 2006.) Therefore, fewer of these are available relative to the plethora of few-party simpler negotiations in other contexts, and very few of them model the multi-level nature of public policy negotiations. Nor do simulations address how the negotiation fits in and interacts with broader policy-making efforts. In fact, even public dispute role-plays represent an underlying assumption that most of the action occurs in a few face-to-face negotiation encounters embedded in an already designed process (see Miller and Dingwall 2006). And they also fail to provide any insights about process convening and management, since the simulated negotiation moment happens when all the necessary information has been collected and structured for the benefit of the role-playing students.

Inexperienced mediators have to develop some of the necessary convening and process management skills through trial and error, in the early years of practice as a junior facilitator or mediator, or by apprenticeship – the old-fashioned hands-on way. Negotiation 1.0 and 2.0 may be useful for some aspects of collaborative public decision processes; however, neither addresses adequately the convening challenge that precedes such dialogues. We believe that – even if these skills cannot be honed through coursework alone – we owe students at least awareness of these challenges, as well as some tools to help them acquire the skills. In the following section, we detail some of the challenges in teaching negotiation for public affairs professionals and discuss how Negotiation 2.0 could be improved to address these challenges.

**Reports From the Field of Teaching Negotiation For Public Policy Students**

We present briefly the contexts – universities and professional education in Japan, Korea, Singapore and the United States – in which the chapter’s authors teach public negotiation, and we describe some of the challenges and solutions in each context. To some extent, the similarities and differences tell of the importance of context (culture, governmental structure and institutions, etc.) not only for the negotiation process but also for its pedagogy. Our similarities and differences also point to the fact that many of the field’s insights travel well, but some do not.
Institutional Tuning is as Important as Interpersonal Negotiation Skills (Dong-Young Kim, Korea)

I have taught negotiation and dispute resolution in the public sphere for diverse groups of participants in various venues and occasions in Korea since 2006. In general, the scope and depth of the content and the pedagogical methods vary depending on the time allotted and the contexts in which the trainees will practice. I teach three regular (semester-length) graduate-level courses at the Korea Development Institute (KDI) School of Public Policy and Management: Participatory Governance, Introductory Negotiation Skills in Public Dispute Resolution, and Advanced Topics for Multiparty Negotiations.

All my courses are conducted in English to accommodate the diverse composition of the student body. Half of the students come from developing countries around the world. Most students are junior or mid-career government officials, while a few come from the private sector, including various types of industry, non-government organizations, and media companies. Occasionally, I have designed and provided, through the Center for Conflict Resolution and Negotiation at the KDI School, short-term (two- to three- day) training programs in the Korean language, mainly for Korean government officials. I also lecture in two- or three-hour special sessions within one- or two-day-long workshops for certain organizations.

I began by offering a semester-length negotiation course at KDI, in which students are introduced to the so-called Harvard model for successful negotiation, first proposed by Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton in *Getting to Yes* (1991). Students in this course learn how to conduct interest-based negotiation in order to build consensus on an agreement which is better than their BATNA and consists of one of the options they generate. They also learn how to balance value creation and value claiming through communication with other parties in ways that separate the people from the problem. They improve their negotiating skills and get to understand this prescriptive model by participating in simulation games and through the debriefings designed for specific take-home lessons. Satisfaction with this course seems very high, judging by the high evaluation scores for the course, which is very popular at my institution.

Based on communications with my students and their feedback at the end of the course, I hypothesize that their satisfaction derives mostly from their perceptions that: 1) their interpersonal skills in dealing with angry people and understanding their interests are improved and may prevent worst-case scenarios; and 2) learning methodologies are interesting and stimulating compared to other courses which are mainly in lecture format. They often report that they feel empowered when they perceive that their new skills really worked
in negotiation simulations in the classroom and in real (if relatively inconsequential) personal situations outside the classroom. However, the students’ answers to the question I pose during the final class of the course greatly intrigue me. I ask them whether they are ready to face reality in typical kinds of public disputes in Korea and their respective home countries, and to change the world. They do not answer my question positively.

The big discrepancy between the high satisfaction level and feelings of empowerment in the classroom and the lack of confidence in facing reality outside the classroom troubles me. How to make my teaching transcend the barriers between classroom-level enlightenment and genuine capacity building in reality has become my key challenge. Several reasons for the discrepancy are expressed in students’ comments and in their sharing past and current experience in real public disputes. In reality they rarely get the chance to utilize their skills to create value by inventing options together, because they are much influenced by powerful external forces they feel they cannot control.

For example, in government or public organizations in many developing countries, senior officers are not interested in negotiating or talking with citizens who are perceived as angry and “irrationally demanding,” or intent on delaying decision-making and implementation of projects or programs. The incentive system within public organizations is based on a quest for efficiency, which prompts people to go fast first in order to go faster later. This assumption, criticized as false efficiency in many advanced democracies, is not false from their perspective. They perceive other stakeholders, usually powerless citizens, or civil society, to lack the countervailing power to create uncertainties around their unilateral actions.

This perception of government immunity to public challenges stems from a lack of legal foundation which people might use to challenge or sue the government. It is also due to a lack of democratic political battlegrounds where people might shore up their power by building coalitions. In such a context, the powerful party in a conflict dismisses the potential costs of not talking with the less powerful parties. This in turn eliminates the incentives for the less powerful citizenry to come to the negotiation table – a prerequisite for any negotiation. The concept of ripeness (Zartman 2006) applies, though the society cannot wait until a powerless group can accumulate some degree of countervailing power to shake up the current power balance, which may take too long with respect to pressing decision needs.

In accounting for their perceived inadequacy to tackle public disputes, students who have been associated with civil society in develop-
ing countries also claim that negotiating with powerful governments is meaningless. Government is so powerful that their voices cannot be heard. Rather than taking an interest-based approach – sit around the table with powerful government agents and talk as partners – they see their only chance at attaining their goals in fighting physically (a power-based approach) to create tangible costs, or other negative consequences such as casualties, for the otherwise unresponsive government. For people who perceive themselves as powerless, the alternative to physical violence is accommodation: accepting the terms set by powerful parties. Then there are no overt disputes or conflicts. For example, millions of rural and indigenous people have been forced to evacuate from their hometowns to make room for the construction of large dams near their town, without any meaningful compensation from companies or governments (Schneider 2005).

Note that these assumptions offered by the students who deal with powerful and powerless groups about the barriers to effective negotiation remain at the personal discourse level. Government officials, for their part, criticize adversarial non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and belligerent residents, accusing them of being irrational, lacking civility, or not having effective negotiation and communication skills. In turn, non-governmental parties blame government officials for being hard-nosed, inflexible, and ineffective negotiators. Perhaps the solution for breaking the barriers to effective negotiation resides in building capacity at both the individual and institutional levels.

Admittedly, my classroom negotiation message about the solution – that personal-level skill sets and mindset changes can solve or prevent public disputes in Korea and other developing countries – is based on an assumption that may not correspond entirely with reality. However, I also came to understand quickly a key reason why the classroom lessons do not match serious, real situations. The classroom negotiation skills are designed to work in situations that fit the institutional, cultural and power balance context of the countries with a tradition of practicing deliberative democracy. For example, in such contexts (which are by no means perfect but much closer to the conditions required for negotiating public decisions) there exist opportunities for parties to improve their BATNAs in various ways, as we recommend in class. But this is not yet the reality of many developing countries. Teaching interpersonal negotiation skills to students who will practice their professions in such situations has inherently limited applicability.

Perhaps negotiation pedagogy should go beyond personal-level skills and should not regard the problematic contexts as set and im-
mutable. If negotiation teaching continues to ignore the real external forces or institutional settings that make students less effective negotiators, and instead keeps promising that with just their negotiating skills they can prevail under such circumstances, soon enough the students become frustrated by the discrepancy between the teaching and the harsh realities created by their interaction with unfamiliar settings they believe they cannot control. Therefore, to go beyond Negotiation 1.0 we should help students look beyond specific personal negotiating behaviors. They should seek to understand their own and the others’ behaviors. Then instead of giving up, they can try to change a context inauspicious to negotiation from the inside, as well as from the outside, through informed discourse.

For example, we might teach students about conflict management systems design (e.g., Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1988; Costantino and Merchant 1996) for the public sphere, although so far it has been applied mainly within organizations. Equipped with such knowledge, students in a public setting may reach a deeper understanding of conflict situations, with more systematic views about the relations between institutional settings, motivation, people’s behaviors and skill sets, and resources in organizations and societies. This knowledge is unlikely to go to waste even if we must warn students that as young professionals they will undoubtedly encounter difficulty in seeking to apply this knowledge in the near future, before the social context has changed.

**Teaching Innovative Policy Process in the Face of Institutional Inertia (Kenshi Baba, Japan)**

My teaching experience derives from organizing a training program of public involvement skills for professionals in charge of facility siting in electric utility companies. In Japan, we have ten electric power companies, which are quasi-monopolies in their respective regions. Electricity facility siting issues have two facets: private companies’ decision making, and public policy which affects many stakeholders. These critical issues differentiate my experience with utility industry professionals from other stories involving mostly university students in academic settings.

The training program for facility siting professionals was held in 2003. I prepared a Japanese edition of a public participation guidebook for electric facility siting issues and invited a famous lecturer from the United States who was an author of the guidebook. We designed a one-day program, with material usually delivered over three days. Therefore, the content was limited to basic components and did not have any applied components such as role plays. In their feedback
session, the training participants expressed their skepticism about the proposed participatory methods. They expressed doubts about people acting rationally and anticipated difficulties in information disclosure. They expressed their uncertainty about the ability to bring about desired outcomes. Interestingly, the negotiation literature of twenty-five years ago reports that professionals in the United States shared most of these concerns, except for the skepticism about the methodology (Ducsik 1986). Japanese professionals were very reluctant to apply the lessons learned, while the U.S. professionals were more concerned about how to apply them.

By reflecting on my hands-on experience, I have come to think that the Japanese professionals were “locked-in” to their own conventional practices of trying to persuade the local stakeholders to accept their siting proposals. For instance, they adhered to nemawashi (caucus with politically powerful individuals) and annmoku-no-ryoukai (getting implicit understandings), techniques that have long been practiced in Japan.

Far from discrediting the effectiveness of participatory negotiation processes for public decisions, my experience suggests that we have to pay attention to the cultural context in which they will be applied, including institutional structures. For instance, in Japan, the legally-mandated Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system was put in place as recently as in 1999. Even though the training participants had experience with EIAs under a Cabinet guideline, public participation had not been mandatory and information disclosure had been limited in the earlier EIA system. Such institutional arrangements allowed the siting professional to be trapped in the inertia of conventional practices.

The context is changing, however. First, the structure of Japanese rural communities has been changing. Political figures are no longer powerful enough to persuade community members through the traditional approaches. Second, newly introduced procedures require extensive public participation. For instance, the amended EIA law of 2011 requires a Strategic Environmental Assessment for major power projects. Therefore, siting professionals will inevitably be faced with the need to deal with the new context in the near future.

In such an environment, one would expect the siting professionals to see the need to explore and acquire new negotiation skills. However, they continue to adhere to seemingly obsolete and impractical negotiation tactics in the changing environment. My experience with a training session in 2003 confirms this trend.

This incongruity suggests that the conventional practice of persuading local communities is embedded in the organizational culture
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of the utilities industry. There is a strong inertia among the corporate workers to adhere to the conventional practice, rather than to try a new approach. Therefore, a new model of corporate training has to be introduced. For instance, negotiation training can be embedded in a longer-term organizational change effort, such as Kurt Lewin’s (1947) unfreeze-change-freeze steps, especially if corporate members follow particular processes despite their ineffectiveness in the current environment—which is something they may be reluctant to admit.

Teaching Stakeholder Analysis and Process Design
(Sanda Kaufman, United States)

I teach at the Levin College of Urban Affairs (Cleveland State University), which offers undergraduate and graduate degrees in public administration, public management, planning, environmental studies, and nonprofit administration. I have designed and teach the only negotiation course (offered in each of two semesters, and cross-listed for both undergraduate and master’s degree students). This course is elective for graduate students, but it is part of the core requirements for some undergraduate degrees, such as public safety. Only a small proportion of my audience, however, is “captive,” suggesting that many students recognize the professional need to acquire negotiation and conflict management skills. Usually each of my classes has a mix of students working towards all the degrees offered. I also teach an environmental dispute resolution semester-long course for environmental professionals, and several executive-style negotiation workshops in one- or three-day formats for elected officials and government agency staff from the Northeast Ohio region.

The college courses face several challenges, driven only in part by class makeup and the need to pack a great deal of information and skills practice into a single course. Chief among the challenges is the students’ acculturation (from other courses and from their public service orientation) to a perspective on public issues that makes it difficult for them to entertain perspectives different from their own. In role-plays that are the stock-in-trade of negotiation classes they have difficulty in representing credibly some of the roles (such as industry representatives, or lawyers). In debriefs, students in “bad guy” roles as they tend to define them (again, the industry reps and the lawyers) acknowledge their difficulties and the fact that they readily saw the need to concede in order to serve communities or protect the environment. In that sense, we face the same effects as when mono-cultural students are asked to represent negotiators from other (unfamiliar) cultures: what emerges in role-plays are the students’ stereotypes of these other cultures. Their skills are not advanced, and indeed their stereotypes may be reinforced.
The same professional acculturation seems to communicate rather too effectively the notion that cooperation is a virtue, rather than a conscious choice of strategy based on the specifics of a situation that has genuine alternatives. This undermines the development of persuasion skills, since they are rarely needed. In the spirit of Richard Shell (2000), I find myself too often having to remind students that agreements are not good in themselves, and can even be detrimental if they do not serve the interests of the stakeholders they represent better than the alternatives.

The challenges that I probably share with many of my colleagues who teach negotiations for public decisions relate to the scarcity of materials for effective teaching of process-related negotiation skills. Even if a few of us may have developed some helpful devices and experiences, these are not nearly as widely known and available as the usual one-shot, face-to-face, equal-power simulations we all tend to use. Granted: the single-course model may be inadequate for accommodating all that students should ideally master in order to be effective at representing stakeholders in public decisions; skills such as selecting stakeholding representatives for direct participation, negotiating the issue mix, or the effect of external events that may change the stances of participants are difficult to simulate in the classroom. Nevertheless, we are arguably shortchanging our students when we do not convey to them a full picture of the reality with which they will contend as professionals, and when we do not equip them with process design tools. Thus, despite all contextual differences among public decision settings, this view parallels the conclusion Dong-Young Kim reached based on his teaching in Korea. This is an example of principles that travel well across continents though the details of how they apply differ (and the devil is in the details!). We have made a similar claim about the negotiation principles we all teach.

The few notable exceptions to the paucity of rich, reality-like simulations illustrate well the obstacles we face in producing more of the rich materials that address process design issues. The two I present here briefly – the *Francilienne* and *Silver County* – are far from perfect, but they are helpful in representing facets of the reality of public domain negotiations we rarely capture with the more usual simulations (see also Druckman 2006).

The *Francilienne* (De Carlo 2009) is a multi-media set of materials delivered (at the time of its production) on a (rather costly) CD-ROM, containing information – in the form of numerous official documents, press and TV clips, interviews with stakeholders, news-like filmed public protests – about the site selection and other issues related to the real project to build the Francilienne peripheral highway around
Paris to alleviate traffic problems. Students are provided with various negotiation theory materials, and then are asked to study a portion of the materials, reflect, propose and discuss next steps and other negotiation issues, after which they are progressively served other chunks of the material as they occur in time. The *Francilienne* illustrates very effectively the complexity of public decisions, the diversity of perspectives driven by divergent interests, power issues, and institutional arrangements, along with the obstacles they present to negotiated agreements, the difficulties in evaluating highly technical information, aspects of the public participation process – not to mention the information overload that any stakeholder may experience in similar situations. The very fact that this simulation (in French) has not made inroads to become one of our staple classroom materials illustrates one of the key points of this chapter – that culture and institutional arrangements differ enough that the more realistic a simulation is, the less it can travel.

*Silver County* draws on many real conflicts, some played out in Colorado, which is the model (Elliott et al. 2002). It uses (fictitious) web-based press clips, agency documents, organization websites, maps and plans of an imaginary county sharing many characteristics with the real Colorado situations on which it draws. It can be used in several ways depending on instructional needs. For example, it can be delivered in installments along a semester to communicate the duration of such public decision making, the many venues in which stakeholders attempt to protect their interests, and the lack of a “script,” making it necessary to negotiate the decision process itself. It illustrates well many of the characteristics of public decisions reflected in the *Francilienne*. Students can be asked to understand and represent some of the parties, and propose a negotiation process for addressing some or all the conflicts (including population and economic growth issues, land conservation, environmental justice, industrial pollution cleanup, and protection of an endangered frog species). Since there is no classroom negotiation table, students can engage in coalition building and negotiations in different venues, including or excluding other participants. I often urge students to use their confidential role instructions in the usual (one-shot) simulations as models for how they should prepare for real negotiations. With *Silver County* they can use the available materials and assemble them in role formats, and even practice being constituents who must give instructions to their representative. This simulation too was rather labor-intensive, though perhaps less than its French counterpart.

These two examples suggest that with a different approach to simulations, we may yet bring into the classroom the reality of public
decision processes. Neither of the two directly helps teach process design, but instructors can use such materials along a semester to drive home some of the basics, certainly better than with the simulations built around one face-to-face negotiation session with pre-digested marching orders for each role.

In the environmental dispute resolution course I have used a different strategy for bringing to the classroom some of the complexities of the convening process. I have asked groups of three to four students to find local cases of environmental disputes, to conduct a stakeholder analysis using only publicly accessible information (meeting documents, websites, etc.), and to propose a process design, or critique the decision process actually used. Though this semester-long exercise lacks the reality check that would be afforded by stakeholder interviews, it does help students to confront real complexities and attempt to understand perspectives different from their own, as well as the difficulties of process design.

On a continuum of classroom experiences from the simplest role-plays to complex simulations, to documenting and analyzing real cases, to adventure learning (as described in other chapters), to practicing convening and process design in the context of real cases with real stakeholders, it seems apparent that the latter may be considered a “gold standard,” because there is no substitute for pitting students against the richness of reality. However, such experiences are not easily afforded in all situations. For example, in communities such as Northeast Ohio (with a considerably smaller population than Tokyo, Seoul or Singapore), where only a handful of stakeholding representatives are likely to take part in most public decision deliberations, sending forty students every semester to interview them would quickly give rise to stakeholder fatigue. We have the responsibility of protecting stakeholders’ limited time for meaningful participation. Soliciting interviews as practice for the students would only be possible on rare occasions. Therefore, our challenge remains to produce more of the complex simulations that are rich, realistic, and institutional context-specific, and to make them broadly available.

**Experiential Convening Training Through Practicum**
(*Masahiro Matsuura, Japan*)

The Graduate School of Public Policy (GraSPP) at the University of Tokyo was established in 2004 as a unique program for training public policy professionals. Following national educational system reforms, the school offers a new kind of master’s degree that certifies professional skills for policy-making. Its curriculum includes many practicum courses that involve students in actual policy-making efforts and develops their skills through direct experience.
While conventional negotiation training is an integral part of cultivating students’ ability to assess the situation and develop an effective negotiating strategy in the public policy field, students benefit enormously from additional training opportunities that encourage them to reflect on negotiation in the context of policy making. A number of factors, not only cultural but also institutional and legal, affect negotiation in the public policy field (Matsuura 2007). Students must acquire the practical knowledge that will help them design deliberative policy processes to negotiate effectively. Kim’s account of his students’ difficulties in applying negotiation skills to the field in developing nations supports this point.

Since 2007, I have been offering a semester-long course called “Public Policy Process Management” with two other instructors at the GraSPP. In real settings, groups of three to five students are asked to conduct a stakeholder analysis as if they were nonpartisan interveners. While the topics for their analysis are proposed by instructors, students explore the issue with real government officials or civil society activists, design interview protocols, conduct interviews, and analyze the key issues and interests of stakeholders. Each instructor is assigned to one of the student groups and provides mentoring and advice for their interviews and analysis. This is in fact a semi-simulated opportunity for the students to obtain practical skills (including ways of conducting effective interviews with real stakeholders). Our course offers a safe environment for them to engage in experiential learning.

For instance, in summer 2011 my students explored the effect of global climate change in the agriculture sector in a particular sub-region of a prefecture. The students identified the stakeholders and explored how they could design a dialogue for devising a better climate change policy in the agricultural sector. After I facilitated the development of necessary rapport between the students and a few key local government officials, students conducted interviews with farmers, seed growers, and retailers. I set up an email list for the student group in order to monitor the communication among them, as well as their correspondence with stakeholders.

The group produced a list of key stakeholders to be included in the discussion about the effect of climate change on agriculture in that particular area. Their analysis was enlightening to the community of climate change researchers; it found that most stakeholders in the agricultural sector are not much worried about global climate change. Stakeholders were concerned about short-term issues, such as the fluctuating national trade policy, the lack of successors, and the price tag of anti-climate change measures. The students presented their findings in class and in a written report. They also presented
their findings to the local farmer community, as well as to a nationally-commissioned research group exploring possible climate change adaptation policy.

This course has been popular since its start and has enrolled the maximum number of students for our supervising capacity. While I offer another semester-long Negotiation 1.0 course in a relatively conventional format, this kind of practicum has to become an integral part of training professionals under the Negotiation 2.0 pedagogy. Every professional field has its own professional norms and standards of practice, so the lessons from Negotiation 1.0 courses have to be tailored to each student’s professional setting. Students can improve their own theory-in-use by reflecting on their practice through the lens of negotiation theories. Based on my experience, however, it seems more effective for a trainer to offer a course or session in which trainees can apply their knowledge to practice, in a relatively safe setting.

**The Challenge of Convening (Boyd Fuller, Singapore)**

The class taught by Masahiro Matsuura on stakeholder analysis focuses the students on one of the key activities of convening consensus-building processes for public disputes. I focus here on convening as a whole. Convening plays an important role in bringing parties to the negotiation table in public disputes. I believe this topic has received too little attention in the Negotiation 2.0 project, given that most negotiating professionals are likely to become stakeholders in a public decision process sometime during their careers.

In my research around Asia and the United States, getting parties to the table ready, willing and able to negotiate is often one of the biggest challenges for negotiation, in many contexts. Even in the United States, with its relatively long history of public participation, negotiated rule-making, mediated settlements of environmental litigation, and other forms of public dispute resolution, parties often choose to negotiate only when they come to believe that all other options (which they tend to prefer) will fail to yield acceptable results.

In Asia, the challenges are greater, in large part because there is little experience with deliberative processes. As Dong-Young Kim reports for the Korean case and Kenshi Baba observes in the Japanese case, decision makers are often unused to, uncertain about, and reluctant to increase the involvement of non-traditional parties in decision-making. They may worry about getting attacked and losing face in front of hostile stakeholders. They may worry about the lack of expertise of some stakeholders (e.g., civil society, the public) and how that might distort policy-making. Their traditional negotiation coun-
terparts, such as domestic and international big business and other government agencies, may not want to negotiate with new partners, or change what is for them a known and often seemingly favorable agenda. They may worry about how negotiating with new players might impact their own benefits. Finally, the new parties are greater in number, unfamiliar, and sometimes positioned lower in the social hierarchy.

Accompanying the various apprehensions about negotiating public decisions, there is a cultural tendency in some Asian countries to avoid conflict and to emphasize harmony. A T-shirt that I have often seen in Malaysian tourist shops illustrates this point well. It shows the facial expressions for each mood – e.g., sad, angry, happy, etc. On the shirt, each mood is accompanied by the same happy face, to indicate how the Malaysians often hide their true feelings behind polite smiles. Stakeholders often delay discussing their disagreements openly until it very late, or even too late. When the disagreement does surface, some of the parties are still unwilling to negotiate, often because they feel injured by the other party(-ies) and believe that negotiation will yield nothing.

And yet, the pressure to involve civil society organizations and citizens in policy-making is increasing in several democratic Asian countries. The key challenge for proponents of consensus building and other forms of multi-stakeholder processes and negotiations is how to help governments and other stakeholders convene processes that not only produce effective and legitimate results but also create the skills and desire to use negotiations for addressing other issues. In this context, I see one of my roles as a teacher of negotiation and public dispute resolution at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy as preparing people to take on the task of getting the process right. The students who take my advanced negotiation course on convening and facilitating policy dialogues represent possible proponents (change agents) who are working or will work in public sector entities, and will seek to advance the use of negotiated decision processes.\textsuperscript{10}

The most applied project in my course is a policy dialogue. Students are required to convene and facilitate such a dialogue (usually no longer than one day long) involving stakeholders other than themselves on an issue around which there is noticeable debate and disagreement. During the course of the semester, students have to identify a topic and then go through the process of convening their proposed dialogue. They have to do research beforehand to identify potential stakeholders and their interests, and the issues about which they disagree. From that point on, the students usually plan and conduct a conflict assessment. The interviews they conduct help the
group learn more about the content of the disagreement, the interests of particular stakeholders, and their willingness to participate in the proposed dialogue. The interviews also help the stakeholders to learn more about the students—e.g., how serious and knowledgeable they are—as well as the proposed purpose and product of the dialogue.

As the students conduct their conflict assessment, they also discover some of the factors that can block some parties from participating or even meeting with the class representative. In one case, for example, some government stakeholders refused to talk with students because of the sensitivity of the issues, and of ongoing negotiations on the same issue taking place behind the scenes. As students work through these challenges, they can discover more about the considerations of stakeholders, how their classroom process can have real political implications, and also about some of the levers they can pull to get reluctant parties to meet them or participate.

Process design is another aspect of convening. Initial design ideas have to be shared with stakeholders during the conflict assessment interviews. As the conflict assessment concludes and the class is better informed about the issues and stakeholders, the students usually prepare a more detailed design to send with their official invitations to the potential participants.

Lastly, students need to understand and practice how to create the necessary political legitimacy and support for the dialogue. As the students discuss the proposed process with those they interview, those stakeholders often ask them what the dialogue hopes to accomplish, what agency or actor is supporting it, and whether it is linked with any official process. Devising answers for these questions and preparing them ahead of meetings with stakeholders becomes part of the students’ tool kit.

The Singaporean and Japanese cases propose teaching innovations that are similar, in that both teach, through a combination of real situations and simulated convening, the importance of the conflict assessment stage, and of understanding the interests of multiple parties before negotiation starts. In both instances, students take on the role of a process designer or process manager rather than that of a stakeholding negotiator. Both cases suggest complementing Negotiation 1.0 teaching with hands-on experience in areas that have not been effectively simulated in the classroom.
Implications of Our Experience for the Journey to Negotiation 2.0

Context Matters: Integrating Public Policy Elements in the Pedagogy
Our reports from the field converge on the need to tailor negotiation training to the public policy context. Matsuura and Fuller highlight the need to give enough attention to the difficulties of convening, which we have already discussed in the introduction of this chapter. Kim and Baba discuss the effect of institutional barriers and inertia, which together limit the application of Negotiation 1.0 in many real public policy settings. Kaufman focuses on the lack of teaching materials that orient students in the complexities of public policy disputes.

None of the authors, however, dismisses the utility of training public policy students with the conventional Negotiation 1.0 pedagogy. In fact, we all continue to teach basic negotiation courses even while we are alert to the discrepancy from the complex settings of actual public policy negotiations. What we argue for is the need to develop additional components for the Negotiation 1.0 curriculum that address unique features of negotiation and disputes in each field of practice. We also propose that far from being useful only to public policy students, public decision negotiation skills should be taught more broadly, because professionals in all fields of practice may become parties to a public decision.

Experiential Learning: Embedding Students in Real Settings
In the introduction, we stressed the significance in the public domain of the convening process in negotiation decisions. Matsuura and Fuller offer similar semester-long courses to their students at their public policy schools, in which they teach convening explicitly. The former asks his students to conduct a stakeholder analysis (i.e., assessment of issues and key stakeholders), and the latter asks them to bring actual stakeholders to the table and manage a constructive dialogue among them.

Such a course, which requires students to engage in real issues, often called a practicum, has long been in place in the public policy and planning schools. In conventional negotiation pedagogy, however, most instructors have relied on in-class simulated negotiation. As Kaufman points out, most simulation materials provide only a simplified negotiation framework, and omit the complexities with which real negotiators have to deal. Considering the complex nature of the real transactions and the difficulty of simulating them satisfactorily
for teaching purposes, it seems likely that students would learn much more from going out of the classroom and engaging in real negotiation.

At graduate schools, a practicum could be designed as an opportunity for action research. Students could identify real decision situations, involve key stakeholders, and practice their negotiation process design skills to help communities. Since the whole process could take several years, depending on the magnitude of the issue, an instructor could involve students only in some parts of the whole action research process. Professors can team up with consultants and professionals to design such a practicum. Although its application might have to be limited to full-time students rather than executive training (because of the time and resources required), a negotiation practicum could be a major contribution to the journey to Negotiation 2.0.

**Institutional Aspects: Changing the System**

Reflecting on feedback from his students, Kim discussed the difficulties of applying the lessons from Negotiation 1.0 lectures to the real situations in Korea and in certain developing countries due to power distance. A similar issue was raised by Baba’s frustrating experience with the introduction of participatory processes to the “locked-in” utility industry. Kaufman also discusses the effect of students’ professional acculturation and its effect on learning to negotiate on behalf of constituencies.

In response, Kim suggests that negotiation pedagogy should include lessons from dispute resolution systems design, and expand them to the extra-organizational domain, in order to cultivate students’ thinking in terms of systems. Baba quotes Kurt Lewin’s organizational change process as a strategy for introducing a new participatory planning process. These are areas that should probably be addressed in Negotiation 2.0. Conventional negotiation training has focused on how the self and the others can maximize their joint benefit, without addressing the specific context. The focus is on the negotiating parties, as if process and outcomes depended only on their choices. This framing of negotiation obscures the significant influence of institutions (e.g., regulations, organizations, and norms) and professional cultures on negotiation.

Negotiation 2.0 should give more attention to the interaction between the institutions and individual negotiation, and encourage students to consider how one can change the institutional structures in ways that bring about the mutual gains that have been featured in the Negotiation 1.0 framework.
Conclusion

Four of the five co-authors of this chapter practice and teach negotiations in Asian countries. There are important and real institutional, organizational, and cultural differences between the North American and the Asian settings that affect considerably how decisions are made in the public domain. These differences pose an added layer of difficulty to the teaching of public dispute negotiations.

Historically, practice, research, and teaching dispute resolution in the public sector began in the United States, where models of public conflict resolution have emerged that fit the institutional context rather well. However, there is hardly a perfect contextual match, if any, between the United States and other countries in terms of scale, of cultural, political, administrative and legal arrangements, and of processes within which public decision negotiations occur. The “American model” and its attendant simulations have traveled far and wide. Despite the fact that the chapter authors teach in very different public decision contexts, not only have they learned the same principles, but they are also using largely the same instruction materials and simulations. There are some good reasons for this: as we have rediscovered by comparing our experiences, some of the negotiation prescriptions developed in the North American context do travel very well at their most general level. For example, seeking mutually beneficial trade-offs or attending to relationships seem to have no contextual downside. Perhaps that is so partly because some stakeholders’ tendencies, such as focus on short-term individual consequences at the expense of long-term collective outcomes, seems to transcend continents. However, to become useful at the practice level, the generally valid prescriptions within the Negotiation 2.0 framework may have to be tuned to context specifics; and some locally-adapted prescriptions may have to be generated.

In the process of identifying which prescriptions are robust, which are in need of adaptation, and what new prescriptions are needed to navigate different contexts, we may discover that some of the latter may also travel well back to the United States. This kind of comparative work may be necessary for an added reason. Globalization of economies and externalities makes necessary and likely the negotiation of international agreements that require mutual understanding of differing decision contexts. Successful international negotiations (e.g., the Law of the Sea) and failed ones (e.g., the Copenhagen negotiations over climate change) suggest that while international agreements are possible, they require attention to precisely the contextual, not just cultural, differences we are highlighting here.
Notes

1 Negotiation 1.0 and 2.0 (as in the title of this chapter) refer to the different generations of negotiation pedagogy as described in earlier volumes in this series.

2 For reasons more fully described by Christopher Honeyman, James Coben, and Andrew Lee (see What Have We Learned, in this volume), the project’s early use of the computer metaphor to describe its critique and revitalization agenda was largely abandoned as the project itself matured.

3 We believe it is equally important for instructors in other fields to characterize their negotiation contexts and include in their teaching the skills necessary for those specific contexts.

4 In volume two of the RNT series, the editors and a number of chapter authors used the term “wicked” to describe problems that exhibit some combination of the following features:

- The problem is ill-defined and resists clear definition as a technical issue, because wicked problems are also social, political, and moral in nature. Each proposed definition of the problem implies a particular kind of solution which is loaded with contested values. Consequently, merely defining the problem can incite passionate conflict.

- Solutions to a wicked problem cannot be labeled good or bad; they can only be considered better or worse, good enough or not good enough. Whether a solution is good enough depends on the values and judgment of each of the parties, who will inevitably assess the problem and its potential solutions from their respective positions within the social context of the problem.

- Every wicked problem is unique and novel, because even if the technical elements appear similar from one situation to another, the social, political, and moral features are context-specific.

- A wicked problem contains an interconnected web of sub-problems; every proposed solution to part or the whole of the wicked problem will affect other problems in the web.


5 For example, Paula Garb and John Whitely (2001) describe how two warring parties in the Caucasus were able to reach agreements on how to run a hydroelectric facility that spanned the territories under their control, and allocate its benefits. Crucial to this cooperation was the presence of engineers from both sides, who helped refocus the negotiations around the practical matters of running the facility.

6 For example, a negotiation may have to comply with a “sunshine law” that requires the process to be open to some form of broader public involvement. The U.S. legislation on sunshine laws provides a useful example and can be found at http://sunshinereview.org/index.php/State_Open_Meetings_Laws (last accessed May 2, 2012). Similarly, a mediator may not be able to offer legal advice unless she has qualifications that are recognized under the law for doing so.

7 At times, the conflict assessment report can conclude that a specific situation is not ripe for tackling, is too polarized, or has a severe power imbalance, so that mediation or consensus building is unsuitable or unlikely to succeed.
8   Weaker parties can also take on facilitating roles, helping to improve communication and problem-solving while using that position to keep their interests on the agenda.
9   This example illustrates that while the specifics differ, some public decision situation characteristics are not unique to a location. Thus the same attention to short-range individual interests uncovered by the students in a Japanese prefecture trumps collective long-range interests in a Northeast Ohio watershed, preventing necessary adaptations to predicted effects of climate change. The situation characteristic that travels across the Pacific Ocean in these two examples is the underlying Commons Dilemma structure of the incentives compelling stakeholders in both cases to make choices they may live to regret.
10  The much-needed Geographic Information Systems (GIS), now standard in most planning agencies and in many other organizations making decisions with spatial consequences, is a good model for this approach of sending change agents into the real world. GIS adoption was slow as agency staffs were reluctant to train for and adopt the new (complicated) technology. Graduates of planning programs equipped with the skills became the change agents, as they increasingly demanded to use GIS at work until the practice percolated. By now, not only do most agencies use it, they have also adopted shared base maps allowing them to share necessary data.

References


